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Abstract 
Abū l-Yusr (d. 493/1100) on the Divine Attributes 
Sheridan Polinsky 
 
The problem of the divine attributes has been central to Islamic theology. In the Quran, God is 
ascribed various qualities and actions, but the nature of their relationship to Him is not 
elucidated. It has therefore been the task of theologians and other thinkers to clarify this matter in 
accordance with their conceptions of God’s unity (tawḥīd) and transcendence (tanzīh). This 
thesis examines the discourse on the divine attributes of the early Māturīdite theologian Abū l-
Yusr al-Bazdawī, whose aim is to uphold two key tenets concerning this problem: 1) the nature 
of all attributes of essence and act as eternal entities subsistent in God’s essence, primarily 
against the Mu‘tazilite rejection of this; and 2) God’s incomparability and incorporeality, mainly 
against the Karrāmites’ spatialization of Him. His reliance on both tradition and rational 
argumentation to support his views demonstrates his contribution to the emergence of 
Māturīdism and at times produces conflict in his thought as he tries to negotiate between these 
two sources of religious knowledge, resulting in nuanced and unique approaches to certain 
aspects of the topic. 
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Chapter 1: Life and Theology of Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī 
 
1.1 Life1 
1.1.1 Education, Works, and Activity 
Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Mūsā b. 
Mujāhid al-Bazdawī (hereafter Abū l-Yusr) was born in 421/1030. His surname, “al-Bazdawī”, 
derives from a fortified area known as Bazda located roughly 35 km from Nasaf (modern-day 
Qarshi, Uzbekistan) on the road to Bukhara,2 though it is not clear whether he originated from 
there or elsewhere. He appears to have first studied with his father, Abū l-Ḥasan, who he tells us 
had learned from his grandfather, ‘Abd al-Karīm (d. 390/999), a direct student of the great 
Transoxanian Ḥanafite of the previous century, Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944).3 Abū l-
Yusr explains that ‘Abd al-Karīm retrieved from al-Māturīdī the doctrines (ma‘ānī) set forth in 
the books of the Transoxanian Ḥanafites (aṣḥābinā) as well as in al-Māturīdī’s key theological 
work, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, and his exegesis of the Quran, Ta’wīlāt al-Qur’ān.4 His father’s 
 
1 For medieval and pre-modern Arab biographical sources on Abū l-Yusr’s life, see Abū Sa‘d ‘Abd al-Karīm b. 
Muḥammad b. Manṣūr al-Tamīmī al-Sam‘ānī, al-Ansāb, vol. 2 (Hyderabad: al-Fārūq al-Ḥadītha lil-Ṭabā‘a wa-l-
Nashr, 1397/1977), 201-2; Shams al-Dīn Abī ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. ‘Uthmān al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-
Islām wa-wafayāt al-mashāhīr wa-l-a‘lām, vol. 10, ed. Bithār ‘Awwād Ma‘rūf (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 
1424/2003), 746; Muḥyī l-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Naṣrallāh b. Sālim 
Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyya fī ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafiyya, vol. 4, ed. ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥulw 
(N.p.: Hujar lil-Ṭabā‘a wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzī‘ wa-l-I‘lān, 1413/1993), 98-9; Abū l-Fidā’ Zayn al-Dīn Qāsim b. 
Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, ed. Muḥammad Khayr Ramaḍān Yūsuf (N.p.: Dār al-Qalam, 1413/1992), 275; Abū l-
Ḥasanāt Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī, al-Fawā’id al-bahiyya fī tarājim al-Ḥanafiyya, ed. Muḥammad Badr 
al-Dīn Abū Firās al-Nuʻmānī (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, n.d.), 188. For modern sources, see Hellmut Ritter, 
“Philologika. XIII: Arabische Handschriften in Anatolien und İstanbul,” Oriens 2, no. 2 (Dec., 1949): 305; Hans 
Peter Linss, Probleme der islamischen Dogmatik: Das Kitāb uṣūl al-dīn des Abū ’l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī 
(Essen: Thales Verlag, 1991), 8-13; Aḥmad b. ‘Awḍallāh b. Dākhil al-Lahībī al-Ḥarbī, al-Māturīdiyya: dirāsatan 
wa-taqwīman ([Riyad]: Dār al-‘Āṣima lil-Nashr wa-l-Tawzī‘, 1413 [1992 or 3]), 115-8; ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Yāmīn b. 
Nāṣir al-Khaṭīb, introduction to Ma‘rifat al-ḥujaj al-shar‘iyya, by Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-
Bazdawī (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risāla lil-Ṭabā‘a wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzī‘, 1420/2000), 3-9; Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqā, 
“Sīrat Abī l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, mu’allif Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn,” in Uṣūl al-dīn, by Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad b. 
Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, ed. Hans Peter Linss, amended and annot. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqā (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-
Azhariyya lil-Turāth, 2002), 9-12 (a translation of most of Linss’ chapter); Éric Chaumont, introduction to Kitāb fīhi 
ma‘rifat al-ḥujaj al-shar‘iyya; Livre où repose la connaissance des preuves légales, by Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad b. 
Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, ed. Marie Bernand and Éric Chaumont (Cairo: al-Maʻhad al-ʻIlmī al-Faransī lil-Āthār al-
Sharqiyya/Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 2003), 5-8; Angelika Brodersen, Der unbekannte kalām: 
Theologische Positionen der frühen Māturīdīya am Beispiel der Attributenlehre (Munich: LIT Verlag, 2014), 26-7. 
2 al-Sam‘ānī, al-Ansāb, vol. 2, 201. 
3 Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Hans Peter Linss, amended and annot. Aḥmad 
Ḥijāzī al-Saqā (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya lil-Turāth, 2002), 14. Abū l-Yusr also mentions that he learned a 
couple of hadiths from his father. See al-Bazdawī, 159 and 162. 
4 al-Bazdawī, 14. 
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instruction thus initiated him into a strong family scholarly tradition that, as we will see below, 
continued with the following Bazdawī generation. 
Besides his father, only two of the Transoxanian scholars Abū l-Yusr received tutelage 
from can be identified: Ya‘qūb b. Yūsuf b. Muḥammad al-Sayyārī al-Nīsābūrī5 and Ismā‘īl b. 
‘Abd al-Ṣādiq (d. 494/1101).6 Little information can be gathered from Arab biographical works 
about either figure. Al-Nīsābūrī studied jurisprudence with a certain Abū Isḥāq al-Nawqadī. He 
was known as one of the most outstanding memorizers of the Quran (ḥuffāz) in Transoxania and 
participated in the transmission of at least two books. Al-Ṣādiq is described as a “god-fearing 
jurist” and a student of Abū l-Yusr’s great-grandfather, ‘Abd al-Karīm. The latter point is 
questionable since if the year given for al-Ṣādiq’s death (494/1101) is correct, he almost certainly 
was not the student of ‘Abd al-Karīm, who passed away more than a hundred years earlier in 
390/999. This inconsistency might reflect the Ḥanafite biographers’ interpretation of the Arabic 
term jadd, which could mean either grandfather or ancestor. Here, they seem to have understood 
it in the former sense when saying that al-Ṣādiq was the student of Abū l-Yusr’s jadd ‘Abd al-
Karīm. In any case, what can be established with certainty is that whether as ‘Abd al-Karīm’s 
student or Abū l-Yusr’s teacher, al-Ṣādiq appears to have had some role in the transmission of 
knowledge in the Bazdawī family. 
Certainly, this meager amount of information that can be retrieved about Abū l-Yusr’s 
education and teachers leaves much to be desired about the course of his intellectual formation. 
We can add, however, that at least in terms of theology, he appears to have engaged in some 
degree of independent study of the works of several major Muslim theologians and philosophers. 
He tells us that he examined (naẓartu) some such works and came across (wajadtu) others. These 
include the writings of the Muslim philosophers (falāsifa), such as Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (d. 
252/866) and Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfizārī (fl. mid-fourth/tenth century);7 those of the Mu‘tazilites, 
such as Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām (d. 220-30/825-35), Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī (d. 303/915-6), Abū l-
 
5 Linss, Probleme, 8. On him, see al-Sam‘ānī, al-Ansāb, vol. 7, 328-9; Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-Jawāhir, vol. 3, 641; al-
Laknawī, al-Fawā’id, 233. 
6 On him, see Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-Jawāhir, vol. 1, 416; al-Laknawī, al-Fawā’id, 46. 
7 Al-Isfizārī was in the tradition of al-Kindī, though almost nothing is known about his life. The only surviving work 
of his is a book covering twenty-eight metaphysical topics, namely, the Kitāb masā’il al-umūr al-ilāhiyya wa-hiya 
thamāniyya wa-‘ishrūn mas’ala. See Elvira Wakelnig, “Die Philosophen in der Tradition al-Kindīs: al-‘Āmirī, al-
Isfizārī, Miskawayh, as-Siğistānī, und at-Tawḥīdī,” in Islamische Philosophie im Mittelalter: Ein Handbuch, ed. 
Heidrun Eichner, Matthias Perkams, and Christian Schäfer (Darmstadt: WBG [Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft]), 
2013), 239. 
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Qāsim al-Ka‘bī (d. 319/931), and Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār (d. ca. 415/1025); and those of the 
mujassima (corporealists), such as Muḥammad b. Hayṣam (d. 419/1019).8 To be sure, he did not 
treat these writings as sources for the development of his ideas, for he found nothing impressive 
therein. The writings of the Muslim philosophers, he believed, lead to destruction and are filled 
with idolatry (shirk), even if composed under the pretext of establishing God’s unity (tawḥīd); 
those of the Mu‘tazilites give rise to doubts about and weaken one’s faith, as well as justify 
adherence to heresy; and the mujassima are simply the evilest heretics. For these reasons, he 
forbids the ownership and perusal of the works of any of these figures or their fellow school 
proponents.9  
The thought of two other Muslim scholars that Abū l-Yusr reports having been acquainted 
with, namely, ‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘īd Ibn Kullāb (d. ca. 241/855) and Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī (d. 
324/935), contributed more to his theological edification, at least on a conscious level. Although, 
as will be discussed below, Abū l-Yusr does not quite consider them Sunnites, whom he himself 
claims to represent, he estimates that their opinions and those of their followers are largely in 
harmony with Sunnite doctrines. He thus permits the ownership and perusal of their works as 
long as one understands their errors in certain matters of faith. While he admits to not having 
been in direct contact with Ibn Kullāb’s writings, he says that he came across around two hundred 
of al-Ash‘arī’s books on kalām and reports that al-Mūjiz al-Kabīr encompasses the content of all 
the others.10 
 
8 The term mujassima, which I have translated as “corporealists”, but may be more literally rendered as “those who 
make corporeal”, was applied by Muslim scholars to figures and groups they believed conceive of God as a body, 
even if their notions of “body” did not necessarily involve physicality. See W. Montgomery Watt, The Formative 
Period of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), 247-8. Ibn Hayṣam was a Karrāmite 
scholar responsible for the transformation of his group’s teachings in the fourth/tenth century. See Ulrich Rudolph, 
al-Māturīdī und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand (Leiden; New York; Köln: E.J. Brill, 1997), 87; Ulrich 
Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the Development of Sunnī Theology in Samarqand, tr. Rodrigo Adem (Leiden; Boston: 
Brill, 2015), 80. For Abū l-Yusr, the mujassima include, in addition to Ibn Hayṣam, the respective followers of three 
figures: Muḥammad b. Karrām (d. ca. 255/868), Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 150/767), and Hishām b. al-Ḥakam (d. 
179-99/795-815). See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 258-9. Although he does not call them mujassima, he also attributes the 
view that God is a body to the Jews. See al-Bazdawī, 33. See also Chapter 5 of this thesis where these attributions are 
discussed in more detail. 
9 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 13. 
10 Wa-qad wajadtu li-Abī l-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī kutuban wa-ghayrahu fī hādhā l-fann mina l-‘ilm, wa-hiya qarīb min 
mi’ātay kitāb; wa-l-Mūjiz al-Kabīr ya’tī ‘alā ‘āmma mā fī jamī‘ kutubihi. I read ghayrahu as wafīra (many) since if 
it were to refer to kutub, it should be ghayrahā with the feminine object pronoun. It seems unlikely that Abū l-Yusr 
had access to and read through all of these writings; thus, perhaps anna should be inserted between wajadtu and li so 
that his statement reads, “I found that Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī has many books in this field; that is, around two 
hundred.” See al-Bazdawī, 14 and 250. Al-Mūjiz al-Kabīr has yet to be recovered. The Ash‘arite Ibn ‘Asākir (d. 
571/1176), who simply calls it al-Mūjiz, explains that it consisted of twelve volumes arranged according to the 
subject matter of the views of al-Ash‘arī’s Muslim and non-Muslim opponents. This seems to validate Abū l-Yusr’s 
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Despite Abū l-Yusr’s strong acquaintance with Islamic theology and philosophy, they 
were not his main areas of concentration. Only one of his nine known works, Uṣūl al-dīn, deals 
with theology; the rest have to do with jurisprudence.11 Among these, only two have been 
published, namely, the Kitāb fīhi ma‘rifat al-ḥujaj al-shar‘iyya,12 which focuses on legal theory 
(uṣūl al-fiqh), and a treatise on determining the qibla, which has been translated and analyzed by 
David A. King.13 The others are: al-Muraṭṭab, a commentary on the al-Jāmi‘ al-ṣaghīr of the 
early Ḥanafite jurist Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Shaybānī (d. 189/804); al-Wāqi‘āt, about legal cases 
(wāqi‘āt); and al-Mabsūṭ, about legal rules (furū‘). In his K. fīhi ma‘rifa, Abū l-Yusr twice refers 
to his book al-Ghinā’,14 as well as vaguely to a “brief, abridged book” (kitāb ṣaghīr mukhtaṣar) 
and a “medium-sized book” (kitāb wasaṭ),15 both on legal theory. Additionally, one of his most 
prominent students, Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar al-Nasafī (d. 537/1142), averred, hyperbolically, that “the 
East and West are filled with his writings in theory (uṣūl) and practice (furū‘)”.16 However, 
whether this implies that the number of his works is more than nine and, if so, how much more, is 
unclear. 
Besides writing, Abū l-Yusr engaged in other professional activities. In 481/1088, he was 
appointed as a judge (qāḍī) in Samarqand,17 where he speaks of having witnessed the invasion of 
the Saljuk sultan Malik Shāh I (r. 465-85/1072-92; d. 485/1092) during the same year.18 He says 
that he came to Samarqand in 473/1080-1,19 but it appears that he may have alternated between 
 
claim about it. See Abū l-Qāsim ‘Alī b. al-Ḥasan b. Hibatallāh b. ‘Asākir, Tabyīn kadhib al-muftarī fīmā nusiba ilā-l-
Imām Abī l-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī and Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Qudsī (Damascus: Maṭba‘at 
al-Tawfīq, 1347 [1928]), 129. Of course, Abū l-Yusr was also well aware of the theological writings of his fellow 
Transoxanian Ḥanafites and those of al-Māturīdī. His perspective on some of these works are discussed below. For a 
full list of the sources Abū l-Yusr cites in Uṣūl al-dīn, including on theology, Quranic exegesis, hadith, and 
jurisprudence, see Linss, Probleme, 18-20. 
11 Linss, 12 and 12n26.  
12 Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, Kitāb fīhi ma‘rifat al-ḥujaj al-shar‘iyya; Livre où repose la 
connaissance des preuves légales, ed. Marie Bernand and Éric Chaumont (Cairo: al-Maʻhad al-ʻIlmī al-Faransī lil-
Āthār al-Sharqiyya/Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 2003). 
13 David A. King, “Al-Bazdawī on the Qibla in Early Islamic Transoxania,” Journal for the History of Arabic 
Science / Majallat Tārīkh al-ʿUlūm al-ʿArabīyah 7 (Jan., 1983): 3–38 
14 al-Bazdawī, 31 and 49. 
15 al-Bazdawī, 3. 
16 Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-Jawāhir, vol. 4, 99; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 275. Uṣūl and furū‘ might also be 
translated as “theology” and “jurisprudence”, respectively. In any case, it is clear that Abū l-Yusr’s legal writings 
were influential amongst subsequent jurists. In the introduction to his edition of K. fīhi ma‘rifa, ‘Abd al-Qādir al-
Khaṭīb mentions fifteen, mostly Ḥanafite legal works in which Abū l-Yusr’s legal opinions are cited. See al-Khaṭīb, 
introduction to Ma‘rifat al-ḥujaj al-shar‘iyya, 10-2. 
17 Linss, Probleme, 11. 
18 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 265.  
19 King, “Al-Bazdawī on the Qibla,” 9. 
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there and Bukhara since he reports having been in the latter city in 478/1085-6,20 where, in 
addition to being one of the most skilled disputers, he taught jurisprudence and dictated his 
teachings and hadiths at a madrasa known as al-Dār al-Jūzjāniyya,21 presumably named after Abū 
Sulaymān al-Juzjānī (d. after 200/815)22 or his student and al-Māturīdī’s teacher, Abū Bakr al-
Juzjānī.23 It was also in Bukhara that Abū l-Yusr passed away on 9 Rajab 493/May 20, 1100 at 
roughly seventy years of age. 
1.1.2 Family and Students 
With this scanty amount of information available about the life of Abū l-Yusr, we can 
only draw up a rough portrait of this scholar’s life and accomplishments. It is therefore helpful to 
briefly survey some of the prominent members of his family and his notable students to better 
understand his background, significance, and legacy.  
With respect to his family, we have already mentioned his great-grandfather ‘Abd al-
Karīm. Little more can be said about him since neither the Ḥanafite biographers who mention 
him24 nor Abū l-Yusr attribute any works or particular teachings to him. His prime significance 
thus appears to lie in his role as a student of al-Māturīdī and transmitter of his doctrines, even if 
only or primarily through the Bazdawī family. This, of course, was no small feat, since it 
contributed not only to the erudition of his descendant Abū l-Yusr, but also to that of the latter’s 
brother, Abū l-‘Usr ‘Alī (d. 482/1089). Abū l-‘Usr was considerably more prolific than Abū l-
Yusr. He authored an eleven-volume al-Mabsūṭ;25 two commentaries, one on al-Shaybānī’s al-
Jāmi‘ al-kabīr and the other on his al-Jāmi‘ al-ṣaghīr;26 and the Kanz al-wuṣūl ilā ma‘rifat al-
uṣūl, a handbook of Ḥanafite legal theory that quickly became a classic in the field of 
jurisprudence together with ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Aḥmad al-Bukhārī’s (d. 730/1330) extensive 
commentary.27 Ḥanafite biographers offer us little other information about Abū l-‘Usr, though the 
 
20 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 261. 
21 al-Sam‘ānī, al-Ansāb, vol. 2, 202; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh, vol. 10, 746; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 275. 
22 On him, see al-Laknawī, al-Fawā’id, 216. 
23 On him, see al-Laknawī, 14. For the place of each Juzjānī in the lines of theological transmission amongst the 
Eastern Ḥanafites up to the time of al-Māturīdī and his students, see Rudolph, al-Māturīdī und die sunnitische 
Theologie, 161; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the Development, 147.  
24 Ibn Abī l-Wafā‘, al-Jawāhir, vol. 2, 458; al-Laknawī, al-Fawā’id, 101. On him, see also Rudolph, al-Māturīdī und 
die sunnitische Theologie, 157-9; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the Development, 144-6. 
25 Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-Jawāhir, vol. 2, 595; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 206. 
26 Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-Jawāhir, vol. 2, 595; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 206. 
27 Chaumont, introduction to Kitāb fīhī ma‘rifa, 5. Kanz al-wuṣūl is likely the work of Abū l-‘Usr that both Ibn Abī l-
Wafā’ and Ibn Quṭlūbughā ambiguously refer to as “a well-known book” on legal theory. See Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-
Jawāhir, vol. 2, 595; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 206. 
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fact that his coffin was brought to Samarqand and buried at the gate of a mosque28 indicates the 
standing he enjoyed in his society. He evidently passed on his intellectual passion to his son, Abū 
Thābit al-Ḥasan (d. 557/1161-2), who, being about twelve years old at the time of his father’s 
death, was brought to Bukhara, where he was raised and educated by Abū l-Yusr together with 
the latter’s son, Abū Ma‘ālī (d. 542/1147).29 Both of these young Bazdawī boys would eventually 
become distinguished figures in their own right. Like his father, Abū Ma‘ālī was appointed as a 
judge in Bukhara and for a time dictated his teachings there.30 He also taught hadith in Baghdad 
and, on his way to perform the hajj, stopped in Merw, where he likewise served as a judge; upon 
returning from the pilgrimage, he died in Sarakhs.31 Abū Thābit, then in Merw, assumed his 
cousin’s position as a judge in Bukhara for a while before retiring to Bazda, where he eventually 
died in 557/1161-2.32 
The passing of Abū Thābit appears to have brought that of the Bazdawī scholarly tradition 
as well; no other representative can be identified after him.33 But their influence continued 
through their writings and students. With respect to Abū l-Yusr, the most distinguished of his 
pupils was undoubtedly the abovementioned Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar al-Nasafī. Although Abū Ḥafṣ 
claims to have had more than 500 teachers and devoted one book to listing them (i.e., Ta‘dād 
shuyūkh ‘Umar),34 the following comment he made about Abū l-Yusr implies that he had a 
special reverence for him: “He was the master of our companions in Transoxania. He was 
absolutely the ‘imam of the imams’, the one to whom many flocked (al-mawfūd ilayhi) from 
distant lands.”35 Nonetheless, in seeking knowledge, Abū Ḥafṣ traveled beyond Transoxania to 
Baghdad and Mecca, during the course of which he met up with the famous grammarian and 
Mu‘tazilite exegete, Abū l-Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144).36 In total, Abū Ḥafṣ is thought 
to have composed around 100 works.37 The twelve of these mentioned by Brockelmann cover a 
wide range of topics, including jurisprudence, theology, Quranic exegesis, and history.38 The 
 
28 Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-Jawāhir, vol. 2, 594. 
29 Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, 76; Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, vol. 4, 407. 
30 Ibn Abī l-Wafa’, vol. 1, 309. 
31 al-Sam‘ānī, al-Ansāb, vol. 2, 202; Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-Jawāhir, vol. 1, 309.  
32 Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, vol. 2, 76. 
33 Linss, Probleme, 6-7. 
34 al-Ḥarbī, al-Māturīdiyya, 121; Brodersen, Der unbekannte kalām, 34. 
35 Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-Jawāhir, vol. 4, 99.  
36 Brodersen, Der unbekannte kalām, 33-4. 
37 al-Ḥarbī, al-Māturīdiyya, 121; Brodersen, Der unbekannte kalām, 34.  
38 Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1937), 758-62; Carl Brockelmann, 
History of the Arabic Written Tradition, vol. 1, tr. Joep Lameer (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2016), 478-80. 
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most popular and influential of his writings is without doubt his Māturīdīte creed known as al-
‘Aqā’id al-Nasafiyya (or simply al-‘Aqā’id). It helped ensure the preservation and development 
of al-Māturīdī’s teachings and has been commented on by a number of scholars, the most 
important of whom is Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1410).39 In 1590, it was translated into 
Malay, making it, according to Sayed Naquib al-Attas, the oldest known Malay manuscript.40 
Although the creed essentially consists of a collection of phrases taken from his teacher 
Abū l-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī’s (d. 508/1114) Tamhīd li-qawā‘id al-tawḥīd,41 Abū l-Yusr’s influence on 
Abū Ḥafṣ reveals itself in the latter’s Sufi heresiography. Nine of the eleven deviant Sufi sects as 
well as the one righteous Sufi sect identified by Abū Ḥafṣ are also found in Abū l-Yusr’s Sufi 
heresiography (contained in his Uṣūl al-dīn) with the same or similar descriptions. In fact, apart 
from adding two sects, Abū Ḥafṣ lists them in almost exactly the same order as Abū l-Yusr.42 
Abū Ḥafṣ’ treatise was eventually twice reproduced, nearly verbatim, for opposite purposes, first 
by the Shi‘ite scholar Muḥammad al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī (d. 1104/1692) to refute Sufism, and then by 
the Turkish Sufi and scholar İbrahim Hakkı Erzurumi (d. 1194/1780) to defend it.43 If only 
indirectly, then, Abū Ḥafṣ contributed to the influence of Abū l-Yusr’s scholarship long after his 
death. 
Two other students of Abū l-Yusr less important than Abū Ḥafṣ but nonetheless worthy of 
mention are ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Ṣabbāghī and Aḥmad al-Khulmī (d. 547/1152). Al-Ṣabbāghī 
authored a commentary on Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Qudūrī’s (d. 428/1037) famous Ḥanafite legal 
handbook, Mukhtaṣar, as well as possibly Ṭilbat al-ṭalaba, a book about Ḥanafite legal 
terminology that has also been attributed to Abū Ḥafṣ.44 Al-Khulmī studied with Abū l-Yusr in 
Bukhara and occasionally even stood in for him as a judge.45 The extent of his literary production 
 
39 Brodersen, Der unbekannte kalām, 35. 
40 See his The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript: A 16th Century Malay Translation of the 'Aqā'id of al-Nasafī 
(Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 1988). 
41 Rudolph, al-Māturīdī und die sunnitische Theologie, 279n88; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the Development, 252n85. 
42 In the published edition of the treatise, the Mutakāsila come immediately before the Mutajāhila, whereas in Uṣūl 
al-dīn, they come immediately after them. However, as the editor of the treatise, ‘Alī Akbar Diyā’ī, points out, Abū 
Ḥafṣ should have put them in the opposite order since they are listed that way in the introduction to the published 
edition as well as in another manuscript of the treatise. Hence, it is likely that the sequences of the two 
heresiographies were originally the same. See Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī, Risāla fī bayān madhāhib 
al-taṣawwuf, ed. ‘Alī Akbar Diyā’ī, al-Turāth al-‘Arabī 12, no. 46 (1412/1992): 133–41 and 141n51; al-Bazdawī, 
Uṣūl, 259-62. 
43 See Hamid Algar, “Impostors, Antinomians, and Pseudo-Sufis: Cataloguing the Miscreants,” Journal of Islamic 
Studies 29, no. 1 (2018): 36-8 and 44-6, https://doi.org/10.1093/jis/etx063. 
44 Linss, Probleme, 12-3. 
45 Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, al-Jawāhir, vol. 1, 259. 
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is not clear, but a certain Abū Sa‘d recounts having met him in Balkh and received from him a 
large, multi-volume book comprising the dictations of three scholars, including Abū l-Yusr, 
whom he studied with in Bukhara.46 
1.2 Theological Affiliation and Approach 
1.2.1 Ḥanafite Theology and Māturīdīsm 
Abū l-Yusr is recognized today as a Māturīdīte theologian. To understand the meaning of 
this title as well as his place in and contribution to Māturīdīsm, some background on the 
emergence and development of this theological school is necessary.  
The seed of Māturīdīsm was planted in Iraq with the theological teachings of the famous 
scholar Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767). These teachings have come down to us in primary form via two 
brief epistles attributed to him. The first epistle,47 which is widely believed to be authentic, 
primarily concerns the subject of belief and sin. He aligns himself with the Murji’ites by 
distinguishing between faith and deeds, meaning that the latter, whether good or bad, cannot alter 
the degree of the former. The second epistle,48 the authenticity of which is more doubtful, yet 
plausible, centers around the issue of free will and determinism; specifically, Abū Ḥanīfa aims to 
establish a mediate position between the conflicting extremes that total power over human action 
belongs to either human beings or God.49 
Abū Ḥanīfa’s Murji’ite leanings detectable in the first epistle ensured the development of 
a theological tradition in his name. This development did not take place in Iraq due to the 
Murji’ites’ rapid decline there during the second/eighth century; instead, it occurred in 
Northeastern Iran and Transoxania where this group enjoyed considerable success. Out of 
admiration of Abū Ḥanīfa for accepting at least some of their opinions, Murji’ite scholars from 
those regions traveled to Kufa to study with him before returning to their homelands with some 
of his other teachings. Two of these figures, Abū Muqātil al-Samarqandī (d. 208/823) and Abū 
Muṭī‘ al-Balkhī (d. 199/814), are worth mentioning here, for they each left behind an important 
 
46 Ibn Abī l-Wafā’, 259. 
47 Abū Ḥanīfa, “Risāla ilā ‘Uthmān al-Battī,” in al-‘Ālim wa-l-muta‘allim, by Abū Muqātil al-Samarqandī, ed. 
Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī (Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Anwār, 1368/1949), 34-8. For a German translation of the 
epistle, see Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Eine Geschichte des 
religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, vol. 5 (Berlin; New York: W. de Gruyter, 1991-1997), 24-9.  
48 See the German translation of it in van Ess, 34-5. 
49 For this paragraph, see Ulrich Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition and Māturīdism,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2-4, DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696703.013.023.  
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treatise aimed at propagating their master’s theology. Abū Muqātil wrote al-‘Ālim wa-l-
muta‘allim50, which takes up the questions covered in Abū Ḥanīfa’s first epistle but is more 
extensive, nuanced, and argumentative towards opponents. The al-Fiqh al-absaṭ51 of Abū Muṭī‘ 
elaborates on the subjects treated in both of Abū Ḥanīfa’s epistles, especially free will and 
determinism, and discusses some matters new to Ḥanafite theology, such as the principle of 
commanding right and forbidding wrong (al-amr bi-l-ma‘rūf wa-l-nahy ‘ani l-munkar).52 
The efforts of such scholars as Abū Muqātil and Abū Muṭī‘ to transmit and build on Abū 
Hanifa’s theology soon paid off. By the close of the second/eighth century, Northeastern Iran and 
Transoxania had become the new center of Ḥanafite theology. At the turn of the fourth/tenth 
century, this theological tradition was embraced by the Sāmānid governors of Khurasan and 
Transoxania. One of these governors commissioned a Ḥanafite scholar by the name of al-Ḥakīm 
al-Samarqandī (d. 342/953) to write a summary of the Ḥanafite principles of faith. He produced 
the Kitāb al-Sawād al-a‘ẓam ‘alā madhhab al-Imām Abī Ḥanīfa53 which, enumerating the 
various beliefs found in the abovementioned texts in creedal form, served as a strong, clear, and 
accessible expression of mainstream Eastern Ḥanafite theology.54 The enduring popularity of the 
creed amongst subsequent generations of Eastern Ḥanafites is attested by, among other things, 
the fact that it was translated into Persian mere decades after its composition and repeatedly 
reprinted in the Islamic East into Ottoman times.55 
However acclaimed the K. al-Sawād al-a‘ẓam was as an articulation of Ḥanafite doctrine, 
it was not finally definitive, for active at the same time and in the same milieu as al-Ḥakīm al-
Samarqandī was none other than al-Māturīdī. His theological masterpiece, K. al-Tawḥīd, stood 
out from the works of his Ḥanafite predecessors in two major ways. First, he described and 
refuted the opinions of a host of theological opponents, primarily other Muslim thinkers, such as 
the Mu‘tazilite Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Ka‘bī (d. 319/931) and the Ismā‘īlite Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad al-Nasafī (d. 332/942), but also Christians; Jews; dualists, such as Zoroastrians and 
 
50 Ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī (Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Anwār, 1368/1949), 8-32. 
51 In al-‘Ālim wa-l-muta‘allim, by al-Samarqandī, 39-60. An unpublished English translation of this text is available 
online. See Abū Muṭī‘ al-Balkhī, al-Fiqh al-absat, tr. Muhammad Huzaifah ibn Adam aal-Ebrahim, Internet 
Archive, last modified July 1, 2017, https://archive.org/stream/AlFiqhAlAbsat_201707/Al-Fiqh%20Al-
Absat_djvu.txt.  
52 For this paragraph, see Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition,” 5-6. 
53 Published under the title al-Sawād al-a‘ẓam fī l-kalām ([Istanbul]: Maṭba‘at Ibrāhīm, n.d.) 
54 For what has thus far been mentioned in this paragraph, see Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition,” 5-7. 
55 Rudolph, al-Māturīdī und die sunnitische Theologie, 108-9 and 109n74; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the 
Development, 100-1 and 101n71. 
 
 
10 
 
Manichaens; the Hellenistic philosophical tradition; and disparate groups, such as the Sabeans 
and Sumāniyya (i.e., Buddhists). Second, he structured it more or less according to the standard 
organization of kalām works developed by the Mu‘tazilites in the early third/ninth century. This 
means that he not only engaged issues long central to Eastern Ḥanafite theology, such as sin and 
belief or freedom and determinism, but also expounded on problems hardly or not at all touched 
on by earlier Eastern Ḥanafites, such as the divine attributes and the creation and physical 
constitution of the world. In other words, al-Māturīdī was interested not only in presenting and 
defending well-established Eastern Ḥanafite convictions, but also in truly practicing speculative 
theology. As a result, he became largely responsible for introducing kalām into Transoxanian 
theology.56 
In spite of its sophistication and comprehensiveness, the K. al-Tawḥīd was, unlike al-
Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī’s creed, little recognized at first. With few exceptions, most notably al-
Māturīdī’s student Abū Salama al-Samarqandī, who wrote a kind of summary of the text,57 most 
Transoxanian scholars continued to follow the traditional approach of the K. al-Sawād al-a‘ẓam 
and earlier Ḥanafite works. Indeed, they even neglected to mention al-Māturīdī or his K. al-
Tawḥīd. This situation only began to change roughly a century and a half after al-Māturīdī’s 
death with the theological productions of two authors, our Abū l-Yusr and his more 
(theologically) prolific contemporary Abū l-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1114). Each scholar 
followed the kalām style of the K. al-Tawḥīd and, moreover, praised it and its author. Abū l-Yusr 
tells us that al-Māturīdī is “among the leaders of the Sunnites” and a “worker of miracles”, 
miracles related to him by his father, who learned of them from his grandfather ‘Abd al-Karīm, a 
direct student of al-Māturīdī as noted above. As for the K. al-Tawḥīd, if not for being a bit 
obscure, prolix, and poorly arranged, it would be satisfactory.58 Abū l-Mu‘īn’s praise for the 
Samarqandi master is far more extensive and lavish: “If amongst them [the Eastern Ḥanafites] 
there was only Imam Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī—who plunged into the seas of knowledge and 
extracted their pearls, and established the proofs of religion so that it was graced with his 
eloquence, abundance of knowledge, and excellence of natural disposition…that would be 
 
56 For this paragraph, see in particular Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition,” 10. See also Rudolph, al-Māturīdī 
und die sunnitische Theologie, 349-52; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the Development, 313-5; Claude Gilliot, “La 
théologie musulmane en Asie Centrale et au Khorasan,” Arabica 49, no. 2 (2002): 156 and 158. 
57 Jumal min uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Ilhām Qāsimī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2015). 
58 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 14. 
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enough.”59 He proceeds to list a number of al-Māturīdī’s works, beginning with K. al-Tawḥīd, 
and concludes that whoever surveys them will know that God endowed their author with 
miracles, gifts of grace, and guidance, since normally the religious and philosophical knowledge 
that he held alone is not possessed by many scholars altogether.60  
The question is why two generations of Transoxanian scholars remained largely silent 
over al-Māturīdī’s accomplishments until Abū l-Yusr and Abū l-Mu‘īn suddenly took note of 
them. Ultimately, this change was due to the rise of a new theological challenge in the form of 
the Ash‘arites, who established a center in Nishapur at the end of the fourth/tenth century.61 The 
Ash‘arites and Transoxanian Ḥanafites disagreed, as we shall see, on several points, but 
especially the nature of God’s attributes of act (ṣifāt al-fi‘l), which were discussed through a 
focus on one in particular, that of creation. In the view of the Ash‘arites, God does not possess an 
eternal attribute of creation; rather, this attribute, which is merely a description of God’s act of 
creation, becomes applicable to Him when He creates something. In contrast, the Ḥanafites hold 
that God’s attribute of creation is an eternal entity subsisting in His essence, so that God has 
always been a creator, even though the objects of His creation have not always existed.62 By the 
end of the fifth/eleventh century, when Abū l-Yusr and Abū l-Mu‘īn were composing their 
theological works, this dispute had become particularly intense, as the Ash‘arites of Nishapur 
attacked the Ḥanafites’ view and disparaged them for espousing it.63 In response, both Abū l-
Yusr and Abū l-Mu‘īn explicitly appealed to the authority of al-Māturīdī and his defence of the 
Ḥanafite position. Abū l-Mu‘īn’s comments cited above are a part of one of his arguments in 
favour of the Ḥanafite opinion in which he lists all the Transoxanian and Khurasanian leaders of 
Abū Ḥanīfa’s followers, from the time of Abū Ḥanīfa himself down to the end of the fourth/tenth 
century, and claims that they held the same views on God’s attributes as he himself holds.64 Abū 
 
59 Abū l-Mu‘īn Maymūn al-Nasafī, Tabṣirat al-adilla fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Muḥammad al-Anwār Ḥāmid ‘Īsā (Cairo: al-
Maktaba al-Azhariyya lil-Turāth, 2011), 556. 
60 al-Nasafī, Tabṣira, 556-7. For this paragraph, see in particular Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition,” 12-4; 
Ulrich Rudolph, “Das Entstehen der Māturīdīya,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 147 
(1997): 397-402. See also Gilliot, “La théologie musulmane,” 159-60. 
61 Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition,” 13-4; Rudolph, “Das Entstehen,” 398-402; Gilliot, “La théologie 
musulmane,” 159-60. 
62 See Chapter 2 of this thesis for the distinction between God’s attributes of essence (ṣifāt al-dhāt) and attributes of 
act as well as Chapter 4 for more details about the attributes of act, the dispute surrounding them, and Abū l-Yusr’s 
discussion of them. 
63 Gilliot, “La théologie musulmane,” 160. 
64 al-Nasafī, Tabṣira, 551-9; Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition,” 14; Rudolph, “Das Entstehen,” 401. 
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l-Yusr states that al-Māturīdī confirmed (ṣaḥḥaḥa) the Ḥanafite doctrine and points out that he 
was earlier than al-Ash‘arī.65 
With the next generation of Transoxanian theologians, beginning around the turn of the 
sixth/twelfth century, Māturīdīsm fully sprouted. They composed several kalām works and creeds 
setting forth the doctrines of their school; although they continued to think of themselves as the 
“followers of Abū Ḥanīfa” (aṣḥāb Abī Ḥanīfa), they were in fact closer to being those of al-
Māturīdī and his later followers like Abū l-Yusr and Abū l-Mu‘īn.66 Meanwhile, the Turks ruling 
over large swaths of territory in Central Asia had come to accept Māturīdīte doctrine.67 When 
they began their expansion into the central Islamic world in the middle of the fifth/eleventh 
century, they brought that theology with them, ensuring its spread throughout western Persia, 
Iraq, Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt.68 Many Transoxanian and other Eastern Ḥanafite scholars 
resettled and taught in these areas between the late fifth/eleventh and eighth/fourteenth centuries, 
so that Māturīdīsm eventually became dominant amongst Ḥanafites everywhere.69 In a 
remarkable twist of fate, then, the theology that Transoxanian scholars such as Abū Muqātil and 
Abū Muṭī‘ had traveled to Kufa to retrieve from Abū Ḥanīfa back in the second/eighth century 
underwent a long and transformational period of development only to be transported back to the 
land from which it originated and beyond. 
1.2.2 Abū l-Yusr as a Proponent of Sunnism 
Clearly, Abū l-Yusr played a key role in the formation of a school of fundamental 
importance in the history of Islamic theology. He adopted al-Māturīdī’s method and style at a 
time when few of his fellow Transoxanian Ḥanafites had done so, thereby contributing to the 
emergence of Māturīdīsm in the next generation. He was not, of course, aware of the nature or 
extent of his participation in this process. Rather, he had his own perspective on his tradition and 
 
65 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 77; Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition,” 13; Rudolph, “Das Entstehen,” 400; Gilliot, “La 
théologie musulmane,” 160. 
66 Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition,” 15. They did not perceive their custom of calling themselves as such 
problematic, because they considered al-Māturīdī to be merely a representative of Transoxanian Ḥanafism. Al-
Māturīdī’s case thus differs from that of al-Ash‘arī who was more readily acknowledged as the founder of a new 
school because of his abandonment of Mu‘tazilism and rejection by the Ḥanbalite traditionalists whose theology he 
claimed to be defending. See Wilferd Madelung, “The Spread of Māturīdism and the Turks,” in Actas do IV 
Congresso de Estudos Arabes e Islamicos, Coimbra-Lisboa 1968 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), 123; EI², s.v. 
“Māturīdiyya.” 
67 Madelung, “The Spread,” 117-8. 
68 Madelung, “Māturīdiyya,” 847. 
69 Madelung, “Māturīdiyya,” 847. 
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his place therein that corresponds only in a few instances to the development of Ḥanafism and 
Māturīdīsm outlined above but is nevertheless worth surveying to better understand his 
positionality and, later, his discussion of the divine attributes. 
To begin with, Abū l-Yusr defined himself not as a Māturīdīte70 or even Ḥanafite, but 
rather as a representative of the Sunnites (ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamā‘a). He believed that his Sunnite 
theological position was shared with a total of six groups and one individual: the jurists 
(fuqahā’), Quran reciters (qurrā’), Sufis, traditionists (aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth), the Prophet’s 
Companions and Successors, and the Prophet himself. Obviously missing from this list are the 
Ash‘arites, the group usually recognized as the other main proponent of Sunnite kalām. Abū l-
Yusr indeed recognizes that al-Ash‘arī and his followers claim to be Sunnites, but he deems them 
to fall somewhat short of earning the title because of al-Ash‘arī’s errant opinions on certain 
issues. In addition to his misconception of the nature of God’s attributes of act, he also believes 
al-Ash‘arī to espouse incorrect views about God’s attitude toward disobedience (‘iṣyān) and 
infidelity (kufr), the nature of faith, and one’s state (happy or miserable) as determined by one’s 
faith or lack thereof.71 
What makes the true Sunnites worthy of the name is, in Abū l-Yusr’s view, their 
emulation of the custom (sunna) of the Prophet, Companions, Successors, and the pious 
(ṣāliḥūn), as evinced by two proofs. First,72 Quranic verses and hadiths reveal that they share the 
theological positions of these four on different issues, such as God’s attributes, predestination 
(qadar), the vision of God in the afterlife (ru’yat Allāh), and the Prophet’s intercession for 
believers on the Day of Judgment (shafā‘a). Furthermore, the Quran indicates that the early pious 
folk (māḍiyūn) did not contradict the sacred text in calling the Muslim community to act in 
accordance with it. Abū l-Yusr’s point here seems to be that since they emulate the early pious 
folk, the Sunnites’ theological opinions are thus also not at variance with the Quran. The second 
proof73 is that Sunnite doctrine constitutes a “middle way” (wasaṭ mina l-madhāhib) as 
demonstrated by its adoption of mediate positions between two extremes on at least four issues: 
 
70 A title that in fact only appears to have become common in the eighth/fourteenth century with al-Taftazānī. See 
Madelung, “Māturīdiyya,” 847. 
71 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 250 and 252-3. For Abū l-Mu‘īn’s attitude toward the Ash‘arites, see Wilferd Madelung, “Abū 
l-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī and Ash‘arī Theology,” in Studies in Medieval Muslim Thought and History, ed. Sabine Schmidtke 
(Farnham, England: Ashgate Variorum, 2013), 318-30 
72 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 244-5. 
73 al-Bazdawī, 135 and 244-5. 
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the divine attributes, the attribution of responsibility for human actions (i.e., to God and/or 
humans), the fate of the grave sinner in the afterlife, and the status of the Companions. Although 
Abū l-Yusr does not elaborate, he seems to be implying that the Prophet, Companions, 
Successors, and the pious after them also espoused a middle way in theology. Indeed, he explains 
that rational beings (‘uqalā’) choose the most moderate thing (awsaṭ al-ashyā’), including in 
attire, food, drink, and personal qualities (khiṣāl), such as courage. For instance, ‘Umar b. al-
Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644) exhibited this tendency in his order to the Companion Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī 
(d. 42-53/662-73): “Be strong without brutality, gentle without weakness.”74 Therefore, while for 
Abū l-Yusr being a Sunnite means abiding by the custom of the Prophet, Companions, 
Successors, and early pious Muslim community in theological matters, it is also rational to do so 
because it is the way of moderation. 
In declaring Abū Ḥanīfa the leader of the Sunnites, Abū l-Yusr is right in line with his 
Ḥanafite predecessors. He makes this clear in the very first chapter of Uṣūl al-dīn: “We follow 
Abū Ḥanīfa, for he is our leader and exemplar in theology (uṣūl) and jurisprudence (furū‘).”75 He 
later expresses this in even stronger words when discussing one of the topics concerning human 
action: “Abū Ḥanīfa is a leader in this and every [other] matter for the Sunnites; indeed, the entire 
body of Sunnite doctrine has been transmitted by Abū Ḥanīfa.”76 However, this is, to some 
degree, rhetoric designed to demonstrate respect for Abū Ḥanīfa as an illustrious forebear since 
Abū l-Yusr rejects his distinction between the meanings of the terms mashī’a and irāda.77 The 
same can be said of his remark about al-Māturīdī’s K. al-Tawḥīd being adequate apart from 
aspects of its style since he also disagrees with al-Māturīdī on a number of issues, such as al-
Māturīdī’s belief in the obligation of human beings to believe in and thank God before the 
coming of prophets,78 denial of God’s primordial covenant with humankind (mīthāq),79 and 
theory about sensible bodies being made up of “natures” (ṭabā’i‘), which Abū l-Yusr rejects in 
favour of an atomistic conception.80 
 
74 al-Bazdawī, 244. 
75 al-Bazdawī, 16. 
76 al-Bazdawī, 120. 
77 al-Bazdawī, 52-3. For Abū Ḥanīfa, mashī’a means “will” and irāda means “desire”, whereas for Abū l-Yusr and 
the majority of Ḥanafites, they both signify “will”. See al-Bazdawī, 52-3. See also Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
78 al-Bazdawī, 214. 
79 al-Bazdawī, 218. 
80 al-Bazdawī, 24; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī und die sunnitische Theologie, 285-6; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the 
Development, 257-8; Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition,” 14. 
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Abū l-Yusr thus had a firm conception of the theological tradition to which he belonged 
and its main authorities as well as, to some extent at least, his freedom to define his own stance 
within it. But he was also aware of the distinct contribution that he could make to it. He found not 
only the K. al-Tawḥīd inadequate, but also the kalām works of the Samarqand scholars more 
generally.81 His purpose in writing Uṣūl al-dīn was to address these shortcomings: “I thus 
decided to write an abridged, elucidatory book in accordance with Sunnite doctrine in order that 
they [the Sunnites] would not stray from the earnest way and deviate from guidance. One who 
keeps to what I set forth in this book is on the way of the Sunnites, which is the way of the 
Prophet, Companions and the pious after them.”82 
I noted above the significance of this project for the formation of Māturīdīsm, but it may 
be even better appreciated after hearing what Abū l-Yusr has to say about the poor standing of 
kalām in his region (fī diyārinā) during his age. He tells us that the majority of jurists and imams 
there prevented people from studying it in public and from teaching and debating in it.83 Scholars 
mostly concentrated on jurisprudence and blamed, despised, and forsook those who delved into 
kalām.84 He is likely referring to the intellectual environment of Bukhara since he seems to have 
spent a considerable portion of his life there and because the scholars of that city are known to 
have exhibited anti-rationalist tendencies in theology, in contrast to the more rationalist scholars 
of Samarqand.85 This divergence in approach is reflected in their positions on several issues. One 
is the anthropomorphic expressions about God in the Quran and hadiths, such as His “sitting” 
(e.g., 20:5) or “hand” (e.g., 48:10) and “eyes” (e.g., 52:48). According to Abū l-Yusr’s 
contemporary, Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī (fl. second half of 5th/11th century), the early Bukharans 
(mutaqaddimūna min mashā’ikh Bukhārā) insisted that such expressions must be thought to be 
describing attributes, the modality of which should not be speculated on (bi-lā kayfa), whereas 
the Samarqandis permitted interpreting them (yajūzu an-yata’awwala l-mutashābih).86 Another, 
apparently more provocative question they disputed was whether faith (īmān) is created or 
 
81 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 14. 
82 al-Bazdawī, 14.  
83 al-Bazdawī, 15. 
84 al-Bazdawī, 264. 
85 Madelung, “The Spread,” 117n30. 
86 Abū Shakūr Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Sayyid b. Shu‘ayb al-Sālimī, Kitāb al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd wa-huwa 
hidāya li-kull mustarshid wa-rashīd, in Zwischen Māturīdīya und Aš‘arīya: Abū Šakūr as-Sālimī und sein Tamhīd fī 
bayān at-tauḥīd, by Angelika Brodersen (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press LLC, 2018), 135-6. 
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uncreated.87 The Samarqandis were unanimously of the view that it is created and deemed one 
who believed the opposite to be ignorant. The Bukharans, in contrast, agreed that it is uncreated 
and prohibited praying behind one who claimed the opposite; the scholars of Farghana adopted 
the Bukharan stance and went a step further in sanctioning their opponents by forbidding one not 
only to declare faith to be created, but even to remain undecided about its status.88 
This conflict over theological approaches appears to have impacted the development of 
Abū l-Yusr’s own method and ideas in Uṣūl al-dīn. On the one hand, he is firm in his 
endorsement of kalām for certain purposes.89 He believes it is obligatory for one to learn and 
teach kalām if one has difficulty comprehending some theological issues and a simple declaration 
about them by an imam without a supporting rational proof does not help him. Furthermore, 
when a dhimmi seeks rational proofs for theological doctrines in order to convert to Islam, it is 
necessary to provide him with them. Therefore, studying kalām is permissible (mubāḥ) and 
indeed a collective duty (farḍ kifāya); that is, a duty that only a certain number of individuals 
within the community are required to fulfill.90 The only condition is that the aspiring kalām 
student must not learn from just anybody, but rather one who is known to be a Sunnite and is 
both a specialist and counted among the “leaders of religion” (a’immat al-dīn) in kalām.  
Judging by his own remarks, Abū l-Yusr was certainly qualified to be such a teacher. He 
tells us that he has a great deal of knowledge in the science that not just anybody can attain to, 
and that even if the most talented heretics were to gather together and debate him, he would 
prevail.91 He further claims to have baffled many of the most eminent Ash‘arites with his 
 
87 See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 158. 
88 al-Bazdawī, 158. According to Abū l-Yusr, Bukhara had not always been a hotbed of traditionalist theology. 
Around the end of the Sāmānid period (i.e., close of the fourth/tenth century), it had in fact become a center for the 
rationalist Mu‘tazilites and Qadarites. This changed through the efforts of a Sunnite teacher of the vizier, the latter 
having otherwise favored these two groups. Positioning the vizier behind a curtain in the governing palace, the 
teacher first brought in a group of Sunnite imams and asked them whether a ruler should be deposed when he 
oppresses, commits adultery, drinks alcohol, and follows young male servants while he is aware that these actions 
are forbidden. They replied that he should not be removed from power but rather repent from such disobedience. The 
teacher then sent out the Sunnite imams and invited in Mu’tazilite and Qadarite ones. He asked them roughly the 
same set of questions and they responded that the ruler should indeed be removed from power. Having heard all this, 
the vizier ordered the Mu‘tazilites and Qadarites to be rounded up and subdued, and he set about extirpating them 
until “there did not remain in Bukhara an eye that blinked” that did not belong to a Ḥanafite. See al-Bazdawī, 197. If 
true, this story might help explain the anti-rationalist zeal of the Bukharan scholars in Abū l-Yusr’s time, less than a 
century after this alleged event. 
89 See al-Bazdawī, 16. 
90 In contrast to an individual duty (farḍ ‘ayn), such as ritual prayer or fasting, the execution of which is incumbent 
on each person. On both terms, see EI², s.v. “Farḍ.”  
91 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 264. 
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arguments against their view of the relationship between God’s attribute of creation and the 
created being,92 as well as a kalām expert passing through Bukhara for business with his 
challenge to the expert’s rejection of the possibility of seeing God in the afterlife.93 
On the other hand, Abū l-Yusr at times reveals himself to be allied with or at least 
sympathetic towards the anti-rationalist scholars of his region. He defends the Bukharan 
doctrines that faith is uncreated94 and that nothing is incumbent upon human beings before the 
missions of prophets;95 while he interprets anthropomorphic expressions about divine actions 
figuratively, he considers the hand(s), eye(s), and face ascribed to God in the Quran to be 
attributes.96 And although he vehemently rejects the view, which he attributes to a group of 
traditionists (ahl al-ḥadīth) and a Sufi faction, that the letters (ḥurūf) of the Quran are uncreated, 
he recognizes that a part of the reason they claim so is their worry that ordinary Muslims would 
be unable to distinguish between these letters and God’s speech, so that in holding them to be 
created, they would also think that God’s speech is created. He thus permits teaching ordinary 
people that the Quranic letters are uncreated if they cannot differentiate between such letters and 
God’s speech, though they should also be ordered to believe that God’s speech is uncreated.97 
Ultimately, a key concern behind Abū l-Yusr’s formulation of his theology is to maintain 
the integrity and dominance of the group he defined as the Sunnites. He can thus both be an avid 
practitioner of kalām and appreciate the opposition towards it of many of his fellow Transoxanian 
scholars: their intention—“may God love them”—is only to strengthen the Sunnites in order to 
prevent the rise of heretics in the area, for persons of little understanding may not be able to 
comprehend the rational proofs used by the Sunnites to support their views and thus end up 
espousing heretical opinions.98 His interest in protecting that which he believed to be orthodox 
appears to have been just as strong when it came to legal matters. He famously declared that it 
was forbidden for a Ḥanafite to follow a Ṣhāfi‘ite in prayer on the basis of a report from Abū 
Ḥanīfa that raising one’s hands before and after the bowing of the head (rukū‘) invalidates one’s 
 
92 al-Bazdawī, 264. 
93 al-Bazdawī, 92. 
94 al-Bazdawī, 158-9. 
95 al-Bazdawī, 214-7. 
96 al-Bazdawī, 37-9 and 251. See also Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
97 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 69-70. See also Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
98 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 264. 
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prayer; although some Ḥanafites accepted Abū l-Yusr’s ruling, many others discounted it.99 
Therefore, Abū l-Yusr was a scholar committed to defending the beliefs and practices of his party 
against the opposing ones of outsiders. While he was ready to allow for certain disagreements 
within his party, he was careful to draw and maintain clear lines between it and those who stood 
beyond it.  
1.3 Uṣūl al-dīn 
1.3.1 Authorship 
In spite of having thus far treated Abū l-Yusr as the author of Uṣūl al-dīn, it must be 
noted that, in recent years, his authorship of the text has been questioned. Hans Peter Linss 
completed his edition of it in 1952 based on a single manuscript preserved in Ankara dating from 
486/1093.100 He attributed it to Abū l-Yusr, presumably because the manuscript had his name 
recorded as the author. In 2003, however, in the introduction to his and Marie Bernand’s edition 
of the K. fīhi ma‘rifa, which they also attributed to Abū l-Yusr, Éric Chaumont pointed out two 
disparities between the two texts making it likely that they do not belong to the same author.101 
The first concerns their language and style; those of Uṣūl al-dīn are simple and clear, while those 
of K. fīhi ma‘rifa are awkward and, at times, abstruse. The second is that the author of Uṣūl al-
dīn equates the meanings of the terms mashī’a and irāda,102 while that of K. fīhi ma‘rifa 
distinguishes between them.103 Chaumont thus suggests that Uṣūl al-dīn may have been written 
by Abū l-Yusr’s brother, Abū l-‘Usr, noting that the copyist of the only known manuscript of K. 
fīhi ma‘rifa attributed it to Abū l-Yusr, while the copyist of another, later manuscript of Uṣūl al-
dīn preserved in al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem attributed it to Abū l-‘Usr.104 
 
99 Madelung, “The Spread,” 125n39. His passion over this issue even manifests in Uṣūl al-dīn when recounting the 
visit of a member of a deviant Sufi sect he calls the “Ilhāmiyya” to Bukhara. Despite just previously blaming this 
group for their antinomianism, their claim that their hearts speak to them about God, and their propagation of 
Karmathian teachings to the masses for a profit, what seems to outrage Abū l-Yusr most about this individual is that 
he raises his hands before and after the bowing in prayer, since for Abū l-Yusr this action indicates his abandonment 
of the school of Abū Ḥanīfa. See Uṣūl, 261-2. 
100 Linss, Probleme, vorwort. The manuscript was discovered by Hellmut Ritter, who described it in an article 
published a few years before Linss completed his edition. See Ritter, “Philologika. XIII,” 305-8. For the copyist’s 
remarks about his job, see al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 265.  
101 Chaumont, introduction to Kitāb fīhī ma‘rifa, 6, 6n6, 11, and 11n39.  
102 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 52-3. 
103 al-Bazdawī, Kitāb fīhi ma‘rifa, 71. 
104 Bernand, who wasn’t aware of this dilemma, having passed away before the completion of the edition of K. fīhi 
ma‘rifa she initiated and Chaumont took over, remarked in 1982 that it was uncommon for the same author to 
produce a work in theology (uṣūl al-dīn) and legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). See Marie Bernand, “Manuscrits inédits 
‘d’uṣūl al-dīn’ et ‘d’uṣūl al-fiqh’,” Arabica 29, no. 2 (June 1982): 218.  
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After Chaumont, Brodersen discussed this problem in her 2014 study of the divine 
attributes amongst early Māturīdites.105 According to her, a manuscript preserved in Rampur 
Library in India under the title Kitāb al-Muyassar fī ‘ilm al-kalām and attributed to Abū l-‘Usr106 
is in fact another copy of Uṣūl al-dīn, the two only differing in their conclusions. She also cites 
an ‘Aqīda Abī l-Yusr al-Bazdawī preserved in al-Aqsa Mosque,107 the initial and closing passages 
of which match those of the Rampur manuscript, suggesting that it is likely yet another copy of 
Uṣūl al-dīn. However, as she notes, the other manuscript mentioned by Chaumont cannot be 
located in the al-Aqsa catalogue. 
Oddly enough, neither Chaumont nor Brodersen refer to the statement of the author of K. 
fīhi ma‘rifa that he composed it in the month of Ramaḍān 486/October 1093,108 four years after 
the death of Abū l-‘Usr and seven years before that of Abū l-Yusr. This seems to be a strong 
indication that at least this book was written by Abū l-Yusr. Yet, if the copyist of the Ankara 
manuscript did attribute it to Abū l-Yusr, this would also seem to be accurate since he completed 
it in Ramaḍān 486/October 1093 while Abū l-Yusr was still alive. This suggests that both works 
were penned by Abū l-Yusr; to that effect, Brodersen mentions the possibility that irāda and 
mashī’a were conceived of differently in theological and juristic contexts.109 However, as 
Chaumont recognizes, if one considers his observations about the language and style of the two 
works alongside the stories behind the brothers’ respective nicknames (kunan), a partially 
different conclusion may be reached. Abū l-Yusr, “father of simplicity”, is said to be called so 
because of the simplicity of his writings, while Abū l-‘Usr, “father of difficulty”, is said to be 
called so because of the difficulty of his writings.  
Ultimately, as Chaumont concludes, the dilemma is essentially impossible to resolve 
today, being at bottom caused by the unique occurrence of two brothers on the same intellectual 
scene. In light of this situation, I maintain Abū l-Yusr as the author of Uṣūl al-dīn and echo 
Brodersen’s suggestion for a new critical edition of the book based on, in addition to the Ankara 
manuscript, the Rampur and al-Aqsa manuscripts that Linss was unaware of. 
 
105 Brodersen, Der unbekannte kalām, 29-30. 
106 Imtiyaz Ali Arshi, Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in Raza Library Rampur, vol. 2 (Rampur: Rampur Raza 
Library, 1996), 188-9. It was listed earlier by Brockelmann, Geschichte, vol. 1, 638. 
107 Khaḍir Ibrāhīm Salāma, Fahras Makhṭūṭāt maktabat al-Masjid al-Aqṣā, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Maktabat al-Masjid al-
Aqṣā, n.d.), 77. 
108 al-Bazdawī, Kitāb fīhi ma‘rifa, 86. 
109 Brodersen, Der unbekannte kalām, 552. 
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1.3.2 Structure and Content 
To understand the context and significance of Abū l-Yusr’s discourse on the divine 
attributes within Uṣūl al-dīn, it is helpful to provide a rough outline of the book’s structure and 
content.110 
Table 1. Structure and Content of Uṣūl al-dīn 
Introduction (pp. 13-14) Theological and falsafa literature review 
Chapter 1 (pp. 15-16) Learning, teaching, and writing on kalām 
Chapters 2-8 (pp. 17-23) Epistemology 
Chapters 9-11 (pp. 24-30) The nature and constitution of the world 
Chapters 12-22 (pp. 31-94) The divine attributes and related issues 
Chapters 23-25 (pp. 95-103) The messengers 
Chapters 26-32 (pp. 104-129) The actions of humans and other created 
beings 
Chapter 33 (pp. 130-133) Nothing is binding on God 
Chapter 34 (p. 134) Why God created the world 
Chapters 35-36 (pp. 135-147) Grave sins (al-kabā’ir) 
Chapters 37-42 (pp. 148-159) Faith 
Chapters 43-51 (pp. 160-171) Eschatology 
Chapter 52 (p. 171) Destiny 
Chapter 53 (pp. 172-176) The infallibility of prophets and messengers 
Chapter 54 (pp. 177-182) The alteration of happy and miserable states 
in accordance with one’s faith or lack thereof 
Chapters 55-58 (pp. 183-190) Positions on the Rightly Guided Caliphs 
Chapters 59-67 (pp. 191-198) The imamate and caliphate 
Chapter 68 (pp. 199-202) The best human beings after the Prophet 
Muḥammad and all other prophets and 
messengers 
Chapters 69-70 (pp. 203-204) Positions on ‘Alī, Mu‘āwiya I (r. 41-60/661-
80; d. 60/680), and Yazīd b. Mu‘āwiya (r. 60-
64/680-3; d. 64/683) 
Chapter 71 (pp. 205-207) Superiority of Muslims to angels 
Chapter 72 (pp. 208-209) Ranks of human messengers, angel 
messengers, and the best human beings 
Chapter 73 (pp. 210-211) The fate of jinn 
Chapter 74 (pp. 212-213) The nature and function of reason 
Chapter 75 (pp. 214-217) Whether reason obligates belief in God 
Chapter 76 (pp. 218-220) The primordial covenant (mīthāq) 
Chapter 77 (pp. 221-222) Non-existents (ma‘dūmāt) 
Chapter 78 (pp. 223-225) Moral status of one’s mere contemplation of 
performing an evil act 
 
110 For a summary of the positions taken on each of the following issues by Abū l-Yusr and his opponents as well as 
Abū l-Yusr’s heresiographies and doxography, see Linss, Probleme, 33-74. 
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Chapter 79 (p. 226) Whether language has divine or human 
origins 
Chapters 80-81 (p. 227) The miracle and benefit of the Quran 
Chapter 82 (p. 228) Relationship between Islam and faith (īmān) 
Chapter 83 (p. 229) The difference between a prophet and a 
messenger 
Chapter 84 (p. 230) The things God possesses but has no need of 
Chapters 85-87 (pp. 231-233) Spirit, life, and wind 
Chapter 88 (p. 234) The actions of jinn and devils 
Chapter 89 (p. 235) When repentance is accepted 
Chapter 90 (pp. 236-238) The miracles of saints 
Chapter 91 (p. 239) The fate of deceased children in the afterlife 
Chapter 92 (p. 240) The impossibility of two atoms occupying 
one place 
Chapter 93 (p. 241) Religious law and reality 
Chapter 94 (pp. 242-243) The possibility of knowing one aspect of a 
thing and being ignorant about another aspect 
of it 
Chapter 95 (pp. 244-245) Using the title “Sunnite” 
Chapter 96 (p. 246-8) Non-Muslim heresiography 
[Chapter 97] (pp. 249-263) Muslim doxography and heresiography 
[Epilogue] (pp. 264-265) Final remarks on kalām; some notes on the 
composition, copying, and review of the 
book, as well as their historical context, by 
Abū l-Yusr and the copyist 
 
What should first be noted about this outline is its confirmation of why, beyond his 
explicit references to al-Māturīdī, Abū l-Yusr has earned the title “Māturīdite”. Clearly, like his 
great predecessor, he did not restrict himself to merely enumerating the essential articles of faith, 
as was typical for the Eastern Ḥanafites of his time. Instead, he sought to provide a 
comprehensive, albeit condensed, theological treatise touching on a wide range of themes, 
including epistemology, ontology, prophetology, politics, natural science, human action, heresy, 
and more.  
The divine attributes occupy a central place in the book, making up about one quarter of 
its content. A more detailed outline of these chapters offers a preview of what will be disucssed 
in the rest of the thesis. 
 
Table 2. Structure and Content of Chapters on the Divine Attributes 
Chapter 12 (pp. 31-32) Unity 
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Chapters 13-14 (pp. 33-42) Incomparability and incorporeality 
Chapter 15 (pp. 43-44) Hearing and seeing 
Chapter 16 (pp. 45-50) The existence of eternal, substantive attributes 
subsisting in God’s essence 
Chapter 17 (p. 51) Will 
Chapter 18 (pp. 52-61) What God wills 
Chapter 19 (pp. 62-75) Speech, the Quran 
Chapter 20 (pp. 76-82) Attributes of act 
Chapter 21 (pp. 83-92) The vision of God in the afterlife 
Chapter 22 (pp. 93-94) The name, naming, and the named thing 
 
Chapters 12, 18, 21, and 22 are not covered. Unity is not included because it is a quality 
that all Muslims agree belongs to God and thus falls outside of the intra-Muslim discourse on the 
divine attributes that is our main focus. As for the issue of what God wills, it is a moral problem 
and hence does not pertain to our concern with the metaphysical dimension of the divine 
attributes, while the problem of the vision of God only indirectly concerns His attributes since it 
is a question of whether or not He will be seen in the afterlife. Lastly, while the divine names are 
not unrelated to the attributes, they are ultimately a distinct topic. 
1.4 Context and Method of This Thesis 
The divine attributes in Islamic theology have long been the subject of numerous studies 
in Western languages. Many of these studies concern Ash‘arite and Mu‘tazilite discussions of the 
topic; far fewer look at Māturīdite ones.111 By examining Abū l-Yusr’s discourse, this thesis aims 
to address this lack. Thus far, only two studies have looked at his discourse. The earliest is 
Maziah Mustapha’s doctoral thesis in English submitted to the International Islamic University in 
Kuala Lumpur in 2005.112 She compares the opinions of Abū l-Yusr and al-Ash‘arī on the 
attributes of creation, will, and speech, as well as on the anthropomorphic expressions about God 
 
111 Besides the two works mentioned below, Western scholarship on Māturīdite discussions is limited to sections of 
broader works and mostly pertains to al-Māturīdī’s ideas. See, in chronological order, Manfred Götz, “Māturīdī und 
sein Kitāb Ta’wīlāt al-Qur’ān,” Der Islam 41 (Oct. 1965): 49-51; Fathalla Kholeif, A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 
and His Controversies in Transoxiana (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq Éditeurs, 1966), 89-130; Farouq ‘Omar ‘Abd-Allah 
al-‘Omar, “The Doctrines of the Māturīdite School with Special Reference to as-Sawād al-A‘ẓam of al-Ḥakīm as-
Samarqandī,” PhD diss., (University of Edinburgh, 1974), 67-74; Mustafa Cerić, Roots of Synthetic Theology in 
Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, ed. Sharifah Shifa al-Attas (Kuala Lumpur: International 
Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996), 149-99; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī und die sunnitische Theologie, 
298-334; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the Development, 268-300; Madelung, “Abū l-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī,” 324-30. This 
situation reflects the general lack of scholarship on the lives, thought, and religious and cultural environments of both 
al-Māturīdī and his followers; in fact, many of the writings of his followers have yet to be edited. See Rudolph, al-
Māturīdī and the Development, 17. 
112 Maziah Mustapha, “The Sunni Position on Selected Issues in Kalam: A Comparison between the Views of al-
Ash‘ari and al-Bazdawi,” PhD diss., (International Islamic University, 2005). 
 
 
23 
 
in the Quran and hadiths. Then, as alluded to above, in 2014, Brodersen published an extensive 
study in German on the divine attributes amongst early Māturīdites, in which she first presents 
the views of Abū l-Yusr and seven other early Māturīdites separately and then analyzes them 
together.113 This thesis seeks to build on these two works by focusing its analysis solely on Abū l-
Yusr’s ideas. 
As indicated by the outline of Abū l-Yusr’s discussion of the divine attributes, it is a 
complex topic with multiple dimensions. Accordingly, it has generated a variety of approaches to 
and views on the problems it poses. It is well beyond our scope to review all of this variety here. 
Rather, I begin the following chapters with a brief account of the basic issue(s) surrounding the 
attribute(s) under discussion and then present and analyze Abū l-Yusr’s opinions and their 
supporting arguments. I contextualize the more specific issues he addresses as they occur in this 
presentation. These chapters are themed as follows: Chapter 2) the nature of God’s attributes; 
Chapter 3) speech, hearing, vision, and will; Chapter 4) attributes of act; and Chapter 5) 
anthropomorphic descriptions of God. The Appendix comprises a translation of Abū l-Yusr’s 
chapter on God’s speech. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
113 Brodersen, Der unbekannte kalām. 
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Chapter 2: God’s Attributes 
2.1 Introduction 
At the core of Muslim discourse on the divine attributes lies a fundamental disagreement 
over the very meaning of “attribute” as represented by the Arabic ṣifa. The word, in fact, does not 
occur in the Quran; it was borrowed from the grammarians, who understood it to include mainly 
two types of adjectives, the active and passive participles (ism al-fā‘il and ism al-maf‘ūl), but 
other types as well, such as those in the forms of fa‘l, fa‘il, and fa‘īl, or the superlative af‘al, 
which were treated as words that resemble participles (al-mushabbaha bi-asmā’ al-fā‘il wa-l-
maf‘ūl).114 The Mu‘tazilites maintained precisely this meaning of ṣifa established by the 
grammarians when applied to God115 and distinguished between His “attributes of essence” (ṣifāt 
al-dhāt) and “attributes of act” (ṣifāt al-fi‘l).116 Under the first category, most of them included 
such adjectives as knowing (‘ālim or ‘alīm), powerful (qādir or qadīr), and living (ḥayy), and 
under the second one they included adjectives such as creator (khāliq), provider (rāziq), and actor 
(fā‘il).117 A key difference between the two types of attributes, according to the Mu‘tazilites, is 
that those of essence, being one with God, are eternal, while those of act only become applicable 
to Him when He performs their corresponding actions. In other words, God is eternally knowing, 
powerful, and living via His essence, but only becomes a creator when He creates something or a 
provider when He provides something.118  
 
114 Michel Allard, Le problème des attributs divins dans la doctrine d’al-Aš‘arī et de ses premiers grands disciples 
(Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1965), 2-3; Daniel Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-Ash‘arī (Paris: Les éditions du cerf, 
1990), 235. 
115 Gimaret, 235 and 237. 
116 On this distinction, see Otto Pretzl, Die frühe islamische Attributenlehre: Ihre weltanschaulichen Grundlagen und 
Wirkungen (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1940), 9; van Ess, Theologie und 
Gesellschaft, vol. 4, 443; Josef van Ess, Theology and Society in the Second and Third Centuries of the Hijra: A 
History of Religious Thought in Early Islam, vol. 4, tr. Gwendolin Goldbloom (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2019), 
496-7. 
117 Abū l-Ḥasan ʻAlī b. Ismāʻīl al-Ashʻarī, Kitāb Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn wa-ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn, ed. Hellmut Ritter 
(Vīsbādin: Dār al-Nashr Frānz Shtāynir, 1963), 164-5 and 179-80. 
118 Although the Mu‘tazilites were the most well-known proponents of this doctrine, it was not exclusively held by 
the them. Al-Ash‘arī reports that it was also espoused by the majority of Khārijites, many Murji’ites, and some 
Zaydites. See his Kitāb Maqālāt, 164-5. Jahm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/746) is also said to have denied that God has 
substantive attributes but was more rigorous than most Mu‘tazilites in limiting the extent to which God can be 
qualified. He argued that it is unacceptable to describe God with an adjective that can be applied to anything other 
than Him, for doing so would involve likening God to His creation (tashbīh). Hence, God is neither a thing, living, 
knowing, nor willing; however, He is powerful, acting, creating, enlivening (muḥyī), and deadening (mumīt). See 
Abū Manṣūr ‘Abd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir b. Muḥammad al-Baghdādī, al-Farq bayna l-firaq wa-bayān al-firqa al-nājiya 
min-hum:ʻaqāʼid al-firaq al-Islāmiyya wa-ārāʼ kibār aʻlāmihā, ed. Muḥammad ‘Uthmān Khisht (Cairo: Maktabat 
Ibn Sīnā, n.d.), 186; Abū l-Fatḥ Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, vol. 1, ed. Aḥmad 
Fahmī Muḥammad (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1992), 73. According to van Ess, however, this doctrine was 
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Despite this distinction, in the opinion of the Mu‘tazilites, God’s attributes, whether of 
essence or act, are nothing more than words that describe His being or action.119 This point as 
concerns the attributes of essence was strongly disputed by Sunnite theologians. In their view, 
these attributes are not identical with God’s essence but rather eternal entities subsisting in His 
essence that make it possible for one to apply the corresponding adjectives to Him. Thus, God is 
knowing, powerful, and living via substantive attributes of knowledge, power, and life subsisting 
in His essence. As for the attributes of act, the Ash‘arites sided with the Mu‘tazilites, while the 
Ḥanafites and Māturīdites extended to them the formula for the attributes of essence that they 
shared with the Ash‘arites, so that God is, for instance, creating, providing, and acting via eternal, 
substantive attributes of creation, provision, and action subsisting in His essence.120 Therefore, as 
Abū l-Yusr aptly puts it, for his party the two types of attributes are really just the same.121 
Abū l-Yusr’s outline of the Mu‘tazilite position highlights the philosophical basis on 
which they established it.122 This is the argument that, if God has substantive attributes,123 they 
must be either eternal or temporally originated. If they are eternal, then multiple eternal beings 
exist; if they are temporally originated, then God is a substrate for the inherence of temporal 
 
likely developed amongst his followers, the Jahmites, rather than espoused by Jahm himself. See Theologie und 
Gesellschaft, vol. 3, 501; Theology and Society, vol. 2, 564. Lastly, the Muslim philosophers likewise rejected that 
God has substantive divine attributes, a view that Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) made the target of one of his 
attacks in his famous treatise against their doctrines and for which he accused them of contradicting the entire 
Muslim community except the Mu‘tazilites. See his The Incoherence of the Philosophers = Tahāfut al-falāsifah: A 
parallel English-Arabic text, tr. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 96. See 
also EI², s.v. “Falāsifa.” 
119 EI², s.v. “Ṣifa.” 
120 For these Sunnite views, see Gimaret, La doctrine, 237; EI²,  s.v. “Allāh,”; EI², s.v. “Ṣifa,”; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī 
und die sunnitische Theologie, 312-3; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the Development, 281-2. The notion of substantive 
divine attributes was also not only postulated by Ash‘arites and Māturīdites. It was held much earlier by two Shī‘ite 
theologians, Hishām b. al-Ḥakam (d. 179/795-6) and Sulaymān b. Jarīr (fl. second half of second/eighth century), as 
well as Ibn Kullāb (d. ca. 241/855), who synthesized the ideas surrounding it into a coherent system that two 
generations later was taken up by al-Ash‘arī and his contemporary Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qalānisī. See 
Gimaret, La doctrine, 237; van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 4, 443-4; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 4, 
497-8; EI², s.v. “Ibn Kullāb.” According to Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) as well as his student and Shādhilī 
Sufi Ibn Mughayzil (d. 894/1488-9), many Sufis held the view of the Ḥanafites and Māturīdītes about the attributes 
of act. See Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭī, Ta’yīd al-ḥaqīqa al-‘aliyya wa tashdīd al-ṭarīqa al-
Shādhiliyya (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1971), 42; ‘Abd al-Qādir b. al-Ḥusayn b. Mughayzil, al-Kawākib al-
zāhira fī ijtimā‘ al-awliyā’ yaqẓatan bi-Sayyid al-Dunyā wa-l-Ākhira, ed. ‘Āṣim Ibrāhīm al-Kayyālī (Beirut: Kitāb 
Nāshirūn, 2013), 330. 
121 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 55-6.  
122 al-Bazdawī, 46. 
123 While for the sake of precision I often write “substantive attributes” here, Sunnites like Abū l-Yusr customarily 
spoke of mere “attributes” when describing both their position and the Mu‘tazilite one. Hence, they could accuse the 
Mu‘tazilites of “denying the attributes” and portray themselves as “those who affirm the attributes” or the “adepts of 
the attributes”, despite the fact that the Mu‘tazilites also extensively discussed God’s attributes as they understood 
them. On this, see EI², s.v. “Ṣifa.” 
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beings. Both of these conclusions are untenable; therefore, God cannot be said to have 
substantive attributes. As Abū l-Yusr explains, it is precisely because of this view that the 
Mu‘tazilites call themselves “the people of unity” (ahl al-tawḥīd) and believe that positing the 
existence of eternal, substantive divine attributes constitutes polytheism (shirk). 
The accusation of polytheism is very strong, for it implies the exclusion of the Sunnites 
from the Muslim community. But of course, the Sunnites had their own arguments, both in 
defence of their opinion and against that of the Mu‘tazilites. In this chapter, we will examine 
some of these arguments as set forth by Abū l-Yusr as well as his refutation of the negative 
theology of the early Mu‘tazilite Ḍirār b. ‘Amr (d. 200/815). 
2.2 Substantive Attributes ≠ Multiplicity 
The first argument that Abū l-Yusr sets forth on this topic seeks to expose the 
baselessness of the Mu‘tazilite belief that positing substantive attributes for God is equivalent to 
positing the existence of multiple eternal beings.124 He points out that two distinct beings (al-
ghayrayn) are two separate existents (mawjūdān), of which it is possible to imagine one existing 
without the other. Two proofs are provided for this assertion. The first is a verse of the first 
chapter of the Quran: “The path of those upon whom You have bestowed favour, those other 
(ghayr) than those who have evoked [Your] anger or those who have gone astray,” (1:7). 
According to Abū l-Yusr, here God refers to infidels as being “other” than believers, which 
means that it is possible for Muslims to exist and infidels not to. The second proof is based on 
reason: the world is different from God; at one point, God existed and the world did not.  
The purpose of these remarks is to contrast the distinct existence of two separate beings 
with the relationship between God and His attributes. God’s attributes, Abū l-Yusr explains, are 
of the kind that is neither distinct from nor identical with Him. He adduces the movement of a 
mobile being (mutaḥarrik) as an example of this relationship; its movement is neither different 
from nor identical with it. Similarly, the number ten consists of several numbers, yet they are all 
neither different from nor identical with the number ten itself. This principle, he argues, equally 
holds for God’s attributes. They are neither identical with nor different from His essence; it is 
impossible to conceive of His essence without His attributes and, furthermore, any of His 
attributes without the others. For instance, one cannot imagine His essence without His 
 
124 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 46-7. 
 
 
27 
 
knowledge and power; His knowledge without His essence; His knowledge without His power; 
His power without His life; and so on for the rest of His attributes. Therefore, positing 
substantive attributes for God does not involve assertion of otherness within Him and 
consequently the existence of multiple eternal beings, but rather only one eternal being. 
Abū l-Yusr also points out that, in maintaining their view, the Mu‘tazilites contradict their 
belief that non-existents (ma‘dūmāt) are things (ashyā’).125 They based this doctrine on the nature 
of the divine act of creation as described in two verses of the Quran (16:40 and 36:82): when God 
wants a thing (shay’) to be, he simply says “Be!” to it and it is. In their view, that “thing”, 
although still a non-existent, must somehow be present before God creates it in order for Him to 
be able to say “Be!” to it.126 Therefore, they allowed that “things” are eternal. Abū l-Yusr thus 
simply asks what prevents them from admitting that God’s attributes are entities that are eternal 
along with Him, even if this means positing the eternity of things, since they do not believe that 
violates God’s unity (ishrāk). 
2.3 Quranic Proofs for God’s Substantive Attributes  
Having thus shown that the Mu‘tazilites’ objection to the Sunnite view is rationally 
indefensible and inconsistent with their own theology, Abū l-Yusr proceeds to show that the 
Quran is in full support of the Sunnite position.127 He does this wisely, citing five verses that 
mention verbal nouns (maṣādir; s. maṣdar) as divine attributes rather than adjectives. The 
Mu‘tazilite opponent is thus faced with explaining what precisely the nouns in those verses refer 
to if not substantive divine attributes. Abū l-Yusr’s systematic presentation of these verse-proofs, 
this opponent’s objections to them, and his responses to these objections lends itself to the 
following schematic layout of these exchanges. 
Quranic Proof #1 
Verse: “Verily, God is the Provider, the Possessor of Strength (dhū l-quwwa), the Firm,” (51:58). 
Objection: God is the “Possessor of Strength” in that He is the creator and master (mālik) of the 
strength that He created for His servants. This is in the same way that it is said that a man is a 
“possessor of wealth” (dhū māl) in the sense that he is its owner (ṣāhib) and master. 
 
125 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 47. 
126 Other theologians, in contrast, insisted that only what exists can be said to be a “thing”. On their respective views, 
see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 148-
9. 
127 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 47-8. 
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Rebuttal: This objection is valid with respect to bodies, but not attributes. When it is said that one 
is the possessor of (dhū) a certain attribute, such as knowledge or strength, that attribute subsists 
in him. The same applies to God and His attributes. 
Quranic Proof #2 
Verse: “He is greater than them in strength (quwwatan),” (41:15).  
Objection: This verse signifies that God is stronger than them. Indeed, God is truly the Strong 
(i.e., via His essence). 
Rebuttal: In ordinary speech, saying that so-and-so is greater in strength than so-and-so amounts 
to an ascription of strength to the former person. 
Quranic Proof #3 
Verse: “To God and His messenger belongs might (‘izza),” (63:8).  
Objection: This means that God is the Fortifier. Fortification (i‘zāz) belongs to and originates 
from Him. 
Rebuttal: In this verse, God assigns the attribute of might to Himself. Fortification is indeed also 
one of God’s attributes, but it is not identical with His might: fortification is an attribute of act, 
while might is an attribute of essence. 
Quranic Proof #4 
Verse: “They do not encompass anything of His knowledge (‘ilmihi),” (2:255).  
Objection: His knowledge here refers to the objects of His knowledge (ma‘lūmuhu) because it is 
these which may be encompassed, not His knowledge. 
Rebuttal: First, God’s knowledge may be encompassed in the sense of being known about 
(yu‘lam), because His attributes, like His essence, are known about. Second, when the term 
“knowledge” is used, it obviously refers to knowledge as an attribute. This particular verse, 
however, does clearly refer to what God knows and not His knowledge, for God says, “They do 
not encompass anything (bi-shay’) of His knowledge,” and that which is known can be conceived 
of as a “thing” (shay’), while knowledge cannot. 
Quranic Proof #5 
Verse: “He sent it [the Quran] down with His knowledge (‘ilmihi),” (4:166). 
Objection: Descent does not occur with knowledge, but rather with power. This verse thus means 
that God sent the Quran down and is knowing about it; it is His known thing. 
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Rebuttal: The verse provides clear proof that He has knowledge. Its meaning is that God sent the 
Quran down and His knowledge of it is complete (muḥīṭ). Additionally, just as “wondrous acts” 
(af‘āl ‘ajība) in this world indicate the existence of a knowing actor and the actor’s knowledge, 
God’s wondrous acts indicate that He is knowing and has knowledge.128 
Clearly, in Abū l-Yusr’s mind, his Mu‘tazilite opponent can do nothing but offer 
figurative interpretations of the verses to avoid lending any support to the Sunnite position. 
Hence the opponent argues that God “has” strength in the sense that He created it and allotted it 
to His creatures, while His might is in fact His fortification and His knowledge is merely His 
known thing. Abū l-Yusr considers literal interpretation of the sacred text to be justified and more 
powerful, and thus in the last three rebuttals, draws his opponent’s attention to the letter of the 
text. In the first two rebuttals, he analogizes between ordinary and divine language. Conversely, 
as we will see in Chapter 5, that same strategy is crucial to support his own non-literal readings 
of anthropomorphic expressions in the Quran and a hadith. It appears then that Abū l-Yusr’s 
religio-textual hermeneutic is just as fuelled by rational considerations as that of his Mu‘tazilite 
opponent; it is just that the wording of the verses he chooses here happens to accord with his 
views.  
2.4 Inferring the Unseen from the Seen 
For the Mu‘tazilites, a key principle of reasoning was the “analogy of the unseen to the 
seen” (qiyās al-ghā’ib ‘alā l-shāhid): what can be said of the creature can, in some cases, also be 
said of God.129 The principle also became important for Sunnites,130 including al-Māturīdī, who 
devoted a special chapter of his K. al-Tawḥīd to laying down the rules for its application, in 
contrast to his Ḥanafite predecessors who merely claimed that it could be used to infer the 
existence of the Creator but did not comment on its scope.131 Although Abū l-Yusr, like these 
earlier Ḥanafites, does not specify when it should be used, he is clearly aware of its potential to 
support both the Sunnite and Mu‘tazilite positions. This is evinced by its employment in the fifth 
 
128 The interpretations of these five passages of the Mu‘tazilite exegete al-Zamakhsharī largely parallel those made in 
the objections. See his Tafsīr al-Kashshāf ‘an ḥaqā’iq al-tanzīl wa-‘uyūn al-aqāwīl fī wujūh al-ta’wīl, ed. Khalīl 
Ma’mūn Thīmā (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifa, 2009), 1055, 967, 1110, 145 and 272-3, respectively. 
129 EI², s.v. “Mu‘tazila.” 
130 EI², s.v. “Mu‘tazila.” 
131 al-Māturīdī, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, 92-4; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī und die sunnitische Theologie, 295-8; Rudolph, al-
Māturīdī and the Development, 266-8. 
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rebuttal above as well as in several arguments designed to uphold one or the other of the two 
positions and which take knowledge as an example for the rest of the attributes.132 
In reply to a claim that a knower in this world can be knowing without knowledge and 
thus, it is implied, God can be knowing simply through His essence and not an attribute of 
knowledge,133 Abū l-Yusr explains that people who are less or more knowledgeable, or even 
ignorant, are so because of differences in the state of their attribute (ma‘nā)134 of knowledge, just 
like things that are less or more white, black, in motion, in rest, and so on, are so because of 
differences in the states of the corresponding attributes; accordingly, one is not knowing in some 
instances and ignorant in others because his essence has changed or because the attribute of 
knowledge does not exist. Therefore, since a knower in this world always possesses an attribute 
of knowledge, so it must be with God. 
Naturally, one would expect that this claim to which Abū l-Yusr responded was made by 
a Mu‘tazilite. This is not the case, however, because while the Mu‘tazilites shared the Sunnite 
conception of ṣifāt as entities when applied to created beings, they refused to extend that 
conception to God.135 A second argument136 that Abū l-Yusr must address seems to offer us at 
least one reason why they refused to do so. This argument affirms Abū l-Yusr’s assertion that a 
being in this world is knowing through an attribute of knowledge since one may be knowing in 
some instances and ignorant in others. But it contends that the same cannot be true for God 
because He is knowing at all times and thus must be knowing via His essence.  
Abū l-Yusr admits, of course, that God is knowing at all times, noting that ignorance is 
impossible for Him. However, he maintains that, like one in this world, He is knowing in each 
instance through knowledge, not His essence. Indeed, if God were knowing via His essence, His 
essence would be knowledge. This, however, is not the case, because when something is 
qualified by a thing, that thing is its attribute; for instance, a mobile being is qualified by 
movement, and thus movement is its attribute. Therefore, God is not knowing via His essence. 
Furthermore, the idea of a knower without knowledge is equivalent to the idea of a rational being 
 
132 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 48-50. 
133 al-Bazdawī, 49. 
134 Sunnites used ma‘nā and ṣifa synonymously. See Gimaret, La doctrine, 237. 
135 Gimaret, 237. 
136 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 49-50. 
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without reason, a mobile being without movement, and something white without whiteness; it is 
therefore false, and to accept it is in fact to deny that God is even knowing.137   
Certainly, then, Abū l-Yusr’s frequent use of the principle of reasoning about God on the 
basis of matters in this world in defence of the Sunnite doctrine, here and, as we shall see, in 
other chapters on the attributes, vindicates al-Māturīdī’s efforts to ensure its proper employment 
by future scholars.  
2.5 Refutation of Negative Theology 
There existed amongst the Mu‘tazilites different views about how their unanimous 
rejection of substantive divine attributes and ideas about the existence and/or nature of certain 
attributes should be formulated. Some of these views are countered by Abū l-Yusr in Uṣūl al-dīn, 
the first of which he ascribes to Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām (d. 220-30/835-45).138 Al-Naẓẓām was 
born and educated in Basra, mostly within the scholarly circle of his uncle, the important 
Mu‘tazilite Abū l-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf (d. 227/842). He later moved to Baghdad where he was 
active in the court of the caliph al-Ma’mūn (r. 198-218/813–33; d. 218/833). His theology, unlike 
his poetry, was not popular since it was founded on complex philosophical speculation. In his 
heresiography, the Ash‘arite Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) reports that all rationalist 
and traditionist groups (jamī‘ firaq al-umma min farīqay al-ra’y wa-l-ḥadīth) as well as the 
Khārijites, Shī‘ites, Najjārites, and most Mu‘tazilites considered al-Naẓẓām an infidel, and that 
al-Ash‘arī wrote three books refuting his ideas.139 
In spite of the contempt in which he appears to have been held by most theologians, al-
Naẓẓām made an important contribution to the development of basic Mu‘tazilite doctrine on the 
divine attributes. He reformulated Abū l-Hudhayl’s phrase, “God is knowing via knowledge that 
is identical with Him (huwa ‘ālim bi-‘ilm huwa huwa),”140 as “God is always knowing, living, 
powerful, hearing, seeing, [and] eternal via Himself (bi-nafsihi), not via knowledge, life, power, 
hearing, vision, [and] eternity.”141 His version was subsequently adopted by the majority of 
 
137 al-Bazdawī, 49-50. 
138 al-Bazdawī, 50. On him, see EI², s.v. “al-Naẓẓām.”  
139 al-Baghdādī, al-Farq, 120-1. Of course, one should bear in mind that al-Baghdādī’s tone is strongly polemical 
throughout his heresiography. He also writes, for instance, that the types of errors propagated by the Karrāmites in 
his day were “more than thousands and thousands”. See al-Baghdādī, 189. 
140 al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 165. 
141 al-Ash‘arī, 486-7.  
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Mu‘tazilites in Basra and Baghdad.142 Most important for us, however, is his comment that in 
affirming the attributes mentioned in his formula, he was both affirming God’s essence and 
denying Him ignorance, death, weakness, deafness, and blindness,143 and that this method of 
affirmation and denial applied to all essential attributes.144 In other words, he saw God’s 
attributes as both positive statements about Him and negations of their opposites.145 
Given al-Naẓẓām’s stance on the divine attributes, it is a surprise to find Abū l-Yusr 
credit him with a different view. Abū l-Yusr phrases it thus: “‘We do not say that He is truly 
knowing. Rather, we mean [by saying that He is knowing] that He is not ignorant. Hence, if He is 
not truly knowing, it is not necessary that He has knowledge’.” As we just saw, while al-Naẓẓām 
did indeed deny that God is ignorant and has an attribute of knowledge, he affirmed that He is 
truly knowing. The view related by Abū l-Yusr instead seems to have belonged to al-Naẓẓām’s 
senior contemporary, Ḍirār b. ‘Amr. He believed that to say that God is knowing means that He 
is not ignorant, that He is powerful means that He is not weak, and that He is living means that 
He is not dead.146 He appears to have extended this principle to all divine names in the Quran, 
thereby arriving at a strictly apophatic theology. He was driven by a concern about making 
analogies between such names and their significations in human language147 as well as his belief 
that while God’s existence (anniyya) is known, His quiddity (māhiyya) is not fully known, just as 
one’s human nature is not fully known by others.148 Abū l-Yusr in fact states in Uṣūl al-dīn that 
Ḍirār considered only God to know His quiddity,149 but evidently he was not aware of the 
negative theology that in part followed from this view.150 
 
142 van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 3, 399; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 3, 433. Shortly after their 
emergence, the Mu‘tazilites split into the Basran and Baghdad schools. Over time, both spread well beyond their 
original homes and came to include distinct early and later periods of thought. See EI², s.v. “Mu‘tazila.” 
143 And temporality, presumably. 
144 al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 166-7 and 486-7. 
145 van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 3, 399; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 3, 433. 
146 al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 166; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal, vol. 1, 77. 
147 van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 3, 37-8; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 3, 40-1. 
148 EI², s.v. “Ḍirār b. ‘Amr.” 
149 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 257 
150 It thus appears that at least one Mu‘tazilite did not conceive of the attributes of essence as adjectives truly 
descriptive of God’s being. This may or may not be the case since Ḍirār’s identity as a Mu‘tazilite has been disputed 
by several Mu‘tazilites and non-Mu‘tazilites alike. Josef van Ess, however, who has extensively studied Ḍirār’s 
theology, considers him a Mu‘tazilite. See van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 3, 35-6; van Ess, Theology and 
Society, vol. 3, 37-8. The ambivalence over categorizing him happens to be reflected in Uṣūl al-dīn. Abū l-Yusr first 
associates him with the Mu‘tazilites, but later identifies the Ḍirāriyya as a Qadarite branch who agree with the 
Mu‘tazilites on all but a few issues. See Uṣūl, 24, 249, and 257. 
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Abū l-Yusr’s response to Ḍirār’s doctrine consists of three brief proofs. These are not 
directed against the ultimate conclusion of the argument he ascribes to al-Naẓẓām that God does 
not have an attribute of knowledge; rather, they simply demonstrate that God is truly knowing. 
First, he again offers literal readings of descriptions of God in the Quran, which this time merely 
involve adjectives: God calls Himself the Knowing (‘alīm) and the Aware (khabīr) in several 
verses. Second, he reminds us that wondrous actions only originate from a knower. And third, he 
alludes to the self-defeating effect of Ḍirār’s claim: every essence that is not knowing is ignorant, 
while every essence that is not ignorant is knowing. 
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Chapter 3: Speech, Hearing, Vision, Will 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It was important for Abū l-Yusr to demonstrate that God’s attributes are eternal entities 
subsisting in His essence, for he made thereby a decisive claim about the nature of each attribute. 
This was, however, only the first of several tasks he had to perform to shore up the Ḥanafite 
doctrine on the divine attributes as he conceived of it since certain attributes pose additional and 
finer problems requiring more specific claims and arguments. The most complex and notorious of 
these is undoubtedly speech. There are two basic topics of discussion concerning this attribute. 
The first is the nature of the attribute itself, and the second is its manifestations in the form of 
scriptures, most notably the Quran, along with God’s speaking to Moses as recorded in Q 28:29-
35. In both cases, the central question is whether the attribute and its manifestations are created or 
uncreated.  
Once again, the debate is chiefly between the Mu‘tazilites and Sunnites. For the 
Mu‘tazilites, the whole matter is rather straightforward. Not only, they argued, does God not 
possess a substantive attribute of speech; He is not even to be qualified as eternally speaking via 
His essence. Instead, for most Mu‘tazilites, God’s speech is an accident (‘araḍ) that He creates in 
a substrate (maḥall)151 so that the attribute and manifestations are one and the same. Sunnites, in 
contrast, speak of a substantive and eternal attribute of speech subsistent in God’s essence via 
which He speaks.152 While they disagreed, as will be detailed below, over precisely what such 
speech consists of, the more pressing and intricate problem they faced was its relation to its 
manifestations in time. 
Abū l-Yusr was well aware of the significance of this topic. He subtly criticizes 
traditionists who saw no need to label the Quran created or uncreated by insisting that it is a 
momentous and particularly delicate question (min adaqq al-masā’il) that has been discussed by 
early and later scholars (al-mutaqaddimūn wa-l-muta’akhkhirūn) as well as the Rightly Guided 
Caliphs.153 At roughly sixteen printed pages, his own discussion constitutes the longest chapter in 
Uṣūl al-dīn. Most of his criticism is aimed at the Mu‘tazilites, although he also refutes the 
opinions of several other groups and individuals, such as the Ash‘arites and Karrāmites as well as 
 
151 EI², s.v. “Mu‘tazila.” 
152 EI², s.v. “Kalām.” 
153 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 62 and 75. 
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certain Sufis and traditionists. The three themes he covers are discussed in corresponding sections 
below: definitions of speech, eternity of God’s speech, and the manifestations of God’s speech. 
We will then look at his brief discussions of God’s hearing, vision, and will. 
3.2 Definitions of Speech 
3.2.1 The Ḥanafite Definition 
The first step Abū l-Yusr takes to establish the Ḥanafite doctrine on divine speech is to 
provide a definition of speech. He certainly does not get any help from the Mu‘tazilites, since he 
considers that their definition as “arranged letters and sounds articulated in a particular manner” 
(ḥurūf manẓūma wa-aṣwāt muqaṭṭa‘a bi-taqṭī‘ khāṣṣ)154 is conceptually wrong. Furthermore, it 
only allows God to be called a speaker in a metaphorical sense by virtue of His creation of speech 
in another being, just like the one who orders others to build, rather than building himself, is 
called a builder.155 What Abū l-Yusr is seeking instead is a notion of speech that permits it to be 
applied to both God and His creatures. He begins with three similar definitions current amongst 
 
154 The more common formulation appears to be simply “arranged letters and articulated sounds”. See Ibn Aḥmad al-
Asadābādī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-‘adl, vol. 7 (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub, 1961), 3; EI², s.v. 
“Mu‘tazila.” Abū l-Yusr also attributes this concept of speech to “the affirmers of the createdness of the Quran”, 
presumably those to whom he previously ascribes the view that God’s speech is created, namely, the Khārijites, 
Murji’ites, Shī‘ites (rawāfiḍ), Jabbārites (including Jahm b. Ṣafwān and Bishr al-Marīsī [d. 218/833]), and 
Karrāmites. See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 62-3. In his list of those who prescribed to the doctrine of the created Quran, al-
Ash‘arī mentions only the first three of these groups. See his Kitāb Maqālāt, 582. Rawāfiḍ (sing. rāfiḍa) is a term 
generally used to refer to either the “proto-Imāmites” (and later the Twelver Shī‘ites) or various Shī‘ite sects. It was 
originally meant to be pejorative, but the Imāmites quickly transformed it into an honorific title. See EI², s.v. “al-
Rāfiḍa.” Abū l-Yusr seems to apply the title to both categories of Shī‘ites. As a doctrine shared between different 
Shī‘ite sects, he cites the view that ‘Alī is more knowledgeable, god-fearing, courageous, and noble than all other 
Companions of the Prophet, and details some opinions held exclusively by either the Imāmites, Zaydites, or certain 
extremist sects (ghulāt). See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 254-5. According to al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022), an early and 
major Twelver Shī‘ite scholar, all Imāmites, with the exception of a few deviants, believed that God’s speech and the 
Quran are created. See al-Shaykh al-Mufīd Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Nu‘mān b. al-Mu‘allim, Awā’il al-
maqālāt, ed. Ibrāhīm al-Anṣārī (Mahar: al-Mu’tamar al-‘Ālamī li-Alfiyyat al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, 1413 [1992-3]), 52-3. 
The label “Jabbārites” (jabbāriyya or mujbira) is derogatory and was arbitrarily applied by Muslim theologians to 
opponents whom they believed to espouse the doctrine of jab (compulsion), namely, the belief that only God truly 
acts, not human beings. Hence, the Mu‘tazilites applied it to traditionists, Ash‘arites and others who rejected their 
conception of free will, while Ash‘arites applied it to the Jahmites. See EI², s.v. “Djabriyya.” Abū l-Yusr classifies 
the Jabbārites into two groups, the Jahmites and Marīsites, each named after its respective leader, Jahm b. Ṣafwān 
and Bishr al-Marīsī. See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 249 and 258. Jahm is in fact believed to be the first figure to have 
explicitly professed the doctrine of the created Quran; Bishr was eventually called a Jahmite for his adoption of it. 
See EI², s.v. “Bishr b. Ghiyāth al-Marīsī.” Lastly, the Karrāmites had a nuanced and unique understanding of God’s 
speech and the Quran, which is discussed below. Whether all these groups and their various adherents espoused the 
Mu‘tazilite definition of speech as Abū l-Yusr suggests is beyond the scope of our investigation here. It is enough for 
our purposes to frame the debate on God’s speech and its manifestations as being between the Mu‘tazilites and 
Sunnites overall since they have historically been its key participants. 
155 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 63-4. 
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the Ḥanafites.156 The first is that speech is that which muteness and silence lack.157 The second 
supplements the first, adding that speech is also heard (masmū‘) and precludes muteness and 
silence. And the third posits that speech is both heard and comprehensible (mafhūm) and that 
muteness and silence lack it. 
Although these definitions emphasize the difference between speech on the one hand and 
muteness and silence on the other, we would be misled if we supposed that, in the view of the 
Ḥanafites, speech thus necessarily comprises sound. In fact, Abū l-Yusr explains, neither sound 
nor a specific structure (bunya makhṣūṣa) are conditions for it; rather, its only absolute condition 
is a permanent essence (dhāt bāqin). However, if an act of speech is volitional, it also requires 
life because volition needs life. This principle is in fact not unique to speech but roughly applies 
to all attributes. Knowledge, for instance, does not require a brain, heart, or specific structure to 
exist, but rather only a permanent essence and life.158 
3.2.2 Refutation of the Mu‘tazilite Definition 
The Ḥanafite understanding of speech as described by Abū l-Yusr may sound quite 
strange to a reader accustomed to think of vocal enunciation as an essential component of speech. 
But the goal, again, is to allow speech to be ascribed to God, something very important to Abū l-
Yusr and his fellow Ḥanafites, perhaps because it preserves the idea of a personal God whom the 
ordinary believer can easily comprehend and relate to. The importance of this capacity for these 
theologians is highlighted by four arguments Abū l-Yusr raises against the idea of God being a 
speaker in a purely metaphorical sense.159 First, God attributes speech to Himself in many verses 
of the Quran; for instance, “And God spoke to Moses directly,” (4:164). Second, God commands, 
prohibits, informs, and inquires, actions that are only possible for a speaker. Third, speech is 
among the praiseworthy attributes of a thing, and God is truly the Praiseworthy One (al-
 
156 al-Bazdawī, 63. 
157 al-kalām mā yanbaghī bi-hi l-kharas wa-l-sukūt. This rather puzzling phrase might be rendered in at least two 
other ways. First as, “Speech is that which requires muteness and silence.” However, besides being illogical, this 
rendering does not accord with the other details Abū l-Yusr provides about speech. Second, reading mā with its 
negating function, as, “Speech does not require muteness and silence.” But this conflicts with a part of the third 
definition without the use of mā, namely, yanbaghī bi-hi l-kharas wa-l-sukūt, which, if read in the same sense, posits 
that speech “requires muteness and silence”. Brodersen (Der unbekannte kalām, 323) simply substitutes yunāfī 
(precludes), which Abū l-Yusr uses in the second definition and later on in his discussion (p. 68), for yanbaghī bi-hi.  
158 As for the speech of inanimate beings (jamādāt), Abū l-Yusr explains that if it is volitional, then God created life 
(ḥayāt) in them because life is a condition for volition; if it is not volitional, it is possible that it exists without life. 
See al-Bazdawī, 64. 
159 al-Bazdawī, 67. 
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mamdūḥ). And fourth, a being’s lack of speech is a deficiency, for such a condition is connected 
with muteness, silence, and ignorance, and constant silence is a defect in this world because it is 
due to the inability either to speak or to properly express oneself, while also meaning that the 
being does not command, prohibit, or inform, which is another deficiency.  
From these objections, it seems that, as far as Abū l-Yusr is concerned, for one to say that 
God only speaks in a metaphorical sense is to say that He does not speak at all. This assessment, 
of course, would not be appreciated by the Mu‘tazilites, who readily and earnestly spoke of 
God’s speech and His role as a speaker.160 Moreover, two prominent Mu‘tazilites, Abū ‘Alī al-
Jubbā’ī and his son Abū Hāshim (d. 321/933), circumvented the criticism about metaphor by 
defining a speaker as “one who makes speech (man fa‘ala l-kalām)” rather than “one in whom 
speech subsists (man qāma bihi l-kalām)”.161  
Yet even if these four arguments are not enough to take down the Mu‘tazilite position, 
Abū l-Yusr could always fall back on three additional ones directed at the Mu‘tazilite definition 
of speech itself.162 The first of these arguments concerns the first two parts of the definition 
(arranged letters and articulated sounds) and the other two concern its third part (in a particular 
manner). To begin, letters cannot be “arranged”, because they are various sounds. For instance, 
the letter “kāf” (ك) is a sound occurring (yaqa‘u) in the uvula, the letter “ḥā’” ( ح) is a sound 
occurring in the throat, and the letter “bā’” (ب) is a sound occurring on the lip. Letters are called 
so because “letter” (ḥarf) means “side” (jānib), and letters occur on the sides of the mouth in the 
form of sound. Although this latter statement (that letters occur on the sides of the mouth in the 
form of sound) appears to contradict the claims of the preceding sentence, it is perhaps best 
explained with reference to the concept of letters espoused by classical Arab philologists that 
Abū l-Yusr appears to be drawing on. In their view, letters are simply sounds that originate in the 
chest and are transported up the throat and through the mouth by the breath, being shaped in the 
meantime into their specific pronunciations by the articulatory organs.163 Hence, what Abū l-Yusr 
 
160 ‘Abd al-Jabbār, for instance, describes the standard Mu‘tazilite doctrine as follows: “God’s speech is a type of 
speech intelligible in this world (min jins al-kalām al-ma‘qūl fī-l-shāhid), namely, arranged letters and articulated 
sounds. It is an accident [that] God creates in bodies in a way that makes it heard and its meaning understood. The 
angel conveys it to the prophets in accordance with the extent to which He commands through it and knows it will 
benefit [humankind]. It encompasses orders, prohibitions, reports, and all types [of communication], just like human 
speech.” See his al-Mughnī, 3. 
161 al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal, 67; Gimaret, La doctrine, 310; Brodersen, Der unbekannte kalām, 565. 
162 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 63-4. 
163 J.R.T.M. Peters, God's created speech: A study in the speculative theology of the Mu‘tazilî Qâḍî l-Quḍât Abû l-
Ḥasan ʻAbd al-Jabbâr bn Aḥmad al-Hamaḏânî (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 296. 
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seems to mean is that, while the three letters listed above are formed into their specific 
pronunciations by the uvula, throat, and lip, respectively, they eventually exit via one’s mouth 
and thus pass the sides of it.  
Having thus established that letters are actually sounds, Abū l-Yusr next explains that 
sounds are accidents (a‘rāḍ), which means that, due to their impermanence, they cannot be 
arranged, and they cannot be articulated, since articulation is only possible for bodies (ajsām). 
In refuting the third part of the Mu‘tazilite definition of speech, Abū l-Yusr presents a 
more complete version of it, namely, one that adds the phrase, “In a particular, unknown manner 
that is impossible to explain.” In his view, failing to specify the manner of the articulation 
invalidates this definition for it leads to the sounds of, for instance, a trumpet and thunder being 
considered arranged letters and articulated sounds. Moreover, the purpose of a definition is to 
make something known (lil-i‘lām). Trying to make an unknown thing known through another 
unknown thing is unsound and, frankly, completely stupid.  
3.2.3 Refutation of the Definition of Ibn al-Rāwandī and the Ash‘arites 
In spite of how crucial Abū l-Yusr believed it to be to provide a definition of speech that 
allows it to be literally ascribed to God, he opposes a concept of human speech that equally 
exhibits this capacity, which he attributes to Abū l-Ḥusayn Ibn al-Rāwandī (d. middle or end of 
the fourth/tenth century)164 and “some Ash‘arites”, who he claims relay it from al-Ash‘arī 
himself.165 As Abū l-Yusr describes it, human speech subsists in the heart (qalb); what is spoken 
with the tongue is an expression (‘ibāra) of that speech but not identical with it and thus may 
only be said to be speech in a metaphorical sense.  
This is indeed precisely how Ibn al-Rāwandī seems to have conceived of speech.166 Al-
Ash‘arī drew on his thinking as well as that of Ibn Kullāb to arrive at a more elaborate view: 
speech is an entity (ma‘nā)167 subsisting in the soul (nafs); letters, sounds, and the words they 
 
164 Ibn al-Rāwandī was a highly controversial thinker. Originally a member of the Mu‘tazilite school, he left it and 
wrote refutations of its doctrines before turning to Shī‘ism for a time and then engaging in free thought. Among the 
contentious aspects of his thought are his criticism of prophethood, especially that of Muḥammad; his belief in the 
irrationality and therefore unacceptability of religious dogmas; his insistence that the miracles of the prophets are 
fabricated; and his assertion that the Quran is not revealed scripture. He covered up his adherence to these views by 
claiming that they were the statements of the Brahmans (barāhima). See EI², s.v. “Ibn al-Rāwandī.” 
165 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 67.  
166 See van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 4, 310; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 4, 349. 
167 I.e., substantive attribute. 
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form, as well as writing (kitāba) and signs (ishārāt), give expression to this speech.168 Notable is 
the location of speech in the “soul” (nafs) rather than the heart (qalb) because this permitted it to 
be analogized with God whose nafs could be thought to represent His essence.169 By virtue of this 
term, al-Ash‘arī’s theory became known amongst his followers as kalām al-nafs (or ḥadīth al-
nafs), gaining special prominence in ‘Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynī’s (d. 478/1085) Kitāb al-Irshād, 
where he employed it against the Mu‘tazilite and Karrāmite views.170 
Abū l-Yusr’s criticism of this concept of speech is brief and sharp. He judges the idea that 
speech subsists in the heart to be so manifestly wrong that it requires no explanation. Suffice it to 
say that it amounts to ascribing to a human being what is the opposite of speech, for the “thing” 
(shay’) in the heart that the definition refers to (i.e., supposed speech) is actually silence. Since 
one who is silent is not speaking, that thing can in no way be speech.  
The brevity of these comments suggests that Abū l-Yusr is appreciative of the fact that, 
although conceptually false, ascribing such speech to God would not necessarily compromise the 
transcendence and eternity of His speech as does the Mu‘tazilite definition. The enormous threat 
that the Mu‘tazilite definition poses to these aspects of the attribute affirmed by all Sunnites is 
illustrated by another argument against it, this time aimed specifically at its preclusion of the 
eternity of divine speech. 
3.3 The Eternity of God’s Speech 
Abū l-Yusr presents and defends one proof for the eternity of God’s attribute of speech.171 
It is based on Q 16:40: “Indeed, Our word to a thing when We intend it is but that We say to it, 
‘Be!’ and it is.” What this verse means, he explains, is that God creates things through His 
utterance of the word “Be” (bi-kalāmihi “kun”). Thus, if the word “Be” were created, it would 
have to have been created through a preceding “Be”, which itself would had to have been created 
through a preceding “Be”, and so on ad infinitum, so that nothing at all could ever have been 
created. Therefore, this verse demonstrates that God’s attribute of speech is uncreated.  
To avoid arriving at this conclusion, a Mu‘tazilite could interpret the meaning of the verse 
in at least two ways. First, he could argue that it is a metaphor illustrating the rapidity of creation 
 
168 Gimaret, La doctrine, 201 and 204-5. 
169 Gimaret, 203-4. 
170 ‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Abdallāh al-Juwaynī, Kitāb al-Irshād ilā qawāṭi‘ al-adilla fī uṣūl al-i‘tiqād, ed. Aḥmad ‘Abd 
al-Raḥīm al-Sāyiḥ and Tawfīq ‘Alī Wahba (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 2009), 95-115; Allard, Le 
problème, 391-2; EI², s.v. “Kalām.” 
171 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 65-6. 
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because things are created through God’s act of creation, not through His speech. For Abū l-Yusr, 
this interpretation is wrong because while the verse does indeed illustrate the rapidity of God’s 
act of creation, this act occurs through His speech. In fact, with God’s statement that He creates 
things with His word “Be”, a distinction is made between His act of creation, as it occurs through 
the utterance of “Be”, and the created thing; this is a proof against another doctrine held by most 
of this opponent’s fellow Mu‘tazilites, namely, that God’s act of creation is identical with the 
created being.172  
The second possible Mu‘tazilite interpretation of Q 16:40 is that it establishes that God’s 
speech is not pre-eternal (azalī) since it states that God’s utterance of “Be” succeeds His will; that 
is, God first wills something to be and then says “Be!” and it is.173 Given his conviction that all 
the divine attributes are eternal, this reading poses no challenge to Abū l-Yusr. Neither God’s 
will nor speech, he retorts, are temporally originated, and thus it is impossible that one of them 
could precede the other.174 
3.4 The Manifestations of God’s Speech 
3.4.1 Refutation of the Karrāmite Doctrine 
Although as a Sunnite it was crucial for Abū l-Yusr to demonstrate the eternity of God’s 
speech, that tenet raises another problem, namely, the relationship between eternal speech and its 
manifestations in time. Before examining Abū l-Yusr’s solution to this dilemma, we may look at 
why he refuses to accept the solution set forth by the Karrāmites.175 They argued that God’s 
speech (kalām Allāh) is His capacity to speak (al-qudra ‘alā l-takallum) and is eternal; in 
contrast, His “utterance” (qawl), or an instance of speech resulting from the employment of this 
capacity, such as the Quran, is temporally originated (ḥādith), but uncreated and subsists in 
 
172 al-Bazdawī, 66. A clearer version of this argument is found in al-Bazdawī, 78-9. As I will discuss in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis, the expression, “the act [or attribute] of creation is identical with the created being” (al-ījād huwa ‘ayn al-
mawjūd) was used by Ash‘arites and most Mu‘tazilites to deny that God has a substantive attribute of creation 
through which He creates things. In their view, this attribute, which is simply a description of His action, only 
becomes applicable to Him when He creates something. 
173 This is one of the many arguments ‘Abd al-Jabbār makes for the temporality of God’s speech. See his al-Mughnī, 
168; Peters, God’s created speech, 380. 
174 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 66. 
175 The Karrāmites were a theological, juristic, and ascetic group active primarily in the region of present-day Iran 
and Afghanistan from the third/ninth to the seventh/thirteenth centuries. For a brief outline of their historical 
development and main doctrines, see Aron Zysow, “Karrāmiyya,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. 
Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1-13, DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696703.013.29. 
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God.176 To prove this doctrine, they cited certain events recounted in the Quran.177 God must 
have commanded Moses to throw down his cane (27:10) after He created Moses, gave him the 
cane and the cane was in his hand. Likewise, God must have declared that Adam disobeyed his 
Lord (20:121) after He created him. These verses thus testify to the temporal origination of 
speech from God (i.e., His utterance), though He is pre-eternally (fī l-azal) capable of 
speaking.178 
Another version of this scriptural argument draws attention to the acts of informing 
(ikhbār) and commanding (ṭalab) in these two verses as well as of inquiring (istikhbār) in another 
verse.179 God informed us that Adam disobeyed Him and went astray (20:121), commanded 
Moses to throw down his cane (27:10), and inquired what was in Moses’ right hand (20:17). 
How, therefore, could His speech (i.e., His utterance) not have originated in time while His acts 
of informing, commanding, and inquiring did?  
Given the Ḥanafite definition of speech as outlined above, it is already clear why Abū l-
Yusr must reject this Karrāmite doctrine. He begins his refutation by pointing out its lack of 
logic. Just as the capacity to move is not movement itself, the capacity to speak is not speech 
itself; one merely capable of speaking is thus not necessarily speaking. Hence, what the 
Karrāmite view in fact implies is that God’s speech is temporal.180 
Abū l-Yusr next shows that the metaphysical grounds of the Karrāmite doctrine are just as 
weak. For one thing, God cannot be a substrate for temporal beings (ḥawādith) because He would 
then change as they changed, and change for the Eternal (al-qadīm) is impossible since He is at 
 
176 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 62. See also al-Baghdādī, al-Farq, 192; Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 300-2; Zysow, “Karrāmiyya,” 10. Abū l-Yusr specifically 
names Ibn Hayṣam as a Karrāmite who held this view. 
177 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 65. 
178 Abū l-Yusr also ascribes this view of God’s speech and the Quran as well as the accompanying argument to the 
Ḥanbalites, but this ascription is questionable. For one thing, they did not conceive of God’s speech as His capacity 
to speak, but rather as eternal words and sounds subsisting in His essence. See A.S. Tritton, “The Speech of God,” 
Studia Islamica 36 (1972): 8. As for the Quran, they believed it to be uncreated but, unlike the head of their school, 
Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), came to explicitly equate its uncreatedness with its eternity. This equation was 
strongly rejected by the later Ḥanbalite Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), who instead proposed a teaching that resembles 
that of the Karrāmites. He contended that God’s speech is eternal in its species (jins) but not in its particular 
manifestation (‘ayn). Thus, as God spoke the Quran in time, the Quran is not eternal; however, it is uncreated 
because His speech acts subsist in His essence. See Wilferd Madelung, “The Origins of the Controversy concerning 
the Creation of the Koran,” Orientalia Hispanica sive studia F.M. Pareja octogenario dicata, ed. J.M. Barral, vol. 
I/1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 523-5 and 524n4. For Ibn Taymiyya’s view, see also Jon Hoover, “Ḥanbalī Theology,” 
in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 17-8, 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696703.013.014. 
179 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 74. 
180 al-Bazdawī, 62. 
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every instant necessarily existent with His attributes.181 Furthermore, to contend that the Quran is 
temporal yet uncreated is even more evil than to simply assert that it is created, for while 
origination in time (ḥudūth) through an act of creation is conceivable, it is impossible without 
it.182 What Abū l-Yusr considers to be evil is perhaps not only the misconception of the nature of 
creation involved in this view, but also its possible implication (even if not embraced by the 
Karrāmites) that the Quran simply came to be on its own, thus severing its direct connection to 
God. 
Neither do the Karrāmites’ scriptural references make their view any more convincing for 
Abū l-Yusr, who is careful to rebut each version of the argument based on them.183 As to the first 
version, he explains that God speaks with an eternal and single (wāḥid) speech without beginning 
and end. With this speech, He speaks with people at different times, such as Moses after He 
created him when He commanded him to throw down his cane. How precisely this works, 
however, ultimately cannot be explained since there is no “howness” (kayfiyya) for His speech 
just as there is no howness for His essence, and inquiring about the howness of that for which 
there is no howness is impossible. Thus Abū l-Yusr, despite offering a definition of speech that 
can be literally ascribed to God, emphasizes that divine speech is finally beyond human 
comprehension. 
To the second version of the Karrāmite argument, Abū l-Yusr offers two responses, each 
of which is represented as the view of some Sunnites.184 In the first response, the reduction of 
speech to mere acts of informing, commanding, and inquiring that the argument seems to imply 
is rejected, and the Ḥanafite notion of speech as that which precludes muteness and silence and is 
heard and understood is reiterated. Such speech has been established for God and in its divine 
form is forever atemporal (lam yazal ghayr ḥādith), eternal, and single. With it, God informed us 
about Adam’s disobedience, commanded Moses to throw down his cane, and asked Moses what 
was in his right hand.  
In the second response, it is conceded that speech consists of informing, commanding, 
and inquiring. Via His one eternal speech, God informs, commands, and inquires in pre-eternity, 
the present, and the future. He informed in pre-eternity that He is the Glorious, Holy, and Lord of 
 
181 al-Bazdawī, 67 and 73-4. 
182 al-Bazdawī, 65. 
183 al-Bazdawī, 74-5. 
184 al-Bazdawī, 74-5. 
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the angels and spirit, and bore witness to His oneness; He informed us about Adam’s 
disobedience in the present;185 and He will speak with the believers in heaven. While this 
concession seems to dismiss the definition of speech espoused by Abū l-Yusr and other 
Ḥanafites, it maintains a distinction between God’s speech as an eternal entity and the different 
communicative acts He performs with it. Naturally, then, Abū l-Yusr considers the second 
response to be as valid as the first one. 
3.4.2 Scripture as a Manẓūm 
The Mu‘tazilite conception of the Quran as a purely created entity is no more appealing to 
Abū l-Yusr than the Karrāmite one. But that does not mean that he is able to simply ignore it. 
This is because certain aspects of scriptures the Mu‘tazilites point to in order to demonstrate the 
their createdness are undeniable: the Quran has a beginning and end; the Quran is made up of 
parts, some of which abrogate others; the Quran was sent down from the Preserved Tablet to the 
worldly heaven;186 there is Arabic scripture and Hebrew scripture; and scriptures are written, 
recited, memorized, heard, transported from one place to another and erased after having been 
written down.187 Additionally, they enlist verses of the Quran for support.188 First, 43:3 states, 
“We made it (ja‘alnāhu) an Arabic Quran.” They argue that the verbal noun ju‘l, derived from 
the infinitive ja‘ala, commonly meaning “to make” or “to produce”,189 and of which the plural 
first person, past tense form is used in this verse (ja‘alnā), means “creation” (khalq) and 
“existentiation” (ījād). Second, 3:7 mentions that the Quran includes “ambiguous” verses 
(mutashābihāt), and these bear the marks of temporal origination (ḥudūth). And third, in 21:2 the 
Quran is called a “created revelation (dhikr muḥdath).”190 
 
185 “He informed [us] about Adam’s disobedience with His pre-eternal speech, not in pre-eternity.” What Abū l-Yusr  
seems to mean is that God spoke of Adam’s disobedience at the moment when He revealed his story in the Quran. 
186 Q 85:22 affirms that the Quran is fī lawḥ maḥfūẓ, which could mean either “in a Preserved Tablet” or “preserved 
in a tablet”. In Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s (d. 310/923) view, there is little difference between the two readings since both 
indicate that the Quran is protected from alteration. See Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān, s.v. “Preserved Tablet.” 
187 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 65. 
188 al-Bazdawī, 65. 
189 As a first definition of the verb, William Lane writes, “He made a thing,” and mentions ṣana‘a as a synonym for 
it, though he notes that it has a more general meaning than ṣana‘a as well as fa‘ala and their equivalents. However, 
in some of his examples of the verb in use, he translates it as “created” and “brought into being”. See his An Arabic-
English Lexicon, bk. 1, pt. 2 (London; Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1865), 430-1. 
190 Needless to say, this is not how muḥdath in this verse is usually translated into English; it is instead often 
rendered as “new” or “recent”. But this translation captures the sense in which the Mu‘tazilites interpret its meaning 
here. For their references to 43:3 and 21:2 in support of their doctrine, see also, respectively, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 
Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī: al-mushahhar bi-l-tafsīr al-kabīr wa-mafātīḥ al-ghayb, vol. 27 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1981), 
194; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī, vol. 22, 140. 
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To respond to these proofs, Abū l-Yusr introduces the concept of manẓūm (pl. manẓūmāt), 
“composition”.191 Essentially, the term as he uses it designates a communication, whether human 
or divine. This communication or manẓūm may be in the form of a text, such as the poem of a 
poet or a scripture such as the Quran, or simply a transmitted message, such as the sermon of a 
preacher or message of a messenger. Most importantly, the manẓūm does not involve the actual 
speech of its composer, but rather is only indicative of (dāllan ‘alā) that speech. 
Besides these general details, Abū l-Yusr offers little information about the nature of the 
Quranic manẓūm. He insists that it is unnecessary to explain further. It is enough, he says, to 
know that it is a manẓūm that God has composed; His composition of it is His action, and He is 
eternal with His actions. It is created because that which is other than God (ghayr Allāh) is 
created, and it is other than God because it is not a divine attribute. It might have been created in 
the Tablet or in an angel, but that is also not necessary to specify. The important thing is that its 
creation does not compromise the transcendence of God’s speech because while it is called the 
Book of God as well as the Quran, it is not God’s speech itself, but merely indicative of (dāllan 
‘alā) it. In other words, it may be said to be God’s speech in a purely metaphorical sense in virtue 
of its being indicative of His speech.192 
With this notion of the manẓūm in place, Abū l-Yusr is now in a position to address the 
proofs for the createdness of scripture cited by his Mu‘tazilite opponent. He does this with 
precision, designating them one by one as aspects of a divinely authored manẓūm and thereby 
disassociating them from God’s attribute of speech itself.193 
To begin with, God’s manẓūm has a beginning, end, number, and parts, and is transported 
from one place to another; in contrast, His speech is single; subsistent in His essence; devoid of 
beginning, end, number and parts; and not transported.194  
 
191 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 68. 
192 The last two sentences are based on the 1963 edition of Uṣūl al-dīn, which reads as follows: Wa-hādhā l-manẓūm 
yusammā Kitāb Allāh ta‘ālā, wa-yusammā l-Qur’ān, wa-huwa ghayr kalām Allāh ta‘ālā; bal, huwa dāll ‘alā kalām 
Allāh ta‘ālā. Wa-yuṭlaqu ‘alā hādhā l-manẓūm anna-hu kalām Allāh ta‘ālā bi-ṭarīq al-majāz li-kawnihi dāllan ‘alā 
kalāmihi. In the 2002 edition that I mainly use, Kitāb Allāh reads kitāb lil-lāh, and the portion from bal to the fourth 
ta‘ālā is omitted. This makes Abū l-Yusr to say, rather nonsensically, that the Quranic manẓūm is “not God’s speech 
in a metaphorical sense in virtue of its being indicative of His speech.” See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 68; Abū l-Yusr 
Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Bazdawī, Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Hans Peter Linss (Cairo: Dār Iḥyā’ 
al-Kutub al-‘Arabiyya, 1383/1963), 61. 
193 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 68-71. 
194 al-Bazdawī, 68 and 70. 
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As for abrogation, it concerns God’s legal rules (ḥukm) and their durations, which they 
have because God rules (yaḥkumu) whatever and whenever He wishes to. As the abrogation of 
God’s speech itself is impossible, it applies to His manẓūm through which His legal rules are 
stipulated. This abrogation consists of the annulation of the recitation of a passage that was 
originally a part of the scripture (raf‘ hifẓ al-tilāwa ‘an qulūb al-‘ibād). An example is provided 
in the following statement of ‘Umar: “Among that which was recited in the Quran is, ‘When an 
old man and old woman commit adultery, stone them as an exemplary punishment from God. 
God is Mighty and Wise’.”195  
God’s manẓūm, not His speech itself, descended (anzala) from the Preserved Tablet to the 
worldly heaven, and from there to the earth. Confirmation of this is Q 44:2-3, “By the Clear Book 
(al-kitāb al-mubīn), We indeed sent it down (anzalnāhu) on a blessed night.” The “Book” here is 
a name for the Quranic manẓūm for “book” (kitāb) signifies a written thing (al-maktūb), and the 
Quranic manẓūm is a written thing. This is similar to how it is said that a vizier “sends down” 
(anzala) the speech of a ruler from the citadel when he delivers (anzala) the ruler’s message 
(kitāb).196 
God’s speech itself does not exist in any language. Arabic, the language of the Quran, and 
Hebrew, the language of the Torah, are attributes of the Quranic and Torahic manẓūmān, 
respectively. However, it is in virtue of such languages that God’s speech is written in books, 
memorized in hearts, recited with tongues, and heard with ears, though it does not inhere (ghayr 
ḥāllin) in any of these entities. Rather, it subsists in God’s essence because speech, whether 
divine or human, subsists in the essence of its speaker and does not disjoin from it. Nonetheless, 
one who writes, memorizes, recites, and hears God’s manẓūm truly, not metaphorically, writes, 
memorizes, recites, and hears God’s speech. The evidence for this is how the occurrence of these 
actions is expressed in ordinary language. One is said, for instance, to have memorized the 
speech of another person when he has memorized the poetry (i.e., the manẓūm) that the person 
composed (naẓama); the same scenario applies to reciting and hearing.197  
 
195 al-Bazdawī, 69. For a similar version of this narration, see Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj, “Sahih Muslim 1691 a,” Sunnah, 
accessed March 28, 2020, https://sunnah.com/muslim/29/21. 
196 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 69. 
197 Presumably also writing, which seems to have been noted where there is a gap in the manuscript. For this 
paragraph, see al-Bazdawī, 70-1. 
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It is hard to reconcile the claim that one truly deals with God’s speech in performing these 
actions with Abū l-Yusr’s previous statement that the speech of a manẓūm is indicative rather 
than constitutive of the speech of its composer. In the case of hearing God’s speech, Abū l-Yusr 
supports it by proposing a kind of divine intervention. He relates, with approval, the view of 
some Ḥanafites that it is possible that God causes his speech to be heard (yusmi‘ kalāmahu) in the 
recitation of the Quran so that His speech and the reciter’s speech are witnessed simultaneously 
(mushāhad ma‘an); this is because God’s speech is permanent (bāqin), unlike human speech, 
which is an accident (‘araḍ).198 In holding this view, however, Abū l-Yusr stood alone amongst 
his fellow early Māturīdites who rejected the possibility of truly hearing God’s speech.199 
Finally, as for the verses of the Quran cited by his Mu‘tazilite opponent, Abū l-Yusr does 
not feel the need to offer alternative interpretations. Like the empirical aspects of scripture, he 
can simply claim that they all refer to the Quranic manẓūm and not God’s speech.200 
So far, Abū l-Yusr demonstrates his capacity to defend his conception of the relationship 
between God’s speech and scripture against the proofs of his Mu‘tazilite opponent for the 
createdness of scripture not by refuting or denying these proofs, but rather incorporating them 
into his own theory.201 His final step in consolidating his notion of the Quranic manẓūm is to 
briefly discuss the revelation and canonization of the Quran.202 Specifically, he wants to prevent 
any misunderstanding of the compilation of the Quran by Abū Bakr and ‘Uthmān that 
compromises its divine authorship. To begin with, he explains that Gabriel transmitted the verses 
and chapters of the Quran to the Prophet Muḥammad. Gabriel explained to the Prophet that so-
and-so verse belongs to so-and-so chapter and that so-and-so chapter is to come after so-and-so 
chapter. Its verses and chapters were dictated by various people, so Abū Bakr gathered them 
together in a book (maṣḥaf) after the Prophet’s death, and then ‘Uthmān ordered the writing of 
several copies (maṣāḥif), compared them with the version put together by Abū Bakr, and sent 
 
198 al-Bazdawī, 72. 
199 Brodersen, Der unbekannte kalām, 572.  
200 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 73. However, he thinks that 21:2 might also concern legal rulings (aḥkām). Alternatively, 
aḥkām might be read as iḥkām, “strengthening”. According to al-Māturīdī, some scholars understood muḥdath in 
21:2 as muḥkam, “strengthened”, meaning that God strengthened the Quran so that neither falseness can penetrate it 
nor anyone produce the like of it. See Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Māturīdī, Ta’wīlāt al-Qur’ān, vol. 
9, ed. Murād Sulūn (Istanbul: Dār al-Mīzān, 2007), 256. 
201 With the exception of the proof that scripture is erased after having been written down, which Abū l-Yusr 
mentions but does not respond to. We can safely assume that, in his view, the object of this act is the Quranic 
manẓūm, not God’s speech. 
202 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 72-3. 
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them off to distant lands. Therefore, neither Abū Bakr nor ‘Uthmān devised the arrangement of 
the Quran (ann al-naẓm waḍa‘ahu Abū Bakr aw ‘Uthmān) or compiled its chapters (al-suwar 
jami‘āhā); rather, the Quran is God’s manẓūm and its chapters are His compilation (majmū‘ 
Allāh). 
3.4.3 The Letters and Utterance of the Quran 
On the spectrum of the debate over the nature of the Quran, the theologians who stood at 
the far end away from the Mu‘tazilites were those who sought to maintain the absolute 
uncreatedness of all forms and worldly aspects of the sacred text, including its letters, utterance, 
numbered pages, binding material, and the parchment on which it was written.203 The first two of 
these forms are discussed by Abū l-Yusr. He attributes the view that the letters are uncreated to a 
group of traditionists (qawm min ahl al-ḥadīth) and a group of Sufis (farīq mina l-ṣūfiyya). These 
groups likely include Ḥanbalites or those influenced by their theology since they conceived of 
God’s speech as eternal words and sounds subsisting in His essence.204 This conception implies, 
of course, that the letters of God’s speech are also eternal, which is indeed rather forcefully 
voiced by the early Ḥanbalite ‘Ubaydallāh Ibn Baṭṭa (d. 387/997): “And one who contends that 
[even] one letter of it [the Quran] is created without doubt disbelieves”. Furthermore, he states, 
wherever the Quran is written, whether on children’s chalkboards or a stone, it is the uncreated 
word of God; whoever denies this disbelieves in God and may be executed.205 Approximately a 
century later, the Ḥanbalite Sufi Khwāja ‘Abdallāh Anṣārī (d. 481/1089) wrote a commentary on 
the Quran that, although no longer extant, served as the source for the like work of the little-
known Sufi Rashīd al-Dīn Maybudī (d. 467-93/1075-1100).206 While Maybudī, like Abū l-Yusr, 
does not consider himself a Ḥanbalite but, rather, simply a Sunnite, he expresses the same 
doctrine about the Quranic letters in his interpretation of the three ambiguous letters beginning 
the second chapter of the Quran: “The ahl al-sunnat say that these letters give evidence and clear 
[proof] of the fact that the Qur’ān has letters and is eternal in its letters, and whosoever says other 
 
203 al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal, 96; Tritton, “The Speech of God,” 8-9. 
204 Tritton, “The Speech of God,” 8. 
205 Hoover, “Ḥanbalī Theology,” 6; Abū ‘Abdallāh ‘Ubaydallāh Ibn Baṭṭa, al-Sharḥ wa-l-ibāna ‘alā uṣūl al-sunna 
wa-l-diyāna, ed. Riḍā’ b. Na‘sān Mu‘ṭī (Medina; Damascus: Maktabat al-‘Ulūm wa-l-Ḥikam, 2002), 202-5. 
206 Annabel Keeler, “Mystical Theology and the Traditionalist Hermeneutics of Maybudī’s Kashf al-Asrar,” in 
Sufism and Theology, ed. Ayman Shihadeh (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 15. 
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than this is being insolent and stubborn in the face of God, which makes him a heretic 
(mulḥid).”207 
Abū l-Yusr is no less forthright than Ibn Baṭṭa and Maybudī in his rejection of the 
Ḥanbalite belief concerning the letters of the Quran: it is completely wrong and forbidden for one 
to assert.208 All rational people (‘uqalā’) believe the opposite, the proof of which is that letters 
are, similar to what was explained earlier, in fact the sides of the mouth (jawānib al-fam),209 and 
the sounds that occur on the sides of the mouth are also called letters, while both the sides of the 
mouth and sounds are created. Additionally, letters written on paper, which are called “letters” 
because they are indicative of the letters/sounds that occur on the sides of the mouth, are simply 
created ink.  
Abū l-Yusr is, however, more understanding of his opponents’ stance than the two 
Ḥanbalites of theirs. He attributes their inadequately thought-out arguments to a sincere desire to 
avoid asserting that God’s speech is created and thus possibly misleading the common people. In 
Abū l-Yusr’s eyes, that concern is legitimate because ordinary people would have difficulty 
distinguishing between the letters of the Quran and God’s speech. Thus, it may indeed be 
necessary to indoctrinate (yujri) them to believe that both God’s speech and the letters are  
uncreated.   
Abū l-Yusr’s response to the doctrine that the utterance (lafẓ) of the Quran is uncreated, 
which he attributes to “some traditionists” (ba‘ḍ aṣhāb al-ḥadīth) and “some jurists”, is 
similar.210 Again, we may suppose the Ḥanbalites to be among those scholars; indeed, it is stated 
in one of the creeds attributed to Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) himself that whoever believes 
the utterance and recitation of the Quran to be created is a Jahmite and infidel.211 For Abū l-Yusr, 
 
207 Abū l-Faḍl Rashīd al-Dīn Maybudī, Kashf al-asrār wa-‘uddat al-abrār, vol. 1, ed. ‘A. Ḥekmat (Tehran: Amīr 
Kabīr, 1331-9 [1913-21]), 43, in Keeler, “Mystical Theology,” 17. Later in the text, Maybudī condemns the 
Ash‘arites for rejecting this view and holding instead that the Quran is merely eternal in meaning. See Keeler, 27n16.  
208 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 69-70. 
209 Before he mentioned that “letter” (ḥarf) means “side” (jānib), and that letters (ḥurūf) become letters (ḥurūf) in 
virtue of their occurrence on the sides of the mouth (ḥurūf al-fam) as sound. See al-Bazdawī, 63. 
210 al-Bazdawī, 73. 
211 Abū l-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. Abī Ya‘lā, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, vol. 1, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqī (Cairo: 
Maṭba‘at al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya, n.d.), 29; Allard, Le problème, 100; Watt, The Formative Period, 293. 
According to Saud al-Sarhan, this creed was likely penned by Ibn Ḥanbal’s student Ḥarb b. Ismā‘īl al-Kirmānī (d. 
280/893). See Saud al-Sarhan, “The Creeds of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal,” in Books and Bibliophiles: Studies in honour of 
Paul Auchterlonie on the Bio-Bibliography of the Muslim World, ed. Robert Gleave (Cambridge: E.J.W. Gibb 
Memorial Trust, 2014), 34-7. 
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the falseness of this doctrine is evident from the fact that all human acts are created by God.212 
But once again, he defends those he criticizes, though more staunchly: they also are trying to 
protect the masses, who cannot distinguish between an utterance (lafẓ) and its referent (al-
malfūẓ), but in their case it must not be thought that that they lack understanding.  
It should be kept in mind that, from Abū l-Yusr’s perspective, the traditionists, Sufis, and 
jurists all belong to the Sunnites. This may explain why he seems rather embarrassed by their 
espousal of these doctrines and attempts, in effect, to exculpate them. He is also sincerely willing 
to overlook what he considers incorrect teachings in order to safeguard the eternity of God’s 
speech, that being his overriding concern throughout his discussion of the attribute. This concern 
emerges once again in his response to the question of whether or not the Quran is created. 
Previously, we saw him categorically affirm that the Quranic manẓūm is created, but he is more 
cautious now that he must directly enter into the notorious debate over the ontological status of 
this scripture:  
The Quran occurs in (yaqa‘u ‘alā) reading, recitation, and this manẓūm, and it 
occurs as God’s speech…This being the case, it is not proper for anyone to say 
that the Quran is uncreated. Rather, what one must say is, ‘The Quran is God’s 
speech, and God’s speech is uncreated.’ [But] if one says in an absolute sense 
(muṭlaqan), ‘The Quran is uncreated,’ that is fine and harmless, even though the 
reading, recitation, and utterance of the Quran are created, because the absolute 
sense (al-muṭlaq) here ultimately pertains to God’s speech [itself].213 
What these remarks confirm is that, in spite of Abū l-Yusr’s toleration of those 
who affirm the uncreatedness of the Quran, his concept of the Quranic manẓūm is 
remarkably close to the Mu‘tazilite view of the Quran. Yet the difference that remains 
makes all the difference: whereas for the Mu‘tazilites the Quran is the created speech of 
God and nothing else, for Abū l-Yusr it is speech indicative of eternal speech subsisting in 
God’s essence. 
 
212 His arguments in favour of this view and against opposing opinions are presented in a separate chapter. See al-
Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 104-14. 
213 al-Bazdawī, 73. These remarks, and Abū l-Yusr’s concept of the Quranic manẓūm overall, contrast starkly with 
al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī’s comments on the Quran in his famous Eastern Ḥanafite creed. He writes: “The Quran is 
the uncreated speech of God, for the Quran is truly God’s speech, not metaphorically. One who says that the Quran is 
created is like one who says that an attribute of God is created, and this is disbelief because the Quran is God’s 
speech and His attribute.” Among his proofs for this opinion are several hadiths in which the Prophet declares that 
one who considers the Quran to be created is a disbeliever. See al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī, al-Sawād, 11-2. However, 
Abū l-Yusr’s claim that one truly deals with God’s speech in writing, memorizing, reciting, and hearing the Quran 
might be seen as a compromise with al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī’s position.  
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3.4.3 God’s Conversation with Moses 
The conversation between God and Moses recorded in Q 28:29-35 generated yet another 
debate over the nature of divine speech. Here, God does not address humankind as He does with 
scripture, but rather a single human being. Once again, theologians debated whether this instance 
of God’s speech is created or uncreated, but now, in constructing their arguments, had to pay 
particularly close attention to the description of the event in the Quran. This was complicated by 
the fact that the scripture seems to lend support to both interpretations. On the one hand, many 
Sunnites pointed to the use of the verbal noun (maṣdar) taklīman as an adverb in 4:164 to 
characterize the manner of God’s address to Moses: “God spoke to Moses taklīman [in actual 
speech or words].” Invoking the Arabic grammatical rule that the employment of the masḍar in 
this way, termed in technical language the “absolute passive participle” (maf‘ūl muṭlaq), is to 
negate the possibility of a metaphor,214 they argued that God must have truly spoken directly to 
Moses.215 On the other hand, Mu‘tazilites could refer to a more detailed description of the event 
in 28:30 in which the divine address seems to be transmitted to Moses via sound from the 
external world: “He was called by a voice from a tree in a blessed spot, on the right side of the 
valley: ‘O Moses, I am God, Lord of the Universe’.” This account accorded perfectly with their 
understanding of God’s speech as being partly made up of articulated sounds, as illustrated by the 
Twelver Shī‘ite ‘Alī al-Faḍl al-Ṭabarsī’s (d. ca. 548/1155) exegesis of this verse who, like many 
of his fellow Twelvers, was strongly influenced by Mu‘tazilite theology.216 He writes, “Moses 
heard the call and speech from the tree because God made (fa‘ala) speech in it and made (ja‘ala) 
the tree a substrate (maḥall) for the speech, as speech requires a substrate [to inhere in] since it is 
an accident (‘araḍ).”217 
 
214 Muḥyī l-Dīn al-Darwīsh, I‘rāb al-Qur’ān al-Karīm wa-bayānuhu, vol. 2 (Homs: Dār al-Irshād lil-Shu’ūn al-
Jāmi‘iyya, 1992), 382. 
215 See, for instance, Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Bakr al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmi‘ li-aḥkām al-Qur’ān wa-
l-mubayyin limā taḍammanahu mina l-sunna wa-āy al-furqān, vol. 7, ed. ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī and 
Muḥammad Riḍwān ‘Araqsūsī (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 2006), 224-5; Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Alī b. 
Muḥammad Abū l-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr fī ‘ilm al-tafsīr, vol. 2 ([Beirut]: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, n.d.), 256. 
The difficulty 4:164 posed to the Mu‘tazilite view is suggested by the fact that al-Zamakhsharī, a Mu‘tazilite 
commentator and renowned grammarian, offers no interpretation of it. See his Tafsīr al-Kashshāf, 272. 
216 EI², s.v. “Mu‘tazila.” 
217 ‘Alī l-Faḍl b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarsī, Majma‘ al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qur’ān, vol. 7 (Beirut: Dār al-Murtaḍā, 2006), 
314. Similarly, the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (d. ca. 45-50 CE) believed that God addressed Moses and 
his people through a voice he commanded to be created in the air. See Wolfson, The Philosophy, 275-6; Madelung, 
“The Controversy,” 507. 
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The Mu‘tazilite perspective was in fact even attractive for Sunnites such as al-Māturīdī 
who also believed that God’s address to Moses was communicated with created letters and 
sound, but, remaining loyal to Sunnite doctrine, considered that through these letters and sound 
Moses heard God’s uncreated speech.218 Abū l-Yusr, however, will have nothing to do with al-
Māturīdī’s opinion, instead insisting, like many other Sunnites, on the direct involvement of 
God’s speech itself. He explains that God caused Moses to hear and understand His self-
subsistent speech, devoid of sound and letter, via the “subtlety of His craftsmanship and 
perfection of His ability”.219 He supports this explanation with three arguments demonstrating 
that God’s communication with Moses did not entail sound.220 The first argument involves a 
claim about the nature of a “call” (nidā’), as Moses is said in the Quran to have been “called” 
(nūdiya) by a voice. This, Abū l-Yusr says, is a type of speech, and speech does not (necessarily) 
require sound. Speech is marked (yukhtaṣṣ) not by sound, but by a speaker; sound is merely 
accessory to speech because there is nothing in sound that is heard. Rather, it is speech that is 
heard, whether it includes sound or not. God’s call to Moses is an instance of speech without 
sound. 
 Abū l-Yusr’s second argument appeals to his conviction that an attribute subsists in the 
being to which it belongs. As an attribute itself, speech subsists in its speaker; thus, if God had 
created a sound in the tree for Moses to hear, the tree would have been the speaker rather than 
God, whereas God makes clear that He was the speaker. And lastly, Abū l-Yusr contends that the 
statement in the verse that Moses was called from the right side of the valley means—“and God 
knows best”—that Moses’ location near a tree on the right side of a valley made it as if he heard 
God’s speech from the tree. He thus sees no choice but to resort to a figurative interpretation of 
this part of the verse to support his view. 
3.5 Hearing and Vision 
All Muslim theologians agreed that God speaks, even though they disagreed over the 
nature of His speech. They did not, however, all agree that God is hearing (samī‘) and seeing 
(baṣīr),221 despite the numerous descriptions of Him as such in the Quran (e.g., 17:1). For some 
 
218 al-Māturīdī, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, 122; Cerić, Roots, 186-7. 
219 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 71. 
220 al-Bazdawī, 71-2. 
221 Samī‘ and baṣīr fall into a class of words known in Arabic as ṣīgh al-mubālagha, a type of active participle (ism 
al-fā‘il) used for intensiveness or multiplication (‘inda qaṣd al-mubālagha aw al-takthīr). This is why, when applied 
to God, they are often rendered as “All-Hearing” and “All-Seeing”, respectively. Here, I translate them as “hearing” 
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theologians, these adjectives could be accepted only as representative of other attributes.222 
Refuting their view and, consequently, affirming the Sunnite opinion that God is truly hearing 
and seeing is the focus of Abū l-Yusr’s brief chapter on these attributes.223 
Abū l-Yusr identifies “some Mu‘tazilites” as those who denied that God was hearing and 
seeing and names al-Naẓẓām and Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Ka‘bī (d. 319/931). This is only 
partly accurate since, as was noted earlier in the outline of al-Naẓẓām’s conception of the divine 
attributes, he did not deny that God is hearing and seeing, but rather affirmed those attributes  
alongside his denial of their opposites, deafness and blindness.224 In admitting their existence, he 
stood in agreement with his fellow Basran Mu‘tazilites,225 who further specified that God sees 
bodies (ajsām) and colours and hears speech and sounds.226 In contrast, al-Ka‘bī and other 
Baghdad Mu‘tazilites believed that God is hearing and seeing in the sense that He is knowing 
about objects of hearing (masmū‘āt) that beings other than Him hear and objects of vision 
(mur’ayāt) that beings other than Him see.227 
Abū l-Yusr relates and responds to one of the arguments that was evidently made in 
favour of the Baghdad Mu‘tazilite view. This argument applies the principle of reasoning about 
God on the basis of matters in this world, specifically the nature of hearing and seeing. Hearing 
occurs when sound joins to the ears (ittiṣāl al-ṣawt bi-l-udhun) and seeing occurs when the light 
of vision (ḍaw’ al-baṣar) comes upon a visible object (al-mur’ā);228 hence, hearing requires ears 
 
and “seeing” because Abū l-Yusr’s main concern is to show that God is hearing and seeing, not that He hears and 
sees everything. On ṣīgh al-mubālagha, see Fu’ād Ni‘ma, Mulakhkhaṣ qawā‘id al-lugha al-‘arabiyya, vol. 2 (Beirut: 
Dār al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya, n.d.), 42. 
222 In this discussion of hearing and vision, I use the term “attribute” in the sense of an adjective rather than 
substantive. This is because, due to the nature of his opponent’s view, Abū l-Yusr only speaks of “hearing” and 
“seeing”. We know, of course, that he, as well as other Ḥanafites and Māturīdites, believed that all adjectives applied 
to God have corresponding substantives subsisting in God’s essence. In the creed near the end of Uṣūl al-dīn, Abū l-
Yusr does mention the substantives hearing (sam‘) and vision (baṣar). See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 250. 
223 al-Bazdawī, 43-4. 
224 al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 173-4. 
225 Ibn Aḥmad al-Asadābādī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-khamsa, ed. ‘Abd al-Karīm ‘Uthmān (Cairo: Maktabat 
Wahba, 1996), 168. According to Daniel Gimaret, this book, which ‘Uthmān attributed to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, is actually 
the commentary on ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s treatise by his Zaydite follower Mānkdīm (d. 425/1034), the real title of which 
is Ta‘līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa. See Daniel Gimaret, “Les Uṣūl al-ḫamsa du Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār et leurs 
commentaires,” Annales Islamologique 15 (1979): 50-7. 
226 al-Baghdādī, al-Farq, 159. 
227 al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 175; al-Baghdādī, al-Farq, 159; ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ, 168; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal, 
67.  
228 This theory of vision, known as “extramission” theory, was predominant in the Islamic optical tradition until Ibn 
al-Ḥaytham (d. 430/1040) established his highly influential “intromission” theory in which he broke down the visible 
object into point sources, each of which emits its ray to the eyes. See David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from al-
Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1976), 33, 59-60, and 85-6. Hearing was less discussed by 
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and seeing requires eyes. Therefore, God, being devoid of such organs, is only hearing and seeing 
in the sense that He is knowing about all objects of hearing (masmū‘āt) and vision (mubṣarāt). 
This is parallel to God not smelling and tasting because He does not have a sense of smell 
(shamm) or taste (dhawq), even though these are means of acquiring knowledge. Instead, God is 
knowing about all objects of taste (madhūqāt), smell (mashmūmāt), and touch (malmūsāt). 
On this matter, the Baghdad Mu‘tazilites thus value rational considerations over the literal 
word of scripture. For Abū l-Yusr, in contrast, the numerous times that God describes Himself as 
hearing and seeing in the Quran constitute the principal proof that He is so. The fact that He does 
not describe Himself, nor does any imam describe Him, as smelling, tasting, and touching, is also 
why He is not to be considered as such.  
Rational argument does, however, play a supporting role. With regard to smelling, tasting, 
and touching, this role is negative in that there simply is no indisputable proof that obligates one 
to believe that God possesses these attributes. As for hearing, neither ears, sound, nor the meeting 
of sound with the ears are conditions for it. This is because speech is what is heard, and speech is 
not sound; sound is only incidentally (ittifāqan) a means for hearing. For vision, too, neither the 
eye nor the meeting of the light of vision with a visible object are conditions. The proof of this is 
that one sees a mountain from a distance of about ten parasangs (about 55 km), while the light of 
vision cannot reach that far.229 In fact, these aspects of hearing and vision are analogous to those 
of other attributes, such as acting and knowing. Bodies are only incidental means for the 
performance of actions, not necessary conditions; and the heart and brain are only incidental 
means by which knowledge arises, not conditions necessary for it to occur. 
Another proof that hearing is not what the opponent claims it to be again appeals to the 
notion that an attribute subsists in the being to which it belongs. Speech subsists in the speaker 
and does not disjoin from him, thus being heard without joining to the hearer (min ghayr ittiṣāl 
bi-l-sāmi‘). In the same way, when speech is expressed with sound (i.e., articulation), the sound 
subsists in the speaker and is his attribute that does not disjoin from him, meaning that it is 
impossible for it to join to someone else’s ears. To explain this with reference to the Stoic theory 
 
Muslim scholars. The theory mentioned by Abū l-Yusr resembles that espoused by al-Naẓẓām. He thought that 
sounds are bodies that must move to and into our ears in order for us to hear them. See van Ess, Theologie und 
Gesellschaft, vol. 3, 356-7; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 3, 387.  
229 This seems to be what he means by wa-ḍaw’ al-baṣar lā yujāwizu bi-a‘yun. Brodersen reads this similarly, “Der 
Blick selbst aber nicht so weit reicht.” See her Der unbekannte kalām, 241.  
 
 
54 
 
of hearing, which may have had some influence amongst Muslim scholars and which Abū l-Yusr 
indeed appears to be drawing on, hearing does not occur through the contact of sound with our 
ears, but rather with that of the sphere-shaped waves produced by the impact of an object 
generating sound on the air around it.230 
By demonstrating that what makes hearing and vision possible in this world is not always 
necessary for them to occur, Abū l-Yusr opens the way to understanding God as hearing and 
seeing in alternative yet literal modalities. While he notes that God hears speech and sees existent 
things as He wishes, he does not comment further on the nature of these modalities, ultimately 
contenting himself with affirming what is said of God in scripture.231  
3.6 Will 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The topic of divine will in Islamic theology has two dimensions, one metaphysical and 
the other ethical. The metaphysical dimension concerns the existence and nature of the attribute, 
whereas the ethical one pertains to its connection to what comes to be and occurs in the world, 
especially human evil, such as disobedience to and disbelief in God. 
The ethical aspect of this problem is beyond the scope of our discussion here. Suffice it to 
say that Abū l-Yusr devotes a chapter to it in which he argues for the Ḥanafite position that God 
wills all good and evil beings and events but is only content with and loves the good ones. His 
main opponents are the Mu‘tazilites, who insist that God does not will disobedience because that 
would make Him unjust, and al-Ash‘arī, who believes that God is also content with and loves 
disobedience.232 
Abū l-Yusr’s treatment of the metaphysical aspect may be divided into two parts, each 
covered in corresponding sections below: his position within the intra-Ḥanafite dispute over the 
meanings of the terms mashī’a and irāda; and his arguments for conceiving of God’s will as an 
eternal and substantive attribute. 
 
230 See Havard Løkke, “The Stoics on Sense Perception,” in Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern 
Philosophy, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Kärkkäinen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 42. 
231 In other words, he applies the famous “without [speculating] how” (bi-lā kayfa) approach to these two attributes. 
On this approach, see Binyamin Abrahamov, “The ‘Bi-lā Kayfa’ Doctrine and Its Foundations in Islamic Theology,” 
Arabica 42, no. 3 (Nov., 1995): 365-379. 
232 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 52-61. 
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3.6.2 The Intra-Ḥanafite Dispute over Mashī’a and Irāda 
Theological disagreements amongst the Ḥanafites are nothing unusual; one finds 
numerous instances throughout Uṣūl al-dīn itself. But their disagreement over the meanings of 
the terms mashī’a and irāda is special because it involves Abū l-Yusr and the majority of 
Ḥanafites facing off against the head of the school, Abū Ḥanīfa. The majority of Ḥanafites 
believe the meaning of both mashī’a and irāda to be “will”, whereas Abū Ḥanīfa defines mashī’a 
as “will” and irāda as “desire”.  
Abū l-Yusr relates Abū Ḥanīfa’s argument as follows: “[When] one says to his wife, ‘I 
will (shi’tu) to divorce you’ and intends the divorce, the divorce occurs. [But] if he says, ‘I want 
(aradtu) to divorce you’…[even if] he intends the divorce, [the divorce] does not occur.”233 For 
Abū Ḥanīfa, then, “to will” (shā’a) something involves the realization of the thing, whereas “to 
want” (arāda) it merely expresses a desire for it to be realized. We also learn from Abū l-Yusr 
that Abū Ḥanīfa considered irāda to be a kind of exploration (mina l-rawd) or, more precisely, 
seeking (ṭalab), while mashī’a does not entail seeking. Additionally, he thought that irāda 
belongs to the genus of love and contentment (min jins al-maḥabba wa-l-riḍā’) and not to that of 
mashī’a. In other words, as applied to God, He wants (arāda) only that which He loves and is 
content with, such as faith and obedience, whereas He wills (shā’a) both such things as well as 
that which He dislikes and is displeased about, such as unbelief and disobedience.234 
The Ḥanafite majority cites Q 6:125 in support of their view: “Whoever God wants 
(yurid) to guide, He opens his breast to Islam; and whoever He wants (yurid) to lead astray, He 
makes his breast tight and constricted.”235 Abū l-Yusr does not explain how this verse 
 
233 al-Bazdawī, 52. In contrast, the author of K. fīhi ma‘rifa says that this is the argument of “our companions 
(aṣḥābunā)”. See al-Bazdawī, Kitāb fīhi ma‘rifa, 71. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, Brodersen suggests that the 
conflicting claims about mashī’a and irāda in Uṣūl al-dīn and K. fīhi ma‘rifa may be due to the different theological 
and legal contexts in which they were interpreted. Alternatively, they might indicate that the authors of the two texts 
are not the same and that they occupied different regions or cities in Transoxania, such as Samarqand and Bukhara. 
In any case, the fact that Ḥanafites made this argument is surprising since it contends that both intent and the use of a 
specific word is required to begin the divorce process, whereas it is generally thought that classical Ḥanafite law 
teaches that if a husband unambiguously announces that he will divorce his wife, the procedure for divorce 
immediately commences, regardless of his intention. See EI², s.v. “Ṭalāk.” Perhaps the argument was peculiar to 
certain Ḥanafite circles in Transoxania. 
234 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 52. Lane’s remarks on the two terms accord with Abū Ḥanīfa’s understanding. He says that in 
spite of the fact that the mutakallimūn make no distinction between them, they are “[said to be] [sic] originally 
different”. In ordinary language, he explains, mashī’a means “the causing to be or exist” and irāda means “the 
willing, wishing, or desiring”, for which a synonym is ṭalab. See Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, vol. 1, pt. 3, 
1625. This is perhaps why the Ḥanafite majority only references the language of the Quran to substantiate its 
opinion. 
235 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 52. 
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demonstrates that mashī’a and irāda are identical, but the reason seems to be that it shows that 
“wanting” a thing can lead to its realization, just as Abū Ḥanīfa claimed that “willing” it does. 
Abū Ḥanīfa was aware of the threat that this verse poses to his position and thus presented his 
own interpretation.236 He claimed that what is meant by irāda (as in yurid) is in fact mashī’a in a 
metaphorical sense. This is because the two terms are similar enough that it must be that one is 
intended literally and the other metaphorically. 
Abū l-Yusr is clearer about his reason for rejecting Abū Ḥanīfa’s understanding of desire 
as seeking (ṭalab), at least with respect to God.237 He explains that His seeking, different from 
that of humans, always involves a command (lā yakūnu illā bi-l-amr), whereas His irāda does 
not involve a command but rather is equivalent to His will (mashī’a).238 
Abū l-Yusr shows signs in his two chapters on divine will of trying not to tarnish the 
image of Abū Ḥanīfa, who is, after all, his leader in theology. He initially presents Abū Ḥanīfa’s 
view as that of all Ḥanafites before revealing that the majority of them in fact do not embrace it. 
He also consistently employs both mashī’a and irāda, even after arguing that they have the same 
meaning.239 Placing too much emphasis on this difference of opinion would not only undermine 
Abū Ḥanīfa’s authority, but ultimately Ḥanafite harmony and strength overall. It would, 
furthermore, take away attention from the errant ideas of others about divine will more urgently 
in need of refutation. 
3.6.3 Refutations of Other Views 
The first doctrine about God’s attribute of will that Abū l-Yusr counters240 is the simple 
denial that He is willing, which he ascribes to “some Mu‘tazilites”. It appears to have originated 
with the Baṣran Mu‘tazilite al-Naẓẓām before being taken up by many Baghdad Mu‘tazilites.241 
In their view, God wills His action in the sense that He performs it and wills a human action in 
 
236 al-Bazdawī, 52-3. 
237 al-Bazdawī, 53. 
238 As for what precisely “will” signifies, Abū l-Yusr says that there is no need to specify this, but rather only that it 
is different from contentment (riḍā) and love (maḥabba). However, he states that “some of them”, presumably some 
Sunnites, describe will as that which precludes weakness and absentmindedness (sahw) (and not displeasure and 
contentment) and necessitates existence. See al-Bazdawī, 61. This explanation is little different from the figurative 
conceptions of divine will detailed below, which Abū l-Yusr, at least implicitly, rejects.  
239 Which may be contrasted with the Ash‘arite al-Baghdādī’s approach to discussing this attribute. After equating 
the meanings of irāda, mashī’a, and ikhtiyār, he only uses irāda. See his Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn (Istanbul: Dār al-Funūn 
al-Tūrkiyya, 1346/1928), 102-4. 
240 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 51. 
241 al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 190-1 and 509-10; al-Baghdādī, al-Farq, 160. 
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the sense that He orders it. Some of the Baghdadis formulated the denial differently. ‘Amr b. 
Baḥr al-Jāḥiz (d. 255/869) contended that God is willing in the sense that it is untrue that His 
actions are performed with absentmindedness (sahw) and ignorance and impossible that He be 
overpowered (yughlab, yuqhar) in performing them.242 ‘Abd al-Raḥīm al-Khayyāṭ (d. ca. 
300/913) considered that God is willing in the sense that He is knowing and powerful and neither 
unwilling (kārih) nor forced (mukrah) to perform His actions.243 In all cases, there is a 
combination of figurativism and negative theology. 
Abū l-Yusr does not mention any of these accounts. Thus, his response is concerned only 
with establishing that God is indeed willing, first with reference to four verses of the Quran: 
1) “And you do not will (tashā’ūna) except that God wills (yashā’),” (76:30). 
2) “If God wills (yashā’), He will seal your heart,” (42:24). 
3) “God wants (yurīd) ease for you,” (2:185). 
4) “Whoever God wants (yurid) to guide, He opens his breast to Islam,” (6:125).  
These verses, Abū l-Yusr explains, establish that God has a will and thus is willing, just 
as one who has movement is moving. This reasoning seems oddly inverse since the verses seem 
to more readily support the belief that God is willing rather than the specific manner in which He 
is so. But it has the effect of both refuting his opponent’s position and reinforcing the Sunnite 
understanding of divine will as a substantive attribute, which the Quran cannot directly help 
prove since it does not mention the substantives mashī’a and irāda. 
The second argument against the Mu‘tazilite view presented by Abū l-Yusr once again 
employs the principle of reasoning about God on the basis of matters in this world, specifically as 
concerns “wondrous actions (af‘āl ‘ajība)”. Earlier, we saw that these actions are indicative of a 
knowing actor in possession of knowledge. Here we learn that they are only possible by means of 
a living, knowing, and powerful being possessing freedom of choice (ikhtiyār), which requires 
will. Abū l-Yusr fails to draw a conclusion from this claim, but its import for the topic at hand is 
clear: God, as the author of wondrous actions, must therefore be living, knowing, powerful, 
freely choosing, and willing.  
Abū l-Yusr next tackles the view that God is willing through a temporally originated will 
not subsisting in anything (ghayr qā’im bi-shay’). He attributes this view to Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī 
 
242 al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal, 65. 
243 al-Shahrastānī, 66-7. 
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and his son Abū Hāshim, though it in fact originated with Abū l-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf (d. 226/840-
1).244 According to al-Baghdādī, it was rejected by other Basran Mu‘tazilites who, while agreeing 
that God’s will is temporally originated, insisted that it requires a place to subsist in.245 
Abū l-Yusr’s initial comment on this doctrine reveals how ridiculous he understood it to 
be: all rational people (‘uqalā’) agree that an attribute cannot subsist on its own. Then, because 
something can only be described with an attribute when the attribute subsists in it, God is 
described as willing in virtue of a will subsisting in Him. Consequently, His will must be eternal 
because God, for the reasons stated by Abū l-Yusr in his refutation of the Karrāmite concept of 
divine speech,246 cannot function as a substrate for temporally originated beings. 
Lastly, Abū l-Yusr takes aim at the position of Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Najjār (d. ca. 220/835). 
This figure and the kalām school that developed in his name (the Najjārites) were important rivals 
to later Eastern Ḥanafites such as al-Māturīdī because they were also Ḥanafites and were based in 
nearby Western Iran, particularly Rayy. But their theology never gained a major following farther 
east, perhaps because al-Najjār only partially grounded his doctrines in the writings of Abū 
Ḥanīfa and his first theological students, instead drawing extensively on Mu‘tazilite teachings, 
especially those of Ḍirār.247 
With respect to the divine attributes, al-Najjār embraced the Mu‘tazilites’ view that they 
are reducible to God’s essence248 but differed from them in adding that God is also eternally 
willing, speaking, truthful, and generous via His essence.249 The significance of this divergence, 
however, is lessened by the fact that he interpreted the nature of these attributes with Ḍirār’s 
apophatic method.250 In the case of will, he contended that God is willing in the sense that He is 
neither forced (mustakrah) nor dominated (maghlūb).251 His opinion thus resembles that of al-
 
244 al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 369; al-Baghdādī, al-Farq, 115; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal, 45; van Ess, Theologie und 
Gesellschaft, vol. 3, 241 and 241n5; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 3, 260 and 260n5. 
245 al-Baghdādī, al-Farq, 115. However, the famous representative of the Basrans, ‘Abd al-Jabbār, as well as his 
Zaydite pupil Mānkdīm (granting that he is the author of the Sharḥ ascribed to ‘Abd al-Jabbar), would later defend it 
against their fellow Mu‘tazilites and other opponents. See ‘Abd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, vol. 6, pt. 2, 104-213; ‘Abd al-
Jabbār, Sharḥ, 440-56. 
246 That is, because He would change along with the temporal beings, whereas change is impossible for Him because 
He is at every instant necessarily existent with His attributes. See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 67 and 73-4. 
247 Rudolph, al-Māturīdī und die sunnitische Theologie, 180-3; Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the Development, 163-6; 
Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition,” 7-8. 
248 al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 285; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal, 75. 
249 van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 4, 159; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 4, 180. 
250 EI², s.v. “al-Nadjdjār.” 
251 al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal, 75. 
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Khayyāṭ noted above, and so he may also be considered to have essentially denied that God is 
willing.  
Abū l-Yusr was evidently not fully aware of the character of al-Najjār’s view. He states 
that it should be rejected for the same reasons that the idea that any of God’s other attributes are 
identical with His essence should be, but he does not refer the reader back to his refutation of 
Ḍirār’s negative approach.252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
252 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 51. 
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Chapter 4: Attributes of Act 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the debates over the attributes covered in the last two chapters, the Mu‘tazilites were 
Abū l-Yusr’s main opponents. This is because they refused to conceive of those attributes as 
eternal entities subsisting in God’s essence and, in some cases, as truly applicable to Him. The 
nature of Abū l-Yusr’s opposition, however, changes when he addresses the attributes of act. On 
this issue, he opposes not only a majority of Mu‘tazilites,253 but also the Ash‘arites. Whereas the 
Ash‘arites rejected that the attributes of act are eternal entities subsisting in God’s essence, the 
Mu‘tazilite majority denied both this and that they constitute aspects of God’s essence. 
According to both schools, God’s attributes of act and their objects are identical (as they often 
phrased it). What this means is that the attributes of act only become applicable to God when He 
performs their corresponding actions, such as the attribute of creation when He creates 
something. Thus, they are merely words that characterize His actions, or, as the Ash‘arite Fakhr 
al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) writes, words that indicate the occurrence of one of the effects of 
God’s power (al-alfāẓ al-dālla ‘alā ṣudūr athar mina l-āthār ‘an qudrat Allāh).254 In contrast, the 
Ḥanafites and Māturīdites maintained that God’s attributes of act, just like His attributes of 
essence, are eternal entities subsisting in His essence. Consequently, they distinguish between 
these attributes and their objects that originate in time. Abū l-Yusr devotes most of his chapter on 
the attributes of act to defending these two interrelated tenets against his Mu‘tazilite and 
Ash‘arite opponents.  
As I discussed in Chapter 1, there is an important historical dimension to this debate as it 
occurred between the Ḥanafites and Ash‘arites. It in part led the Ḥanafites, most notably Abū l-
Yusr and Abū l-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī, to emphasize the authority of al-Māturīdī in theology and draw 
 
253 Among the Mu‘tazilites who disagreed with the majority view were Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir (d. 210-26/825-40), 
Mu‘ammar b. ‘Abbād (d. 215/830), and Abū l-Hudhayl (d. 227/841). They all maintained that God’s attribute of 
creation is distinct from the created being but disagreed over other details. Bishr believed creation to be God’s will 
(irāda) for a thing which exists prior to the created being. Mu‘ammar and Abū l-Hudhayl, in contrast, held that 
creation comes into being simultaneously (ma‘a) with the created being. Abū l-Hudhayl thought that creation 
consists of God’s will (irādatuhu) for a thing and His utterance of “Be”. He considered God’s act of will and 
utterance of “Be” to be accidents and thus created, though only in a figurative sense since His willing is not itself 
willed and the “Be” does not require the utterance of a preceding “Be” to exist. See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 76; al-Ash‘arī, 
Kitāb Maqālāt, 364 and 510; van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 3, 280-2; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 
3, 302-4. Mu‘ammar’s view, and Abū l-Yusr’s refutation of it, are detailed below. 
254 Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ‘Umar al-Rāzī, Kitāb Lawāmi‘ al-bayyināt sharḥ asmā’ Allāh ta‘ālā wa-l-ṣifāt, ed. 
Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn Abū l-Firās al-Nu‘mānī al-Ḥalabī (Egypt: al-Maṭba‘a al-Sharafiyya, 1323 [1905]), 24. 
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on his teachings, which, in turn, contributed to the emergence of Māturīdism in the next 
generation. Abū l-Yusr’s statement on the controversy confirms its importance: 
[The attributes of act] are a momentous question. The Ash‘arites have written 
several works on it. I saw that one of them wrote nearly a whole tract (daftar) on it 
in which he mentioned that a group of traditionists (ahl al-ḥadīth) appeared in 
Khurasan and stated, ‘[God’s attribute of] creation is other than the created 
being…[and] it is eternal.’ Sheikh Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī debated the issue with 
the Mu‘tazilites and confirmed (ṣaḥḥaḥa) the doctrine (madhhab) that the 
Sunnites espouse: [God’s attribute of] creation is other than the created being and  
is not temporally originated; rather, it is pre-eternal. [Sheikh al-Māturīdī] was 
earlier (aqdam) than al-Ash‘arī, and this is the view of Abū Ḥanīfa and his 
followers. Verily, this is the issue on which the Ash‘arites hold their most 
abominable view.255 
These remarks imply that Abū l-Yusr was familiar with the views and reasoning of his 
opponents through their writings and those of his Ḥanafite predecessors; he also became familiar 
with them via first-hand experience, telling us that he discussed the issue extensively with the 
Hayṣamites and Ash‘arites.256 In Transoxania (fī diyārinā), he says, the Hayṣamites renounced 
their position out of fear of being killed by the Ḥanafites, while the Ash‘arites refused to give up 
theirs. Nonetheless, Abū l-Yusr’s assessment of the Ash‘arite doctrine is mild, at least in 
comparison to that of his senior Ḥanafite contemporary Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī, who declared it to 
be disbelief (kufr).257 Some Ash‘arites had a similarly negative perspective on the Ḥanafite 
stance. Abū l-Mu‘īn reports, with considerable dismay, that an Ash‘arite detailed it in a book 
about belief in the eternity of the world.258 The issue was provocative enough that al-Rāzī became 
intimately involved in disputing it during his travels in Transoxania, claiming to have perplexed 
and shamed Nūr al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184) and the judge of Ghazna with his 
sophisticated argumentation.259 Clearly, then, the controversy over God’s attributes of act not 
 
255 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 77. 
256 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 82. I am unable to find any information about the Hayṣamites. Presumably, they are the 
followers of the Karrāmite Ibn Hayṣam. Abū l-Yusr describes their school as a combination between the Qadarite 
and Karrāmite schools. They had followers as far as Firuzkuh (modern-day Jam, Afghanistan), where Fakhr al-Dīn 
al-Rāzī is reported to have debated with their leader, ‘Abd al-Majīd Ibn ‘Umar, known as Ibn al-Qudwa, who 
subsequently set off a riot against al-Rāzī. See Sonja Brentjes, “The Vocabulary of ‘Unbelief’ in Three Biographical 
Dictionaries and Two Historical Chronicles of the 7th/13th and 8th/14th Centuries,” in Accusations of Unbelief in 
Islam: A Diachronic Perspective on Takfīr, ed. Camilla Adang, Hassan Ansari, Maribel Fierro and Sabine Schmidtke 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2016), 135-7. 
257 al-Sālimī, Kitāb al-Tamhīd, 119. 
258 al-Nasafī, Tabṣirat al-adilla, 504. 
259 Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ‘Umar al-Rāzī, Munāẓarāt Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī fī bilād Mā Warā’a l-Nahr, ed. 
Fatḥallāh Khalīf (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1966), 17-22; translated and discussed by Fathalla Kholeif in his A Study 
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only further distanced the Ḥanafites and Māturīdites from their usual Mu‘tazilite and Karrāmite 
opponents, but also caused a serious breach in the otherwise strong affinity between them and the 
Ash‘arites. 
In what follows, I discuss Abū l-Yusr’s treatment of the attributes of act under three  
headings: proofs for the Ḥanafite position; the problem of eternity, or the relationship between 
eternal actions and their temporally originated objects; and other refutations, including of a 
negative approach and the views of the Karrāmites and the Mu‘tazilite Mu‘ammar b. ‘Abbād. 
The attribute of creation serves, as it does in Uṣūl al-dīn, as the focal point of our discussion and 
representative of the other attributes of act.260 
4.2 Proofs for the Ḥanafite Position 
Abū l-Yusr raises three proofs for the Ḥanafite position, two of which are based on 
scripture and one on the principle of reasoning about God on the basis of matters in this world. 
The scripture-based proofs aim to show that God’s act of creation is distinct from its object, the 
created being. First, in Q 18:51, God states, “I did not make them witness (mā ashhadtuhum) 
either the creation of the heavens and earth or the creation of themselves.”261 Here, Abū l-Yusr 
explains, God differentiates between creation and the created thing (makhlūq) by bringing the 
former into relation with the latter.262 Furthermore, God says that He did not make them witness 
the creation of the heavens and earth, while He indeed has made them witness the heavens and 
earth themselves. 
Abū l-Yusr next presents and responds to two alternative readings of Q 18:51 that 
preclude the conclusion he draws.263 The first posits that the meaning of the verse is that God did 
not make them witness the heavens and the earth while He created the two. This is because one 
 
on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His Controversies in Transoxiana (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq Éditeurs, 1966), 39-45 and 
89-104. 
260 In the course of his chapter on the attributes of act, Abū l-Yusr uses five terms for the attribute of creation: khalq, 
ījād, takwīn, takhlīq, and iḥdāth. The fact that they all signify the same attribute is clear from his discussion, and it is 
confirmed by the following comment made by Abū l-Mu‘īn one of his treatments of the topic: “Know that takwīn, 
takhlīq, khalq, ījād, iḥdāth, and ikhtirā‘ are synonymous terms for which one meaning is intended, namely, the 
drawing out (ikhrāj) of a non-existent (ma‘dūm) from non-existence (‘adam) into existence (wujūd).” See his 
Tabṣirat al-adilla, 491. 
261 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 78. 
262 Aḍāfa l-khalq ilā l-makhlūq. Abū l-Yusr is referring to the genitive construction in the verse in which the first 
noun (creation) is connected with the following noun or pair of nouns (the heavens and earth; themselves); that is, its 
reference to the creation of the heavens and earth and the creation of themselves. In Arabic grammar, the first noun is 
known as the muḍāf and the second noun (or set of nouns) is called the al-muḍāf ilayhi. See Ni‘ma, Mulakhkhaṣ, 98-
9. 
263 al-Bazdawī, 78. 
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can only be made to witness a created thing, not the act of creation (fi‘l al-khalq) itself, since 
witnessing (shuhūd) involves presence (ḥuḍūr) and proximity (muqāraba), which are only 
possible for substances (a‘yān).  
For Abū l-Yusr, this reading is wrong because it contradicts the letter of the verse. God 
says that He did not make them witness the creation of the heavens and earth, not that He did not 
make them witness the heavens and earth themselves.264 Therefore, this reading is not an 
interpretation (ta’wīl) of the verse, but rather a modification or invalidation of it. At the same 
time, that one cannot be made to witness the act of creation itself may be true; after all, God 
Himself denies this in the verse. 
The other alternative reading of Q 18:51 contends that it is possible for something to be 
brought into relation with itself. In Q 50:16, for instance, God says of a human being that “We 
are closer to him than [his] jugular vein (ḥabl al-warīd).” Although two terms, ḥabl and warīd, 
are used in the verse, they are in fact identical. The implication of this claim is that, although the 
wording of Q 18:51 brings creation into relation with the created being (and thus they must be 
two distinct things), they are identical. 
Abū l-Yusr refutes this second reading by undermining the basis for its analogy in Q 
50:16. Equating ḥabl and warīd, he says, neither honors the true meanings of the terms nor 
accords with how people ordinarily use them. In reality, warīd is an attribute (ṣifa) of ḥabl, just as 
jāmi‘ is an attribute of masjid in the term masjid al-jāmi‘ (congregational mosque). This is 
because a described thing may be brought into relation with an attribute (al-mawṣūf yuḍāfu ilā l-
waṣf). 
The other verse of the Quran that Abū l-Yusr cites as a proof for the Ḥanafite position is 
16:40: “Indeed, Our word to a thing when We intend it is but that We say to it, ‘Be!’ and it is.”265 
Here, he explains, God informs us that He creates things with a word (qawl); hence, creation and 
the created thing are distinct. Furthermore, since God’s word is eternal, as this verse was 
previously shown to demonstrate,266 His creation must be as well since it is executed through it. 
 
264 Although not in the text, I add the second mention of “earth” to accord the second part of the sentence with the 
first one. 
265 al-Bazdawī, 78. 
266 al-Bazdawī, 65-6. 
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An objection to these claims about Q 16:40 contends that the belief that creation is 
accomplished by means of a word necessitates the rejection of God’s actions.267 This appears to 
have been raised by an Ash‘arite, if we understand the reasoning behind it to be that God’s 
utterance of “Be” does not constitute an act itself since it is simply one instantiation of His 
eternal, essential attribute of speech. Abū l-Yusr finds this accusation so intolerable that he 
devotes a lengthy, four-part response to disproving it.268 First, he argues, it is the consensus of the 
Muslim community that God created the world and substances (a‘yān). Second, from start to 
finish, the Quran provides numerous indications of God’s actions, such as, “Indeed, the 
punishment of your Lord is painful,” (85:12); “Verily, His seizure is painful, severe,” (11:102); 
and, “God refuses except to perfect His light,” (9:32). Third, it is obligatory to describe God as 
acting because this description is cause for praise and glorification, whereas its absence is a 
reason for humiliation and abasement. It thus being established that God is acting, He must, given 
what has been explained about establishing His attributes,269 have attributes of act. Lastly, 
origination in time (ḥudūth) without creation is impossible; therefore, it must be granted that God 
created the world and has an attribute of creation.  
The method of reasoning about God on the basis of matters in this world can once again 
support either side of the debate, depending on how those matters are viewed.270 On the one hand, 
an Ash‘arite or Mu‘tazilite could argue that, just as in this world an act (fi‘l) is identical with its 
object (al-maf‘ūl), so it is for a divine act. On the other hand, Abū l-Yusr maintains that, just as in 
this world an act subsists in its actor,271 so does God’s act subsist in Him. Consequently, since 
that which subsists in a thing is the thing’s attribute, God’s act is His attribute. 
4.3 The Problem of Eternity 
A key reason the Ash‘arites refused to see the attributes of act as eternal entities and the 
Mu‘tazilites refused to see them as aspects of God’s essence was they believed these views imply 
the eternity of the objects of those attributes. They contended that this would be so because 
 
267 al-Bazdawī, 79. 
268 al-Bazdawī, 79. 
269 That is, that one is only qualified as something in virtue of a corresponding substantive attribute, such as a knower 
in virtue of knowledge. See al-Bazdawī, 49. 
270 al-Bazdawī, 79-80. 
271 The text reads, “In the visible world, the act (fi‘l) subsists in the act (fi‘l).” This appears to be a typographical 
error since Abū l-Yusr proceeds to state, “And the same for the unseen world, [that is], it is necessary that [the act] 
be subsistent in the actor (fā‘il).” Furthermore, the 1963 edition has “actor (fā‘il)” in place of the second fi‘l. See al-
Bazdawī, Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn, 73. 
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creation without a created being is impossible, just as breaking (kasr) without a broken object (al-
maksūr) and striking (ḍarb) without a struck object (al-maḍrūb) are impossible. The Ash‘arites, 
in addition, observed that the eternity of God’s creation would negate His power (qudra) because 
the power to create (al-qudra ‘alā l-ījād) implies free exercise of capacity, which God cannot 
have if He is effectively compelled to incessantly create. They compared this with the fact that 
God is not described as capable of speaking, hearing, or seeing since these are eternal attributes 
of essence.272 Therefore, they concluded, since creation is not eternal, and it cannot be thought to 
have originated in time (as an entity in the divine essence), it is not God’s attribute. 
In response to these claims, Abū l-Yusr distinguishes between God’s single, atemporal act 
(fi‘l wāḥid ghayr ḥādith) with which He creates things at their designated times (fī awqātihā), and 
His one power (qudra) with which He is capable of creating things at their designated times. 
Although His act and power are distinct, pre-eternal attributes, they bear an essential relationship 
to one another since acts, just like speech, hearing, vision, and creation, are impossible without 
power; and because God’s acts, just like these other attributes, are eternal, so is His power.273 
As for the assertion that creation is impossible without a created object, Abū l-Yusr 
concedes that creation never lacks (laysa bi-khālin) a created being. However, it is only necessary 
that the created being follows from (mu‘qib) creation, not that it be together with (ma‘a) it, just as 
it is only necessary that a broken or struck object follow from breaking or striking rather than 
occur simultaneously.  
4.4 Other Refutations 
4.4.1 A Negative Approach 
An Ash‘arite could argue that God’s essence and attributes are known by way of necessity 
(bi-ṭarīq al-ḍarūra) through the negation of their opposites. For instance, the opposite of power is 
weakness; of knowledge, ignorance; of vision, blindness; of speech, muteness and silence, and of 
hearing, deafness.274 Actions, however, do not have opposites and thus cannot be divine 
attributes.275 
 
272 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 77. 
273 al-Bazdawī, 80-1. 
274 See, for instance, Abū l-Fatḥ Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, Kitāb Nihāyat al-iqdām fī ‘ilm al-
kalām, ed. Alfred Guillaume (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 2009), 167. See also Gimaret, La doctrine, 
260. 
275 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 81. A similar argument was made by the Mu‘tazilites. They contended that God’s actions 
cannot be His attributes because both they and their opposites, such as creating and not creating, are applicable to 
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In Abū l-Yusr’s view, this method of reasoning about God’s essence and attributes on the 
basis of their opposites is invalid. For one thing, God’s essence in fact does not have an opposite 
yet is still known. His attributes, moreover, are known through necessary proofs (dalā’il 
ḍarūriyya), two of which he mentions here. First, action is a perfection and the lack of it is a 
deficiency and despicable, whereas God is truly worthy of perfection and glory. Second, the 
Quran, from beginning to end, indicates that God is acting and has action. Nonetheless, the 
opponent’s method may be applied inversely to deny God the opposites of, for instance, 
knowledge and power; that is, since, as established through necessary proofs, God has knowledge 
and power, He does not have ignorance and impotence.276 
4.4.2 Karrāmites 
The Karrāmites conceptualized God’s attributes of act in the same way as His speech. 
God is pre-eternally creating in the sense that He is pre-eternally capable of creating (qādir ‘alā l-
khalq). His specific acts of creation are uncreated (ghayr muḥdath) but originate in time (ḥādith) 
and subsist in His essence.277 Given this correspondence between their two doctrines, Abū l-Yusr 
simply re-deploys some of the arguments he made against their view of divine speech.278 
Origination in time (ḥudūth), he says, is impossible without creation (iḥdāth). Additionally, 
conceiving of God as a substrate for temporally originated beings implies change in His essence, 
whereas God’s essence is eternal, and the Eternal (al-qadīm) cannot change because He is 
necessarily existent (wājib al-wujūd) and change contradicts His unity (tawḥīd).  
4.4.3 Mu‘ammar 
Mu‘ammar was a leading Mu‘tazilite of the Basran school during the reign of Hārūn al-
Rashīd (170-93/786-809). He held a unique view about God’s attribute of creation. He believed 
that it is distinct from and originates together with (ma‘a) the created being, and that it is created 
by a preceding act of creation, which is in turn created by a preceding act of creation, and so on 
ad infinitum.279 
 
Him, unlike the attributes of essence and their opposites, such as knowing and ignorant. See Pretzl, Die 
frühislamische Attributenlehre, 9.  
276 al-Bazdawī, 81. 
277 al-Bazdawī, 76-7 and 81; al-Baghdādī, al-Farq, 192. 
278 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 81-2. 
279 al-Bazdawī, 76; al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 253; van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 3, 81; van Ess, 
Theology and Society, vol. 3, 87-8. 
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Abū l-Yusr clearly did not consider this doctrine to be much of a threat to the Ḥanafite 
view. He merely comments that the infinite regress of creative acts is impossible and, in fact, 
asserts the pre-eternity of creation.280 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
280 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 82. 
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Chapter 5: Incomparability and Incorporeality 
 
5.1 Introduction 
We saw in the previous chapters that the principle of divine unity (tawḥīd) figured 
prominently in the debates over God’s attributes of essence and act. To a lesser extent, these 
debates also concerned the notion of God’s transcendence (tanzīh) from the world. This is 
especially so with respect to the attributes of speech, hearing, and vision, which, due to their 
obvious connection to the body in their worldly forms, raised the problem of anthropomorphism 
more forcefully than other attributes, such as knowledge or life. But a more significant source for 
the Muslim discourse on anthropomorphism is the descriptions of God in the Quran and hadiths 
with, as ordinarily understood, corporeal features, such as hands, eyes, and a side, as well as 
actions that seem to imply that He is a spatialized body, such as “coming”, “sitting”, and 
“descending”.281 Hence, a major component of theologians’ treatment of anthropomorphism 
consists of exegeses of these descriptions,282 which many of them referred to as “ambiguities” 
(mutashābihāt), thus signaling the difficulties they raised. 
Abū l-Yusr devotes two chapters of Uṣūl al-dīn to discussing such anthropomorphic 
expressions.283 In the first, he aims to show that God neither resembles anything nor does 
anything resemble Him and, relatedly, that God is not a body; while in the second, his goal is to 
demonstrate that God does not exist in any direction or place. Thus, in contrast to his chapters on 
the attributes of essence and act, he is mainly concerned with denying God certain attributes. 
Another key difference between the two groups of chapters is the nature of his opposition. The 
Mu‘tazilites, who themselves abhorred anthropomorphism, are no longer a target. His adversaries 
 
281 Emotions, the ascription of which to non-humans is also known as “anthropopathy”, were not a major topic in this 
discourse. Many early theologians considered mercy, wrath and satisfaction as fundamental elements of God’s being, 
but, over time, emotions that seemed incompatible with His perfection and sovereignty, such as cunning (Q 3:54, 
4:142), mockery (Q 2:15, 9:79), forgetfulness (Q 9:67), and patience, came to be seen as problematic. See van Ess, 
Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 4, 374-5; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 4, 417-8; EI², s.v. “Tashbīh wa-
Tanzīh.” The debate over “passive” anthropomorphism, or that in which God is the object of human perception, was 
particularly intense around the question of whether God will be seen in the afterlife since the Quran itself raised it by 
stating that on the Day of Judgment faces will be “radiant, looking at their Lord,” (75:22-3). The Sunnites insisted 
this vision is possible, while the Jahmites, Mu‘tazilites, Khārijites, and Zaydites, as well as most Murji’ites and 
Imāmites, rejected it. See EI², s.v. “Ru’yat Allāh”; EI², s.v. “Tashbīh wa-Tanzīh.” Abū l-Yusr devotes a special 
chapter to arguing for the Sunnite position. See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 83-92. 
282 van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 4, 374; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 4, 417; EI², s.v. “Tashbīh 
wa-Tanzīh.” 
283 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 33-42. 
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are rather a diverse set of Muslim and non-Muslim groups and individuals whom he considers to 
hold anthropomorphic views.  
I examine Abū l-Yusr’s discussion in these two chapters under four headings, which may 
be summarized as follows: a list of opponents and description of their views; proofs for God’s 
incomparability and incorporeality; interpretations of some of the anthropomorphic expressions 
in the Quran, along with one hadith; and refutation of the Karrāmite doctrine that God is 
“elevated” (fī l-‘uluww). 
5.2 Opponents 
Abū l-Yusr identifies seven opponents whom he accuses of likening God to His 
creation.284 The first are the Jews. According to Abū l-Yusr, the majority of the Jews believe that 
God is a body with flesh and blood in human form (fī ṣūrat al-ādamā), which they base on 
Daniel 7:9, rendered by Abū l-Yusr as follows: “I saw the Ancient One (qadīm al-ayyām), with a 
white head and body, sitting on the Throne (‘arsh) [and] placing His two feet on the Footstool 
(kursī).”285 Needless to say, his perception of the ubiquity of anthropomorphism in Jewish 
thought is highly distorted, but it was one he shared with many Muslim scholars.286 In reality, the 
anthropomorphic expressions in the Torah generated a level of controversy among Jewish 
interpreters similar to that among Muslims in regard to the Quran and hadiths. While some Jews 
understood these expressions literally and even elaborated them, others interpreted them 
metaphorically.287 
The second opponent identified by Abū l-Yusr is Muqanna‘ (d. 166/783), leader of a 
failed rebellion in Transoxania against the caliph al-Mahdī (r. 158-69/775-85). Muqanna‘ is 
reported to have claimed that God manifested in various individuals, including Adam, Abraham, 
Noah, Jesus, Muḥammad, and, finally, himself.288 
 
284 al-Bazdawī, 33-4. 
285 The NRSV translation of the verse reads: “As I watched, thrones were set in place, and an Ancient One took his 
throne, his clothing was white as snow, and the hair of his head like pure wool; his throne was fiery flames, and its 
wheels were burning fire.”  
286 van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 4, 375-6; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 4, 419. 
287 Edwin M. Yamauchi, “Anthropomorphism in Hellenism and in Judaism,” Bibliotheca Sacra 127, no. 507 (July-
September 1970): 215-8. A good example of a Jewish scholar who adopted the metaphorical approach is the Karaite 
Ya‘qūb al-Qirqisānī (fl. ca. 285-340/900-50). He devoted several chapters of his Arabic magnum opus to refuting 
anthropomorphic ideas he attributed to rabbinical scholars, such as that God is a body with a surface (misāḥa) and 
limbs (a‘ḍā’). See his Kitāb al-Anwār wa-l-marāqib, vol. 1, ed. Leon Nemoy (New York: The Alexander Kohut 
Memorial Foundation, 1939), 15 and 165-79. 
288 See also EI², s.v. “al-Mukanna‘,” where Seth, ‘Alī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya (third son of ‘Alī; d. 81/700), and 
Abū Muslim (an ‘Abbāsid leader; d. 137/755) are also mentioned as loci of God’s manifestation. 
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The next three opponents are listed together: the Karrāmites, Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 
150/767) and the Shī‘ite Hishām b. al-Ḥakam (d. ca. 795-815). Abū l-Yusr states that each of 
them conceive of God as a body (jism), though in different ways, with some believing that God is 
flesh and blood in human form, some that He is light (nūr), and others that He is like a clear 
crystal (ka-l-billawra fī l-ṣafā’). 
It appears that the first view was held by Muqātil. In al-Ash‘arī’s version of the doctrine, 
God’s body is also said to have hair, bones, a hand, a leg, a head, and two eyes.289 The other two 
views seem to have belonged to Hishām. His understanding of God as a body is embedded in a 
comprehensive, complex ontology, according to which all that exists are bodies and their 
characteristics (ṣifāt). By “characteristics”, however, he did not mean qualities like colours, 
smells, and so on, since he also considered these to be bodies; rather, he meant movements, such 
as standing and sitting, and actions, such as obedience to God and sinning. He contended that 
God must be a body because characteristics are always caused and He is not; that He is corporeal 
because a body is a “thing” (shay’) and every “thing” is corporeal; and that, as a “compact, 
luminous body” (jism ṣamadī nūrī), He radiates light capable of penetrating the earth and making 
contact with objects of perception, processes by which He acquires knowledge. Hishām’s 
description of God as a crystal was likely meant to capture the perfection of His three-
dimensional form, as suggested by his description of the crystal as perfectly round (mustadīr) and 
uniform in appearance from every direction.290 
The doctrine that God is a body was held by early members of the Karrāmite school. They 
believed that the cosmos is a plenum; that is, it consists of nothing but bodies in contact with 
other bodies and thus is devoid of empty space. As a body Himself, they claimed, God is in 
physical contact with the Throne. Ibn Karrām (d. 255/869), the head of the school, argued for this 
on the basis of the interpretation by Ibn ‘Abbās (d. 68/687-8), the Companion of the Prophet 
legendary for his knowledge of exegesis, of the term istawā in the statement, “The Most Merciful 
 
289 al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 152-3 and 209. According to Mun’im Sirry, the image of Muqātil as an extreme 
anthropomorphist conveyed by many Muslim theologians, and upheld by some modern scholars, is not accurate. As 
one proof of this, he notes that while Muqātil interpreted some of the anthropomorphic expressions in the Quran 
literally, he understood others figuratively or refrained from commenting on them. In Sirry’s view, the image might 
be motivated by non-theological factors, such as contempt for Muqātil’s closeness to the ruling powers and his free 
use of isrā’īliyyāt (i.e., narratives believed to be of non-Muslim origin) in his exegesis of the Quran. See Mun’im 
Sirry, “Muqātil b. Sulaymān and Anthropomorphism,” Studia Islamica 107, no. 1 (2012): 38-64. 
290 For these points about Hishām’s ontology, see van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 1, 355-64; van Ess, 
Theology and Society, vol. 1, 417-27. Abū l-Yusr says that Hishām was the first Muslim to believe that God is a 
body. 
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istawā on the Throne,” (Q 20:5), as istaqarra, “settle”. However, later Karrāmites, faced with 
immense criticism from opponents, eventually adopted atomism. The concept of the void allowed 
them to distance God from the Throne, at first a finite amount, but later, thanks to Ibn al-Hayṣam, 
infinitely. According to Ibn al-Hayṣam and his followers, the nature of God’s relation to the 
Throne is unknown and in fact beyond the grasp of reason. They simply described His location as 
“above” (fawqa) or “elevated” (fī l-‘uluww), and while they continued to call Him a body, they 
insisted that He is unique in being the only body not made up of atoms. In other words, they held 
that God is a body in name (tasmiyyatan) but not in reality (lā ḥaqīqatan) or “a body unlike 
[other] bodies” (jism lā ka-l-ajsām).291 
The final opponent (apart from the Karrāmites) Abū l-Yusr accuses of likening God to 
His creation is a Sufi group that he calls the “Ḥulūliyya” (Incarnationists).292 According to him, 
they believe that a divine attribute inheres (taḥullu ṣifa min ṣifāt Allāh) in a young boy with a 
beautiful face, whom they are compelled to embrace and kiss because of their witnessing that 
attribute in him. In Abū l-Yusr’s view, their belief is close to the Christian conviction that 
elements of the divine (āthār al-rubūbiyya) manifest in Jesus, although it is worse because their 
infidelity is due to maintaining that such elements manifest in every young boy.293 
5.3 Proofs for God’s Incomparability and Incorporeality 
Despite the different ways in which Abū l-Yusr’s opponents liken God to His creation, he 
responds to their views collectively by demonstrating God’s incomparability and incorporeality. 
Before turning to scripture for help with this task, he lays the rational grounds for the two 
principles.294 An essential attribute (ṣifa dhātiyya), he explains, is one that an essence requires to 
exist. For instance, compositeness (tarkīb) is an essential attribute of a composite being (al-
murakkab); the existence of a composite being without compositeness is inconceivable. Now, the 
likeness (mathal) of a thing is that which resembles it in all its essential attributes, not just some 
 
291 For these points, see Zysow, “Karrāmiyya,” 5-8; al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 34 and 41. 
292 This title was pejorative and applied by Muslim theologians to those they believed to assert God’s inherence in 
creatures. Sunnites and Shī‘ites alike applied it to Christians, certain extremist Shī‘ite and Sufi sects, and monists 
(ittiḥādiyya). See EI², s.v. “Ḥulūl.”  
293 He later adds that the Ḥulūliyya permit singing and dancing. See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 259. Many Sufi writers also 
condemned Sufi Ḥulūliyya. Abū l-Ḥasan al-Hujwīrī (d. ca. 465-9/1072-7), for instance, declares that anyone who 
thinks that staring at beardless youth is lawful is an unbeliever, and that by institutionalizing the practice, the 
Ḥulūliyya have stained the reputation of the saints and Sufi aspirants. See Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. ‘Uthmān al-Hujwīrī, 
Kashf al-maḥjūb, tr. and ed. Is‘ād ‘Abd al-Hādī Qandīl (Cairo: al-Majlis al-A‘lā lil-Thaqāfa, 2007), 506 and 665. 
294 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 34-5. 
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of them. For instance, white is not the likeness of black, for while it shares several essential 
attributes with black, such as being an accident (‘araḍ) and impermanence, it does not share all 
essential attributes with it. The likeness of each colour is therefore only itself. Similarly, God and 
the world do not resemble each other, because one of God’s essential attributes is eternity 
(qidam), whereas one of the world’s essential attributes is temporal origination (ḥudūth). 
From this argument for God’s incomparability, Abū l-Yusr develops his main argument 
for His incorporeality. Atoms (jawāhir), he says, are all alike because they resemble one another 
in their essential attributes, namely, insusceptibility to division (lā tatajazza’u) and receptivity of 
accidents (taqbalu l-a‘rāḍ). They only differ from one another with respect to the (non-essential) 
attributes that subsist in them. For instance, a dog resembles a goat with respect to its atoms but 
differs from a goat with respect to the attributes subsisting in it. Now, a body is simply an 
aggregate of atoms (jawāhir mujtama‘a); bodies thus resemble one another with respect to their 
atoms. But neither does God resemble anything nor anything resemble Him; therefore, He is not 
a body. Furthermore, a body, at the very least, consists of two atoms, whereas God is one. 
An opponent might find this argument for God’s incorporeality too complex. Applying 
the principle of reasoning about God on the basis of matters in this world, he could simply argue 
that, since one never witnesses an actor (fā‘il) in this world who is not a body, God, being an 
actor Himself, must be a body, just as since one only ever witnesses an actor in this world who is 
living, powerful, and knowing, God must be living, powerful, and knowing.295 
In Abū l-Yusr’s view, this method of reasoning about God’s nature is invalid. He retorts 
that we do not establish that God is living, powerful, and knowing because we only ever see a 
free actor in this world who is living, powerful, and knowing, just as we do not establish that God 
sickens, dies, and sleeps because we see people in this world sicken, die, and sleep. Rather, we 
establish that God is living, powerful, and knowing from the fact that a freely performed action is 
orderly (‘alā tartīb ḥasan), a feature which makes its occurrence impossible without a living, 
powerful, and knowing being. He adds that it is not necessary for that being to be a body, but 
rather only to be existent; indeed, an action proceeds from a body in this world because the body 
is existent, not merely because the actor is a body. An additional proof that God is living, 
 
295 al-Bazdawī, 35. 
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powerful, and knowing is that He describes Himself as such in the Quran, and the Quran is 
validated by a necessary proof, namely, the inimitability of its structure and content.296 
Abū l-Yusr points out that, on the contrary, God does not describe Himself as a body in 
the Quran nor does the Prophet describe Him as such in any “well-known” hadith (khabar 
mashhūr).297 Moreover, according to the lexicologists, “body” is a term for an entity possessing 
size and heaviness, features which only exist through the aggregation of substances, whereas 
God, exalted be He, is far above (munazzah) that. For these reasons, Abū l-Yusr deems it 
impermissible to call Him a body. In contrast, he notes that God describes Himself in the Quran 
as a “thing” (shay’) and “self” (nafs) and thus may be referred to as either: “Say, ‘What thing 
(shay’) is greatest in testimony?’ Say, ‘God’,” (6:19);298 and in Jesus’ remark to God, “You know 
what is within myself (nafsī) and I do not know what is within Yourself (nafsika),” (5:116). The 
application of these two terms to God is also supported by what they signify in ordinary 
language. “Thing” simply denotes existence (wujūd); hence, when it is said, “there is nothing” (lā 
shay’), negation (nafy) and non-existence (‘adam) are meant. “Self” (nafs) is merely a name for 
an existent entity (al-mawjūd); hence, we say “the speech itself” (nafs al-kalām), “the question 
itself” (nafs al-mas’ala), and “the faith itself” (nafs al-īmān).299 In other words, neither term 
necessarily signifies something with size, heaviness, or other features indicating corporeality. 
Abū l-Yusr now goes on to discuss Q 42:11, “There is nothing like Him,” (laysa ka-
mithlihi shay’). It is surprising that he takes this long to cite the verse since it would seem that it 
is most effective for proving God’s incomparability and incorporeality. According to al-Māturīdī, 
some anthropomorphists (ahl al-tashbīh), arguing that the letter kāf (like) refers to mithl 
(likeness), interpreted this verse to mean that there is nothing like God’s likeness.300 Although 
Abū l-Yusr does not mention this view, his comment on the verse is clearly aimed at refuting it. 
He says that both kāf and mithl are used to indicate resemblance (lil-tashbīh); thus, kāf is 
 
296 al-Bazdawī, 35. 
297 A mashhūr hadith may either signify one transmitted by at least three distinct lines of narrators, in which case it is 
also known as a mustafīḍ (diffused) hadith; or one that was originally recorded by one or more people and 
subsequently became popular. See Dīb al-Khuḍrāwī, Qāmūs al-Alfāẓ al-Islāmiyya: ‘Arabī – Inkīlīzī, Inkīlīzī – ‘Arabī; 
Dictionary of Islamic Terms: Arabic – English, English – Arabic (Damascus; Beirut: al-Yamāma, n.d.), 108. 
298 Usually, “God” is translated as the subject in the rest of the sentence that Abū l-Yusr omits, which thus reads, 
“Say, ‘What thing is greatest in testimony?’ Say, ‘God is witness between me and you.” Some translations, however, 
do convey the sense in which Abū l-Yusr is reading it, such as that of Aisha Bewley, “Say: ‘What thing is greatest as 
a witness?’ Say: ‘Allah. He is Witness between me and you.’”  
299 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 35-6. 
300 al-Māturīdī, Ta’wīlāt al-Qur’ān, vol. 13, 172. 
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employed to emphasize rejection that a “thing” (shay’) is like God. He adduces the fact that there 
is no difference in ordinary language between “like” being represented by mithla or ka-mithli, 
such as in the expression, “so-and-so is not like (mithla or ka-mithli) so-and-so.”301 
Finally, according to Abū l-Yusr, some Muslim philosophers (falāsifa) contend that since 
God is not a body, and it is impossible for Him to be an accident, He must be a substance 
(jawhar) because all existent things fall into one of these three classes of being.302 Abū l-Yusr 
counters this view by explaining that this classification scheme applies to all created, existent 
things, whereas God is eternal and thus different from what is created. Furthermore, he explains, 
a substance is that in which an accident, such as compositeness (tarkīb), subsists, whereas God, 
exalted be He, is far above such things. Nonetheless, God’s difference from the world does not 
mean that the world is His opposite. Indeed, God does not have any opposite, because the 
opposite of a thing is that which stands directly opposite to it (yuqābiluhu) and contradicts it 
(yu‘āriḍuhu), such as white being the opposite of black or sweetness the opposite of bitterness, 
whereas there is nothing that stands directly opposite to or contradicts God.303 
5.4 Interpreting the Anthropomorphic Expressions 
Having thus established that God is incomparable and incorporeal, Abū l-Yusr can now 
deal with the anthropomorphic expressions in the Quran and a hadith adduced by his 
anthropomorphist opponent to prove that God is a body. The performance of this task is essential 
for, as he notes, these expressions cannot simply be ignored, because, at least with respect to the 
Quran, God must be described as He describes Himself.304 
The anthropomorphic expressions concern three divine actions and two divine features. 
The first of the actions is represented by the infinitives atā and jā’a, which Abū l-Yusr’s 
 
301 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 36. 
302 It is not clear which Muslim philosophers Abū l-Yusr has in mind. According to Diego R. Sarrió Cucarella, 
Muslim scholars, theologians, and philosophers alike did not permit the application of the term jawhar to God, 
because they usually considered it to signify that which occupies a space and receives accidents. It was rather Arab 
Christian scholars who applied it to God, which they often justified with an argument similar to that related by Abū l-
Yusr. They contended that an existent thing is either a substance, meaning that which can subsist by itself, or an 
accident, meaning that which can only subsist in a substance; thus, God, an existent and independent being, is a 
substance. See Diego R. Sarrió Cucarella, Muslim-Christian Polemics across the Mediterranean: The Splendid 
Replies of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 136. Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), perhaps 
the most famous and important Muslim philosopher, denied that God is a substance. Similar to Abū l-Yusr, he 
argued, in one case, that only a contingent being is either a substance or accident. See Muḥammad Legenhausen, 
“Ibn Sina’s Arguments against God’s Being a Substance,” in Substance and Attribute: Western and Islamic 
Traditions in Dialogue, ed. Christian Kanzian and Muḥammad Legenhausen (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2007), 120. 
303 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 36. 
304 al-Bazdawī, 37. 
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opponent understands to mean “come” via locomotion (intiqāl) in the following verses: “God 
came (atā) at their building from its foundations,” (16:26); “God came (atā) at them from where 
they had not expected,” (59:2); and “Your Lord comes (jā’a) and the angels, row upon row,” 
(89:22). In contrast, Abū l-Yusr insists that atā and jā’a simply mean “appear” (ẓahara). Hence, 
he says, 16:26 means that the effects of God’s displeasure appeared in their buildings; 59:2 that 
the effects of God’s power and subdual appeared in them; and 89:22 either that God and the 
angels will appear, since the reference is to an event in the afterlife, or that the effects of God’s 
power will appear from heaven and hell on the Day of Resurrection.  
It is not enough, however, for Abū l-Yusr to simply propose these alternative readings. He 
must also justify them in the face of potential criticism from his opponent that he is departing 
from the literal message of the verses: first, by understanding atā and jā’a as “appear” rather than 
“locomote”; and second, by making “God” represent “God’s effects”.  
With respect to the first point, Abū l-Yusr insists that the literal meaning of atā and jā’a is 
“appear” rather than “locomote”. The proof of this is that they are used in expressions about both 
bodies and attributes; for instance, it is not only said that “the camel comes” and “the clouds 
come”, but also that “the illness comes” and “health comes”.305 Furthermore, the locomotion of 
attributes is inconceivable but their appearance is not, and even when it is said that something 
(i.e., a body) “comes”, it is not meant just that it locomotes, but also that it appears.   
As for reading “God” as “God’s effects”, Abū l-Yusr notes that he did not do so in his 
first interpretation of 89:22 in which he interpreted the verse to mean that God and the angels will  
appear in the afterlife, which is, he says, the interpretation he and his colleagues prefer (wa-
‘alayhi i‘timādunā). At the same time, he justifies reading “God” as “God’s effects” as in his  
second interpretation of 89:22 (in which he takes “God” to mean God’s effects appearing from 
heaven and hell on the Day of Resurrection) and other verses by pointing out that the “coming” 
of a subject is not always understood literally by the language speakers (ahl al-lugha). For 
instance, it said that a ruler comes to a town when his army comes there, and that a city comes 
when its lands and sights appear. Therefore, since people speak like this or employ such 
metaphors in ordinary usage, it is valid to interpret “God” as “God’s effects”. 
 
305 He only mentions jā’a in these examples but implies that he is also speaking of atā by using ityān (coming), the 
verbal noun of atā, when introducing them. 
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Abū l-Yusr follows a similar pattern of reasoning in his explanations of the other two 
anthropomorphic expressions denoting divine actions; that is, he provides a definition of the verb 
representing the action and justifies it with reference to usage of the verb in other expressions. 
The first of these remaining two actions concerns God’s relation to the Throne, it being said in 
several verses of the Quran that He istawā on the Throne. As noted above, Ibn Karrām 
understood istawā in these verses to mean istaqarra, “settle”. Abū l-Yusr attributes this view also 
to the Ḥanbalites, the Karrāmites (i.e., early Karrāmites), the Jews, Hishām and Muqātil.306 The 
meaning of istawā was indeed a major point of dispute among theologians,307 as illustrated by the 
emphasis placed on it in the first of the six creeds Ibn Abī Ya‘lā attributes to Ibn Ḥanbal: 
The Throne of the Merciful is above the water, and God is on His Throne. His feet 
rest upon the stool…God is on His Throne high above the seventh heaven, behind 
the veils of lights, of shadows, of water, and of everything that He knows better 
than anyone. If an innovator or heretic relies upon the words of God such as: “We 
are nearer to him than the jugular vein,” (Q 50:16); “He is with you wherever you 
are,” (Q 57:4); “Three men conspire not secretly together, but He is the fourth of 
them, neither five men, but He is the sixth of them, neither fewer than that, neither 
more, but He is with them, wherever they may be,” (Q 58:7) or similarly 
ambiguous verses, one must say to him: What that signifies is knowledge, for God 
is on the Throne above the seventh heaven and His knowledge embraces 
everything. God is separate from His creation, but no place escapes His 
knowledge. The Throne belongs to God, and the Throne is supported by those 
who carry it. God is on the limitless Throne.308 
According to Abū l-Yusr, the meaning of istiwā’, the verbal noun of istawā, is “mastery” 
(istīlā’) and “subdual” (qahr). One proof of this is God’s comment about Moses, “When he 
reached his full strength and istawā, We granted him [a sense of] judgment and knowledge,” (Q 
28:14); this, he explains, refers to when Moses’ condition (ḥāluhu) became strong with the 
fullness of his physique. Additionally, it is said that one’s affair istawā when it reaches its climax 
 
306 al-Bazdawī, 40. The last two figures being meant by the phrase, “and one who says He is a body,” whom he 
previously (p. 33) mentioned believe that God is a body. As for Ibn Ḥanbal himself, Abū l-Yusr considers him to 
have been a pious man who did not liken God to His creation (lam yaqul bi-l-tashbīh). See al-Bazdawī, 259. 
307 A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2008), 67; 
van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 4, 407-8; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 4, 455-6. 
308 Ibn Abī Ya‘lā, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, vol. 1, 28-9; translated by Mary Ann Danner in Encyclopedia of Religion, 
2nd ed. (2005), s.v. “Attributes of God: Islamic Concepts.” For a French translation of this excerpt, see Allard, Le 
problème, 99-100. Hishām thought that what is called the Throne in Quranic language is the particular space God 
created for Himself and which He occupies in a particular direction. See van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 1, 
363-4; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 1, 426-7. Muqātil indeed interprets istawā as istaqarra. See Muqātil b. 
Sulaymān, Tafsīr Muqātil b. Sulaymān, vol. 3, ed. ‘Abdallāh Maḥmūd Shiḥāta (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Tārīkh al-
‘Arabī, 2002), 20-1. 
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(tanāhā); and when mustawī, the active participle of istawā, is used to describe one’s act of 
sitting on a chair, it signifies mastery (istīlā’). Therefore, God istawā on the Throne in the sense 
that He mastered it (istawlā ‘alayhi) after its creation with an eternal act of mastery (istīlā’ 
qadīm) subsisting in His essence, just as He created the world with His eternal act of creation. 
Although, of course, God possesses mastery over the entire universe, He specifically mentioned 
His mastery over the Throne because it is the greatest, noblest, and most exalted of things. 
While this understanding of istawā as istawlā is enough for Abū l-Yusr to deny that 
God’s relationship to the Throne is physical, he raises two further arguments against the idea that 
God is settled on the Throne.309 First, if we suppose that God settled on the Throne after creating 
the world, then, through His conveyance from one place to another, change occurred in His 
essence; but that is impossible for the Eternal because He is necessarily existent with all of His 
attributes. Second, the Quran depicts God in multiple places, such as in the following verses: 
“There is in no private conversation three but that He is the fourth of them, nor are there five but 
that He is the sixth of them, and no less than that and no more except that He is with them 
wherever they are,” (58:7); “Do you feel secure that the One in the heavens will not cause you to 
sink into the earth,” (67:16); and “It is He who is God in the heavens and God in the earth,” 
(43:84). Ultimately, Abū l-Yusr concludes, God’s purpose with these verses is not to inform us 
that He is in any particular place, but rather that He possesses mastery (mustawlin) over the entire 
universe.310 
The final anthropomorphic expression involving an action cited by Abū l-Yusr’s 
opponent occurs in a hadith. It is represented by a conjugated form of the infinitive nazala, which 
the opponent understands to mean “descend” via locomotion: “God the Highest descends 
(yanzilu) to the worldly heavens on the night of mid-Sha‘bān.”311 For some, Abū l-Yusr tells us, 
 
309 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 40-1. 
310 Abū l-Yusr makes the same kind of argument against the view that God is in every place (fī kulli makān), which 
he attributes to al-Najjār and the Muslim philosophers. Since, according to him, they adduce Q 58:7 as a proof for 
their view, they should be referred to Q 67:16 as well as Q 20:5, in which God is said to be on the Throne; these two 
verses indicate that God is not in every place. Again, he concludes, the meaning of all such verses is that God 
possesses mastery over the entire universe. See al-Bazdawī, 41. Al-Najjār believed that God is in every place with 
His essence, not in the sense that He inheres in every place, but rather because He is infinite. On his view, see al-
Shahrastānī, al-Milal, 77; van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 4, 159; van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 4, 
180. 
311 The hadith continues, “And forgives more [sins] than the number of hairs of a sheepdog.” See Abū ‘Abdallāh 
Muḥammad b. Yazīd b. Māja, Sunan Ibn Māja, vol. 1, Muḥammad Fu’ād ‘Abd al-Bāqī ([Cairo]: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Kutub 
al-‘Arabiyya, n.d.), 444 (no. 1389). The night of mid-Sha‘bān refers to the feast held on the night of the middle day 
of the month of Sha‘bān in the Islamic calendar. See "Food and Feasts," in The Islamic World: Past and Present, ed. 
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this hadith does not pose any theological challenge.312 This is because they believe that a hadith 
must be “well-known” (mashhūr) in order to yield knowledge, which this tradition is not. Abū l-
Yusr, however, does not share that perspective. In his view, it is forbidden for the sake of 
sincerity to reject hadiths, even if they are transmitted by a relatively small number of people 
(mina l-āḥād).313 Thus, he instead resorts to a linguistic argument to deal with this 
anthropomorphic expression. Nuzūl (a noun derived from nazala), he contends, is not an attribute 
of a body, because it does not signify locomotion but rather the contact of a thing with another 
thing or its effect upon it. Of course, one would assume that contact between two things could 
involve locomotion, but the two examples of common usage Abū l-Yusr cites, “the common cold 
reached (nazala) so-and-so,” and, “the illness reached (nazala) him,” avoid giving that 
impression. His examples of expressions about the effect of the contact of a thing with another 
thing show once again that a subject may represent its effects rather than itself: it is said that the 
displeasure or anger of so-and-so “reached (nazala) me” in the sense that the effects of one’s 
displeasure or anger reached the person, not the displeasure or anger itself.  
Having thus made clear his understanding of this problematic term, Abū l-Yusr applies it 
in his interpretation of the hadith in question, even though that means, as he admits, contradicting 
the literal word of the Prophet. God nazala to the worldly heavens on the night of mid-Sha‘bān, 
he explains, in the sense that the effects of His power, mercy, and anger reach the worldly 
heavens on the night of mid-Sha‘bān because the means of sustenance (arzāq) of human beings 
are decreed and their destinies (ājāl) written on this night.314 As confirmation of this, he claims 
that exegetes agree that the “blessed night” mentioned in Q 44:3 is the night of mid-Sha‘bān: 
“Verily, We sent it down (anzalnāhu) on a blessed night. Indeed, We warn [humankind with it]. 
 
John L. Esposito, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, accessed April 26, 2020, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t243/e111. 
312 Presumably, he is referring to some of his fellow Ḥanafites. But the Mu‘tazilites were also critical of hadiths with 
weak lines of transmission. ‘Abd al-Jabbār, for instance, does not consider hadiths related by a single transmitter 
(khabar al-wāḥid) or a relatively small number of transmitters (khabar al-āḥād) to constitute true Sunna, that is, the 
Prophet’s custom in belief and practice. See Binyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and 
Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 45. 
313 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 37-8. On āḥād hadiths, see EI², s.v. “Ḥadīth.” 
314 This is partly based on the 1963 edition, which reads: Fa-yakūnu ma‘nā qawlihi, ‘inn Allāh ta‘ālā yanzilu ilā 
samā’ al-dunyā laylat al-niṣf min Sha‘bān,’ ayy, yattaṣilu āthāru qudratihi wa-āthāru raḥmatihi wa-āthāru 
ghaḍabihi ilā samā’ al-dunyā laylat al-niṣf min Sha‘bān. Fa-inna hādhihī laylat yuqsamu fī-hā arzāq al-‘ibād wa-
yuktabu fī-hā l-ājāl. See al-Bazdawī, Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn, 27. In the 2003 edition, the portion from the first “Sha‘bān” 
to the second one is omitted.  
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In it every wise matter is distinguished. An order from Us. Truly, We are ever sending,” (44:3-
5).315 
Abū l-Yusr’s interpretations of these anthropomorphic expressions are close to those of 
the Mu‘tazilites, who held that all such expressions must be interpreted symbolically to avoid 
conceptualizing God as a body.316 Al-Zamakhsharī, for instance, understands God’s “coming” 
(ityān) in Q 16:26 and 59:2 as the coming of His order (amr),317 and the claim that istawā means 
istawlā was the standard Mu‘tazilite explanation of God’s relation to the Throne.318 The 
Mu‘tazilites also offered philological arguments and cited figures of speech to support their 
interpretations.319 Abū l-Yusr also aligns himself with the Samarqandi scholars who, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 1, permitted interpreting the anthropomorphic expressions. This was in 
contrast to the Bukharans, who held that they must be simply accepted without speculating about  
their meanings. Nevertheless, he favours the Bukharan approach in his treatment of the 
anthropomorphic features ascribed to God in the Quran, specifically the eye (‘ayn) and hand 
(yad).320 While noting that one must affirm the existence of these features just as God does 
Himself, he terms each of them a “special attribute” (ṣifa khāṣṣa) and stresses that neither is a 
limb (jāriḥa). Additionally, although he acknowledges that some Ḥanafites permit these 
attributes to be spoken of in a language other than Arabic as long as one does not believe them to 
 
315 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 38-9. This was certainly not the view of all exegetes. According to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the 
majority opinion was that the “blessed night” is the Night of Power (laylat al-qadr) on which the Quran was sent 
down. Only the Successor ‘Ikrima (d. 105/723-4) and disparate groups (ṭā’ifa ākharūn) believed it to be the night of 
mid-Sha‘bān. After enumerating five proofs used to support the majority opinion, al-Rāzī says that he never saw any 
proof cited for the minority view, its proponents merely transmitting it from “some people” (ba‘ḍ al-nās). See his 
Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī, vol. 27, 238-9. Neither does this view appear to have been common amongst Eastern 
Ḥanafite scholars. Al-Māturīdī does not mention the idea that the “blessed night” is the night of mid-Sha‘bān, though 
the second of the four possibilities he suggests for what the object pronoun “it (hu)” refers to in “We sent it down 
(anzalnāhu)” might imply so: 1) the Quran; 2) the two ambiguous letters (ḥām-mīm) beginning the chapter in the 
sense of the decrees for all that will occur in the coming year, such as those concerning death, life, means of 
sustenance, and the like; 3) the letters ḥām-mīm, simply in the sense of what God has willed to be included in those 
letters (mā ḍummina fī qawlihi “ḥām-mīm” ‘alā mā arāda bi-hi); and 4) something (shay’, amr) that the Prophet and 
His Companions had knowledge of but which God did not disclose, because we do not need to know about it. See his 
Ta’wīlāt al-Qu’rān, vol. 13, 291. 
316 al-Sālimī, Kitāb al-Tamhīd, 134; EI², s.v. “Mu‘tazila.”  
317 al-Zamakhsharī, Tafsīr al-kashshāf, 578 and 1092. 
318 al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 157; ‘Alī b. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm, al-Fiṣal fī l-milal wa-l-ahwā’ wa-l-niḥal, vol. 2 
([Cairo]: Maktabat al-Salām al-‘Ālamiyya, n.d.), 97; Abrahamov, Islamic Theology, 23. 
319 EI², s.v. “Allāh.” 
320 He refers to these two attributes in the singular, but the Quran mentions God’s “eye” (20:39) and “eyes” (e.g., 
11:37) as well as His “hand” (e.g., 3:73), “two hands” (e.g., 5:64), and “hands” (e.g., 36:71). 
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be limbs, he sides with other Ḥanafites who forbid this,321 evidently concerned that the condition 
might not be fulfilled.322 
Although brief, these comments on God’s hand and eye are not insignificant. For one 
thing, Abū l-Yusr appears to make a distinction between God’s ordinary attributes, such as 
knowledge or power, and these two attributes by describing them as “special”. This approach 
differs from that of, for instance, his fellow Māturīdite Abū l-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī who treats all of 
God’s attributes in the same manner: “The hand is among the pre-eternal attributes, without 
[speculating] how (bi-lā kayfa) and likening [it to God’s creation], like hearing, vision, 
knowledge, power, life, will, and speech.”323 Furthermore, Abū l-Yusr does not criticize the 
Mu‘tazilites’ symbolic interpretations of these anthropomorphic features, such as that God’s hand 
represents His power (quwwa) or grace (ni‘ma) and that His eyes represent His knowledge.324 
This absence of criticism is not only at variance with his readiness to attack other Mu‘tazilite 
positions on the attributes, but also with the discussions of these anthropomorphic features of 
some other Māturīdites, such as al-Sālimī and Abū l-Mu‘īn, who explicitly reject and raise 
arguments against the Mu‘tazilite interpretations.325 Hence, it may be that just as Abū l-Yusr 
adopted the rationalist position concerning the letters and utterance of the Quran but sympathized 
with the traditionalist one that some Sunnites espoused, here he embraces the traditionalist view 
but sympathizes (albeit not expressly) with the rationalist one that the Samarqandi Sunnites 
hold.326 
5.5 Refutation of the Later Karrāmite Doctrine 
We saw above that the later Karrāmites rejected that God is settled on the Throne, 
positing instead that He is merely “above” or, as Abū l-Yusr puts it, “elevated” (fī l-‘uluww). In 
 
321 Such as Abū l-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī, who specifically insists that the hand must not be spoken of in Persian. See his 
Baḥr al-kalām, ed. Walī l-Dīn Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Farfūr (Damascus: Maktabat Dār al-Farfūr, 2000), 105. 
322 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 39. 
323 al-Nasafī, Baḥr al-kalām, 105. However, in the creedal statement at the end of Uṣūl al-dīn, Abū l-Yusr simply 
refers to God’s hand, eye, and face (wajh, e.g., Q 27:55) as “attributes” (ṣifāt) though does not list them together with 
His other attributes. See al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 251. 
324 They also considered God’s side (janb, Q 39:56) to symbolize His command (amr), and some, including Abū l-
Hudhayl, thought that God’s face stands for God Himself. See al-Ash‘arī, Kitāb Maqālāt, 218; al-Sālimī, Kitāb al-
Tamhīd, 134. 
325 al-Sālimī, 134-5; al-Nasafī, Baḥr al-kalām, 106.  
326 Al-Māturīdī, for instance, a Samarqandi scholar, considers God’s “eyes” in Q 11:37 to represent either His 
protection (ḥifẓ) and supervision (ri‘āya) or His advice (i‘lām). He thinks that the statement, “From what Our hands 
have done,” (Q 36:71) might refer to what the hands of human beings have done, such as farming, which God 
attributes to Himself, or that “Our hands” stands for God’s power (quwwa). See, respectively, his Ta’wīlāt al-
Qur’ān, vol. 7, 170-1 and vol. 12, 108.  
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other words, while He has no particular place (lā makāna la-hu), He exists in one direction (la-hu 
jiha wāḥida), namely, upwards.327 For this doctrine, Abū l-Yusr enumerates and refutes five 
proofs.328 The first four of these proofs are not detailed arguments, but merely references to 
statements or events that imply that God is elevated. 
First, the later Karrāmites point out that Q 35:10 states that to God “ascends (yaṣ‘adu) 
good speech and righteous work raises it”. In contrast to his approach to the anthropomorphic 
expressions denoting God’s actions, Abū l-Yusr does not offer any definition of ṣa‘ada (infinitive 
of yaṣ‘adu) or its derivatives. Instead, he seems to simply accept that it involves locomotion, for 
he concedes that the reality of this verse ultimately cannot be known because the ascent (ṣu‘ūd) 
of speech, especially human speech due to its impermanence, is inconceivable. This means, on 
the one hand, that God’s intention with the verse is unclear, which renders its meaning 
ambiguous (mujmal) and makes it an inadequate proof for the Karrāmite view. On the other hand, 
its ambiguity makes it possible for it to be interpreted metaphorically in at least one of two ways. 
First, it may be describing the exaltedness of good speech which, subsisting in its speaker, raises 
the esteem of that speaker and makes him close to God by way of an elevated state and standing, 
not by way of essence (min haythu ‘uluww al-ḥāl wa-l-rif‘a, lā min haythu l-dhāt), just as in this 
world one is close to a sultan by way of standing and position, not by way of essence and place. 
Second, “good speech” may refer to the Islamic testimony of faith (shahāda), “There is no God 
but God, Muḥammad is God’s messenger,” which surpasses all creeds (adyān), as indicated by Q 
9:33, “To make it [Islam] prevail over all religions, even if the polytheists despise [so].” But 
again, Abū l-Yusr reminds us, “ascent” (ṣu‘ūd) here is by way of nobility (sharaf) and spiritual 
proximity to God (qurb al-ḥāl), not closeness in essence and place. 
The second Karrāmite proof refers to how the Quran is said to have been “sent down” in 
Q 44:3, “We sent it down on a blessed night,” and a hadith, “The Quran was sent down according 
to seven letters (‘alā sab‘a aḥruf).”329 Abū l-Yusr responds to this proof by explaining that the 
Quran was sent down as a whole from the Throne to the worldly heaven, and then from there to 
 
327 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 41. 
328 al-Bazdawī, 41-2. 
329 The hadith continues, “So recite of it what is easy.” See Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ 
al-Bukhārī (Damascus; Beirut: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 2002), 1276 (no. 4992). The “seven letters” refer to the seven 
readings of the Quran accepted by all Sunnite authorities as mutawātir, that is, transmitted by sets of reliable 
authorities proceeding back to the Prophet himself, and thus believed to be the Prophet’s true word. See Yasin 
Dutton, “Orality, Literacy, and the ‘Seven Aḥruf’ Ḥadīth,” Journal of Islamic Studies 23, no. 1 (2012): 2. 
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the Prophet in segments. By leaving out mention of God Himself in this series of descents, he 
eliminates any opportunity for the later Karrāmites, who agreed that God is not on the Throne, to 
base their position on the revelatory process.330 
The third Karrāmite proof concerns the event known as the Prophet’s Ascension (mi‘rāj), 
during which, according to the standard account, the Prophet journeyed through the seven 
heavens, where he encountered angels and prophets, saw heaven and hell, and finally met God.331 
The event is not detailed in the Quran, but some passages have been thought to allude to it. One 
is 17:1, which mentions the Prophet’s Night Journey (isrā’) from Mecca to Jerusalem believed to 
precede the Ascension: “Glory be to Him who made His servant travel by night from the Sacred 
Mosque to the Furthest Mosque, whose surroundings We have blessed, to show him some of Our 
signs. Truly, He is the Hearing, the Seeing.” Some interpreters argued that “Our signs” might 
refer to what the Prophet witnessed during his time in the heavens or even His encounter with 
God.332 Another passage is 53:1-18, which speaks of two of the Prophet’s visions, which some 
interpreters considered the object of to be God.333 
The aspect of the Ascension that the later Karrāmites cite is the Prophet’s journey beyond 
the Throne, presumably when he met God. It is helpful to quote Abū l-Yusr’s rebuttal to this 
proof for it is not entirely straightforward and, at least at first glance, rather surprising: 
As for the Prophet’s Ascension (i‘rāj) to heaven (samā’) and beyond, it did not 
occur, because God is beyond the universe. Rather, it was [a means of] ennobling 
him (tashrīfan lahu) and manifesting the effects (āthār) of His power. Indeed, 
Moses was not made to ascend to heaven, but rather ordered to climb the 
mountain, and for them,334 God is neither above nor on the mountain; rather, He 
specified a place for him [as a means of] ennobling him. The same holds true for 
the Chosen One.335 And in the same way, people are ordered to visit the Ka‘ba, 
 
330 However, it is not clear how Abū l-Yusr’s response accords with his earlier remark that the Quranic manẓūm may 
have been created in the Preserved Tablet or an angel since here it seems to be implied that the Quran first appeared 
at the Throne. Perhaps he made a connection between the locations of the three based on Ibn ‘Abbās’s remark that 
the words (kalām) of the Tablet are bound to the Throne and its root (aṣl) is in the lap of an angel. See Abū l-Firā’ 
Ismā‘īl b. ‘Umar Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm, vol. 8, ed. Sāmī b. Muḥammad al-Salāma (Riyad: Dār 
Ṭayyiba, 1420/1999), 373. 
331 William Chittick, "Miʿrāj," in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0538 (accessed April 28, 2020). 
332 Josef van Ess, “Vision and Ascension: Sūrat al-Najm and its Relationship with Muḥammad's miʿrāj,” Journal of 
Qur’anic Studies 1, no. 1 (1999): 48. 
333 van Ess, “Vision and Ascension,” 48-51. 
334 I.e., the later Karrāmites. 
335 I.e., the Prophet Muḥammad. 
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while for them,336 God is not at the Ka‘ba; rather, they are ordered to visit it [as a 
means of] glorifying God.337 
 
From this, then, it would seem that Abū l-Yusr rejects the reality of the Ascension. This 
would align him with the Mu‘tazilites, who also rejected it, while affirming the reality of the 
Prophet’s Night Journey from Mecca to Jerusalem because of its basis in Q 17:1.338 This 
approach appears to have been adopted also by some Eastern Ḥanafites. Al-Māturīdī himself 
writes in his exegesis of Q 17:1 that, on the one hand, the Sunnites (naḥnu) affirm what has been 
said about the Ascension in the hadiths, such as the Prophet’s meeting with previous prophets and 
other details (wa-mā dhukira fī-hā), just as Abū Bakr (al-ṣiddīq) affirmed all that; but on the 
other hand, if it turns out that Abū Bakr did not in fact affirm all those details, then the Sunnites 
merely accept that the Prophet traveled by night to al-Aqsa Mosque as mentioned in Q 17:1 and 
nothing more because the other details are transmitted in hadiths narrated by a relatively small 
number of people (āḥād), and thus it is not permissible to attest to their veracity (lā tasa‘u l-
shahāda la-hu).339 Despite this statement, however, rejecting the Ascension does not seem to 
have been so popular in Transoxania, at least not during al-Māturīdī’s lifetime. His contemporary 
al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī declares in his famous creed that anyone who rejects the Ascension and 
the verses of the Quran pertaining to it is an infidel, while one who accepts these verses and the 
Prophet’s voyage to Jerusalem, but rejects the Ascension or remains undecided over whether it 
occurred or not, is a heretic (mubtadi‘).340 This may be why Abū l-Yusr later affirms the orthodox 
view: “The Ascension (mi‘rāj) is real. The Prophet was made to ascend in the heavens (fī-l-
samāwāt) to the place that God intended [him to ascend to], as narrated in the hadiths.”341 Of 
course, that he expresses conflicting opinions on this issue in the same book is strange; it may be 
that the rationalist and traditionalist positions are both appealing to him and he is wavering 
between the two.342 In any case, both views are effective for refuting the Karrāmite argument 
since neither concedes that the Prophet journeyed beyond the Throne. 
 
336 I.e., the later Karrāmites. 
337 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 42. 
338 al-Nasafī, Baḥr al-kalām, 206; van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 4, 596; van Ess, Theology and Society, 
vol. 4, 663. 
339 al-Māturīdī, Ta’wīlāt al-Qur’ān, vol. 8, 224. 
340 Abū l-Qāsim Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī, al-Sawād al-a‘ẓam fī l-kalām ([Istanbul]: 
Maṭba‘at Ibrāhīm, n.d.), 14. 
341 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 252.  
342 This discrepancy could perhaps be explained by Abū l-Yusr’s reference to the Ascension with i‘rāj in his first set 
of comments and mi‘rāj in the second set if he had intended with these terms precisely the meanings al-Sālimī 
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The fifth Karrāmite proof is that all Muslims raise up their hands toward heaven when 
they request something from God. Abū l-Yusr denies what the Karrāmites see as the implication 
of this act by substituting God’s mercy for Himself. People raise their hands upward, he explains, 
because heaven is the place of descent of God’s mercy; the command to supplicate in this 
manner, just like the command to face the Ka‘ba during prayer, is thus merely for the purpose of 
worship (ta‘abbudan). Although Abū l-Yusr thus seems to anthropomorphize mercy in place of 
God, which he indeed regards as one of God’s eternal attributes,343 at least on a purely linguistic 
level, he again refutes the idea that God Himself is elevated.  
The sixth and final Karrāmite proof is, in contrast to the preceding proofs, a rational 
argument. It contends that God must have created the world in some direction from Himself (fī 
jiha min jihātihi), and creating it in a direction below Him is wiser; thus, He must be in the 
upwards direction (fī jihat al-‘uluww). Abū l-Yusr rebuts that a direction is a side of a place 
(jānib mina l-makān), whereas neither is God in a place nor did He create the world in a place. 
Therefore, what the argument asserts is impossible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
assigns them. He defines the mi‘rāj as the Prophet’s journey from the earth to the seventh heaven and the i‘rāj as his 
journey from the seventh heaven to the Throne. Somewhat differently, Abū l-Yusr speaks of the mi‘rāj “in the 
heavens” and the i‘rāj “to heaven”. See al-Sālimī, Kitāb al-Tamhīd, 233. 
343 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 76. 
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Conclusion 
Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī was an important Māturīdite theologian of the fifth/eleventh 
century. He lived at a time of transition for Eastern Ḥanafite theology in which the rationalist 
kalām method introduced by al-Māturīdī was gaining dominance over the traditionalist method 
applied by scholars such as Abū Muṭī‘ al-Balkhī and al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī. His contribution 
to this transition is well illustrated by his discussion of the divine attributes. Like al-Māturīdī, he 
not only affirmed important tenets about God’s nature through reference to scripture and other 
forms of tradition, but also sought to prove them with rational arguments. According to his own 
testimony, this was not a simple task, for kalām was not yet popular in his immediate intellectual 
and social environment; a scholar of his region who pursued the science risked exposing himself 
to the disapproval and sanctions of many of his fellow Ḥanafites. In this context, his efforts are 
all the more impressive.  
Abū l-Yusr was clearly motivated to engage in kalām by a desire to combat what he 
perceived to be heresy. He considered most heresies concerning the divine attributes to be 
propagated by the Mu‘tazilites. Most significantly, he opposed their identification of the divine 
attributes with the divine essence, insisting that the attributes are eternal entities subsisting in 
God’s essence, neither wholly identical nor different from it. He made rational arguments for his 
case, such as those based on unseen-seen analogy (qiyās al-ghā’ib ‘alā l-shāhid), and cited 
references in the Quran to attributes with nouns, such as knowledge and might. He also dismissed 
Ḍirār’s apophatic approach, explaining that God’s attributes are known through both revelation 
and reason. 
Abū l-Yusr equally rejected the Mu‘tazilite belief in the createdness of divine speech. He 
asserted that God truly speaks through an eternal attribute of speech, providing a definition of the 
attribute that allowed it to be ascribed to Him literally. But he recognized the created elements of 
scripture that the Mu‘tazilites adduced to support their view and managed to incorporate them 
into his theory of the manẓūm whereby scripture, although basically created, retains an essential 
connection to God’s eternal speech. Nonetheless, he tolerated the designation of the Quran as 
uncreated and sympathized with those who maintained the uncreatedness of its letters and 
utterance while recognizing the falseness of these opinions, ultimately concerned about 
preserving the transcendence of divine speech. Furthermore, he held that even though scripture is 
indicative rather than constitutive of divine speech, it is in virtue of it that one truly writes, 
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memorizes, recites, and hears God’s speech. In the case of hearing, he proposed a kind of divine 
intervention in which God causes his own speech and that of the reciter to be heard 
simultaneously, and argued that Moses heard God’s eternal speech directly, without the mediums 
of sounds and letters; with the first view he opposed all of his fellow early Māturīdites and with 
the second al-Māturīdī himself. 
Abū l-Yusr’s discussion of God’s hearing and vision was much briefer. Against the 
Baghdad Mu‘tazilite doctrine that God is hearing and seeing in the sense that He is knowing 
about all audible and visible things, he affirmed that God is truly hearing and seeing as indicated 
in the Quran. He justified his contention by arguing that eyes and ears and the processes 
associated with them that make hearing and vision possible in this world are not conditions for 
their occurrence. He did not, however, elaborate the nature of these two attributes, essentially 
applying the “without [speculating] how” (bi-lā kayfa) approach.  
With respect to divine will, Abū l-Yusr aligned himself with a majority of Ḥanafites 
against the revered leader of the school, Abū Ḥanīfa. The majority, citing the Quran, considered 
both mashī’a and irāda to mean “will”, while Abū Ḥanīfa, basing himself on their usage in 
ordinary language, understood mashī’a as “will” and irāda as “desire”. Yet this disagreement did 
not detract from Abū l-Yusr’s respect for the school master as indicated, for instance, by his 
continual employment of both mashī’a and irāda throughout his chapter on the attribute. He was 
more concerned about proving the existence of an eternal attribute of will and thereby refuting 
errant ideas about the attribute espoused by non-Ḥanafites, including the Baghdad Mu‘tazilite 
belief that God is not willing; the conviction of some Basran Mu‘tazilites that God is willing 
through a temporally originated will subsisting nowhere; and al-Najjār’s view that God is willing 
via His essence. 
As the subject shifted to the attributes of act, so did Abū l-Yusr’s opposition change. He 
now stood at odds not only with a majority of Mu‘tazilites, but also the Ash‘arites, both of whom 
denied the existence of attributes of act, whether as aspects of the divine essence or entities 
subsisting therein. Abū l-Yusr noted the intensity of the debate as it occurred between his party 
and the Ash‘arites but made no concessions. He defended the Ḥanafite belief in eternal attributes 
of act with arguments based on scripture, the unseen-seen analogy, necessary proofs, and even al-
Māturīdī’s primacy. 
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The anthropomorphic expressions shifted the focus from God’s unity to His 
transcendence. Abū l-Yusr produced an extensive list of opponents whom he accused of holding 
anthropomorphic ideas about God. He refuted their ideas by demonstrating on mainly rational 
grounds that God is incomparable to His creation and incorporeal before turning to the 
anthropomorphic expressions. He interpreted God’s “coming”, “sitting”, and “descending” 
figuratively by reading “God” as “God’s effects” and furnishing definitions of the verbs that 
preclude locomotion as a necessary component, while classing the hand and eye attributed to God 
in the Quran as special attributes. Several aspects of his discussion reveal his closeness to the 
Mu‘tazilite approach to anthropomorphism, such as his understanding of istawā as istawlā and 
reference to ordinary usage of the problematic terms to justify his definitions of them. He also 
drew nearer to the Mu‘tazilites in his refutation of the later Karrāmite view that God is “elevated” 
with his rejection of the reality of the Ascension, despite affirming it later on in the book. 
Although Abū l-Yusr acknowledged al-Māturīdī’s accomplishments and embraced the 
kalām method he introduced, he opposed him on several theological issues. I mentioned some of 
these in Chapter 1, and we may now add his belief that Moses heard God’s speech without 
sounds and letters and that the hand and eye ascribed to God are attributes. His readiness to 
depart from al-Māturīdī’s views shows that his contribution to the Māturīdite discourse on the 
divine attributes is unique, developed through personal reflection on the problems raised by the 
topic and influenced by certain tendencies and tensions in his immediate environment and 
thought. As such, his discourse demonstrates the value of studying the ideas of the early 
Māturīdites as they negotiated and shaped the dynamic theological tradition to which they 
belonged, consequently producing their own interpretations of it. 
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Appendix 
A Translation of Chapter 19 of Uṣūl al-dīn: “God is Eternal with His Speech”344 
The Sunnites say, “God speaks with a speech and He is eternal with His speech, just as 
He is eternal with all of His attributes. His speech is in no way created (makhlūq, mukhtalaq, 
muḥdath) or temporally originated (ḥādith).” 
The Mu‘tazilites, Khārijites, Murji’ites, Shī‘ites (rawāfiḍ), and Jabbārites, including Jahm 
[b. Ṣafwān] and Bishr al-Marīsī, say, “God’s speech is created.” However, they disagree over 
whether it is a body (jism) or accident (‘araḍ). Some of them say that it is a body, while others 
say that it is an accident that subsists in God or the Preserved Tablet (al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ).When 
they attempt to explain their doctrine, they are at a loss to do so, and this is why they disagree.  
The Karrāmites, including Muḥammad b. Hayṣam, say, “God’s speech (kalām) is eternal, 
but the [divine] utterance (qawl) is temporally originated, uncreated, and subsistent in God.” By 
“speech”, they mean the capacity to speak. Therefore, the real purport of their doctrine is that 
God’s speech is temporally originated since one who is capable of speaking is not [necessarily] 
speaking, and the capacity to speak is not speech, just as the capacity to move is not movement.  
Hishām b. al-Ḥakam says, “God possesses speech, but I do not say that it is created or 
uncreated.” It is narrated that Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Balkhī and ‘Abdallāh b. al-Mubārak [also] held 
this [view], and it is the doctrine of some traditionists (ahl al-ḥadīth). They say, “There is no 
need to declare whether it is created or uncreated.” This is a momentous, delicate question that 
the early and later scholars (al-mutaqaddimūna wa-l-muta’akhkhirūna) discussed, and the 
Rightly Guided Caliphs joined in [the debate] over it. The caliph al-Ma’mūn affirmed the 
creation of the Quran and forced people to affirm so [as well]. The caliph al-Wāthiq bi-llāh 
[likewise] affirmed its creation and compelled people [to affirm so]. It is narrated that the caliph 
al-Ma’mūn retreated from his view because of a debate that took place in his presence between 
Muḥammad b. Muqātil al-Rāzī and Bishr al-Marīsī. Bishr al-Marīsī was defeated, so al-Ma’mūn 
ordered his crucifixion and al-Marīsī was crucified on a beam. Thus, they say, “This is an 
indication of retreat because the debate that occurred between the two concerned the creation of 
the Quran, God’s speech.”345 
 
344 al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl, 62-75; al-Bazdawī, Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn, 53-69. 
345 As Linss points out, the historicity of this event is doubtful since the doctrine of the Quran’s creation was 
endorsed by the state. Moreover, in al-Ma’mūn’s political testament, incomplete upon his death in Rajab 218/August 
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According to the Sunnites, speech is that which muteness and silence lack.346 Some of 
them add [to this], saying, “It both precludes muteness and silence and is heard (masmū‘).” And 
some of them say, “It is heard and understood, and muteness and silence lack it.” 
According to those who affirm the creation of the Quran, speech consists of arranged 
letters (ḥurūf manẓūma) and sounds articulated in a particular manner (aṣwāt muqaṭṭa‘a bi-taqṭī‘ 
khāṣṣ). They argue, “In the visible world (al-shāhid), we find [speech to be] like this; thus it is 
[with speech] in the unseen world (al-ghā’ib).” However, in the view of the Mu‘tazilites and 
Jabbārites, this speech does not subsist in God; rather, it subsists in the Preserved Tablet or a 
speaker. In the view of the Murji’ites, [in contrast], it subsists in God. 
The Karrāmites likewise believe that God’s speech is temporally originated, consists of 
arranged letters and sounds articulated in a particular manner, and subsists in God. 
The Sunnites say, “Speech is that which is preclusive of muteness and silence and is heard 
and understood.” No one can argue, “Sometimes a man hears speech and doesn’t understand it,” 
because it is comprehensible, even if that man cannot grasp it, just as speech is audible even if 
some people do not hear it themselves. What the Mu‘tazilites and others propose as a definition 
[of speech] is false and baseless because the arrangement of letters is inconceivable since letters 
are in fact various sounds. [The letter] “kāf” is a sound that occurs in the uvula, “ḥā’” is a sound 
that occurs in the throat, and “bā’” is a sound that occurs on the lip. It is for the reason that 
“letter” (ḥarf) means “side” (jānib) and these letters (ḥurūf) become letters through their 
occurrence on the sides (ḥurūf) of the mouth as sound that they are called “letters” (ḥurūf), while 
God creates sounds, as He does all temporal beings, and they are accidents, the permanence of 
which is inconceivable and thus also their being arranged. Just so, one cannot conceive of the 
articulation of sounds, because they are accidents and only bodies can be articulated, while, [as 
just explained], letters are [not bodies but] in fact sounds [and thus also cannot be articulated]. 
Therefore, their concept of “arranged letters and articulated sounds” is wrong. [As for] their 
phrase, “in a particular manner that is impossible to explain,” without [explaining] this, the 
definition is not valid for the sounds of a trumpet and thunder [could then also be considered] 
 
833, he encourages the continuation of his politico-religious work. According to Linss, Bishr’s debate partner was in 
fact ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Kinānī al-Malikī (d. 235/849). See Linss, Der Probleme, 10-1 and 11n16; EI², s.v. “al-Ma’mūn 
b. Hārūn al-Rashīd.” 
346 al-kalām mā yanbaghī bi-hi l-kharas wa-l-sukūt. See note 154 in Chapter 3 for alternative renditions of this 
phrase. 
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arranged letters and articulated sounds. Furthermore, defining something while declaring that part 
of it is unknowable is extremely absurd because the purpose of a definition is to make something 
known (lil-i‘lām), while [trying to] make something unknown known on the basis of an unknown 
element is futile and doesn’t make anything known; indeed, it is utterly stupid. 
If they say, “In the visible world, only sound is heard,” we respond: that is not so. Rather, 
both sound and speech are heard.  
If they assert, “Speech does not exist without sound,” we counter that neither sound nor a 
special structure (al-bunya al-makhṣūṣa) are required for speech to exist. Rather, the condition 
for speech is the existence of a permanent essence. In addition, if speech is volitional, life is 
necessary; if it is not volitional, life is not necessary. 
[Concerning] what has been related about the speech of inanimate beings (jamādāt), if it 
is volitional, then God has created life in them; if it is not volitional, it is possible that it exists 
without life because life is a condition [only] for volition. As for sound and a special structure, 
they are not conditions for the existence of speech. The same [scenario] applies to all attributes. 
Knowledge does not require the existence of a brain, heart, or special structure; rather, it requires 
the existence of a permanent essence and life, even though in the visible world, knowledge is 
only found in beings with hearts, brains, and special structures. Thus we say that God is knowing 
even though He does not possess these instruments (ālāt), which occur in the visible world only 
incidentally (ittifāqan) and not as conditions [for the existence of attributes]. It is so simply 
because God made it the custom of things (ajrā l-‘āda); that is, that a human being acts only 
through an instrument and tool (adāt). This is how things are. Thus, if they [the Mu‘tazilites and 
others] maintain their definition of speech, it cannot be applied to God, and so, for them, He does 
not literally speak; rather, He is considered a speaker in a metaphorical sense by being the creator 
and existentiator (mūjid) of speech in what is other than Him. Therefore, [for them], He is called 
a speaker in the same way as one who orders someone else to build is called a builder. 
According to the Karrāmites, God truly speaks in a temporal speech subsisting in Him. 
They [thus] make possible the temporal origination of things in God. 
The sophism of the Mu‘tazilites as well as the Jabbārites among the Jahmites and 
Marīsites regarding this issue is the same as that regarding the issue of the [divine] attributes, 
which we refuted in [our discussion of] that issue. 
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A sophism specifically pertaining to this issue is as follows: “The Quran possesses a 
beginning, end, and parts, which are the marks of a created thing. In the same way, some parts of 
it are abrogated by others and it was sent down from the Tablet to the worldly heaven, which is 
also conceivable only for a created thing. And it consists of letters, some Arabic and some 
Hebrew, which are likewise attributes of created things. And finally, it is written, read, 
memorized, heard, conveyed from one place to another, and erased after being written, which are, 
again, attributes of created things. Indeed, God says, ‘We made it an Arabic Quran,’ (Q 43:3); 
and ‘There comes not to them a created revelation (dhikr muḥdath)347 from their Lord,’ (Q 21:2). 
He thus called it a created revelation and mentioned that He made a Quran, while ‘making’ (ju‘l) 
is, semantically, creation and existentiation. He also says, ‘In it are clear verses,’ (Q 3:97), and 
that ‘they are the foundation of the Book, while others are ambiguous,’ (Q 3:7); ambiguity is a 
mark of createdness.” 
The Karrāmites and Ḥanbalites say, “It [the Quran] is uncreated,” but add, “It is 
temporally originated.” This is more evil than the belief in [it being] a created thing, for while 
temporal origination through creation is conceivable, it is impossible without it. Their sophism [is 
as follows]: “[It is impossible that] God commanded Moses, ‘Throw down your cane!’ (Q 27:10) 
when Moses and the cane did not exist, or that He said, ‘Adam disobeyed his Lord,’ (Q 20:121) 
when Adam and disobedience did not exist. [Indeed], He would have had to command Moses 
after He created him and gave him the cane so that the cane was in his hand; and likewise, He 
would have had to say to Adam, ‘Adam disobeyed his Lord,’ after He created him. These are 
therefore instances of temporal origination of speech from Him, though He is pre-eternally 
capable of speaking.” 
The proof adduced by Sunnites is God’s statement, “Indeed, Our word to a thing when 
We will it (that is, when We will its existence) is that We say to it, ‘Be!’ and it is,” (Q 16:40). In 
this verse, God informs us that He creates things with His word, namely, “Be”. Thus, if His word 
was created, it would had to have been created with another word, and that [word] with another 
[word], endlessly, with the result that nothing at all would ever have been created. Therefore, this 
verse demonstrates to us that His speech is uncreated.  
 
347 Dhikr muḥdath translated as such to reflect Mu‘tazilite belief. More common translations include “new 
revelation” and “reminder”. 
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If they say, “This [expression] signifies the rapidity of creation for things are created by 
God’s act of creation, not by His speech. Furthermore, His speech is not pre-eternal, because by 
saying, ‘Indeed, Our word to a thing when We will it is but that We say to it, “Be!” and it is’ (that 
is, once We will the existence of a thing, We [then] say to it, “Be!” and it is), God confirms that 
His speech (qawl) follows His will. 
Then we respond: according to you, things are not created through God’s act of creation 
since, in your view, the act of creation is identical with the created being, not different from it. 
Therefore, this verse is a proof against you because God informs us that He creates things with 
His word “Be”, which is truly a [distinct] existent thing. [In contrast], we hold that He creates 
temporal things with His word as well as His act (fi‘l), and He is truly the creator.348 
And [to] their statement, “This [expression] signifies the rapidity of creation,” [we 
respond]: yes, indeed, but [creation occurs] through speech. [As for] their claim that this 
[expression] indicates that speech and the word [“Be”] follow will, we respond: neither God’s 
will nor His speech is temporally originated; therefore, the occurrence of one before the other is 
inconceivable. Furthermore, neither is separate from the other (laysā bi-ghayrayn);349 thus, the 
precedence of one of them is inconceivable. 
The rational proof for this question is that God attributes speech to Himself [by] saying, 
“God addressed Moses directly,” (Q 4:164); and, “He was called by a voice from a tree in a 
blessed spot, on the right side of the valley, ‘O Moses, I am God, Lord of the Universe’,” (Q 
28:30). His speech must thus be temporally originated or created, whether subsisting in Him or 
not; or not temporally originated or created, but, rather, pre-eternal; or God speaks with a speech 
He created in what is other than Him. 
It is impossible that God speaks with a speech He created in that which is other than Him 
while it also subsists in Him, for the reason that it is impossible for God to be qualified with an 
attribute subsisting in what is other than Him. Indeed, every attribute subsists in a being, and that 
being is qualified with it, not [with] something else. For instance, when God creates movement in 
a being, that being is qualified with movement, not God; and likewise [for] the attributes of white 
and black. Therefore, [the notion] that He speaks with a temporally originated speech subsisting 
 
348 The last sentence is only found in the 1963 edition. See al-Bazdawī, Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn, 58. 
349 I.e., they both eternally subsist in God’s essence. 
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in what is other than Him is incorrect, and it is not possible that He speaks with a temporally 
originated or created speech subsisting in Him. 
According to the Mu‘tazilites and Jahmites, speech does not subsist in Him, because, in 
their view, God is not a substrate for temporal beings. As for the opinion of the Karrāmites that 
God is indeed a substrate for temporal beings, it is wrong because, as we have explained, change 
is inconceivable for the Eternal (al-qadīm) since He is necessarily existent (wājib al-wujūd) with 
His attributes at every instant, which indicates that His speech is pre-eternal (azalī). What they 
say cannot be accepted also because origination in time without an act of creation is impossible. 
And finally, since they do not say that it [His speech] is created, it must be pre-eternal and not 
temporally originated.  
If they say, “In our view, God speaks in a metaphorical sense through His creation of 
speech in what is other than Him, it being impossible that He [truly] speaks since speech consists 
of arranged letters and sounds articulated in a particular manner, which is only conceivable in a 
body, while God is not a body.” 
We respond: God attributes speech to Himself in many verses. It is among the attributes 
of praise (ṣifāt al-madḥ), and He is truly the Praised One (al-mamdūḥ); thus, the affirmation [that 
He truly speaks] is obligatory. This belief is lent further weight by the fact that, as we have 
explained, speech is heard, understood, and preclusive of muteness and silence; [attributing] this 
to God is valid. This is the response to their statement, “He is called a speaker in a metaphorical 
sense.” Since it is possible to attribute speech to God literally, it is not to be attributed to Him in a 
metaphorical sense.  
The proof that He necessarily speaks [in a literal sense] is that He commands, prohibits, 
informs, and inquires; these acts are only conceivable for an [actual] speaker. And because a 
being’s lack of speech is a deficiency, that being associated with muteness, silence, or 
ignorance…350 There is no doubt [that this is true] in regard to muteness and ignorance. And the 
same is true for constant silence since it is a deficiency in the visible world, where one is silent 
due to an inability to speak or ineptitude, and because silence contradicts His being commanding, 
prohibiting, and informing. 
 
350 Gap in the text. 
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As for the sophism of the Mu‘tazilites, Jahmites, Marīsites, and others who believe in the 
creation of God’s speech, escaping it is easy. Indeed, they [the Sunnites] composed a book for the 
purpose of doing so, but here we [only] relate a bit from it to refute their sophism. 
[To] their remark, “God’s speech possesses chapters and number (‘adad) as well as an 
end, a beginning and parts.” 
We respond: God’s speech, like the speech of every speaker, subsists in His essence. Any 
chapter [of scripture] that has an end, beginning, number, and parts is not truly God’s speech, but 
rather a composition (manẓūm) composed by God that is indicative of (dāllan ‘alā) God’s 
speech, just like Imru’ al-Qays’ composition, “Tarry, my two companions, and let us weep for 
the memory of a beloved and a place, at the sand-dune’s edge, between al-Dakhūl and 
Ḥawmal.”351 Imru’ al-Qays’ composition is indicative of [his] speech, though it is not [actually] 
his speech. In the same way, the sermon of every preacher and the message of every messenger 
are compositions indicative of their speech, though not their speech itself. This is how things are. 
What subsists in God is one thing without a part, number, end, and beginning; indeed, God is 
eternal and permanent with His speech.  
If they ask, “What is this Composition?”352 We say: we have no need to explain it, though 
we have already made clear that it is a composition composed by God. His composition of it is 
His action, and, in the view of the Sunnites, He is eternal with His actions, as we will later 
demonstrate. 
If they ask, “Is this Composition created or uncreated?” We say: what is other than God is 
created. This is other than God since it is not God’s attribute; thus, it is created.  
If they ask, “Where did He create it?” We say: it is not necessary to explain that, though it 
is possible that He created it in the Tablet or in an angel. This Composition is called the “Book of 
God” and it is called the “Quran”. It is not God’s speech but rather indicative of His speech, [for 
which reason] it is termed “God’s speech” in a metaphorical sense.353 
According to the Sunnites, the speech of a human being subsists in his essence, and it is 
heard, understood, and preclusive of muteness and silence.  
 
351 Translated by Roger Allen in his An Introduction to Arabic Literature (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 103. “Imru’ al-Qays” was a nickname for several Arab poets (up to twenty-five, according to Ḥ. 
Sandūbī). See EI², s.v. “Imru’ al-Kays.” 
352 Henceforth, I refer to the scriptural composition as “Composition”. 
353 The translation of this paragraph is partly based on the more complete version of it in the 1963 edition. See al-
Bazdawī, Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn, 61. 
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Ibn al-Rāwandī says, “The speech of a human being is what subsists in his heart. What he 
says with his tongue is an expression of speech but not speech itself; it is [thus] called speech in a 
metaphorical sense.” This is [also] the view of some Ash‘arites, who relate it from Abū l-Ḥasan 
al-Ash‘arī. It is manifestly wrong; there is no need to explain its wrongness for it qualifies human 
beings with that which is the opposite of speech when it posits [the existence of] a thing in the 
heart, which is [actually] silence. Indeed, it is said [of someone who is not speaking that he is] 
“silent”, which indicates that silence is not speech.  
As for abrogation, it applies to legal rules (ḥukm); that is, the legal rules of God, who 
legislates them with His speech, are abrogated, not [His] speech itself. Abrogation is the 
specification of the duration of a legal rule, as we explained in Principles of Jurisprudence (Uṣūl 
al-fiqh), and God rules (yaḥkumu) whatever He wants at any moment. Abrogation applies to the 
Composition itself,354 and it is the effacement of the memory of the recitation [of some part of the 
Quran] from one’s mind (raf‘ ḥifẓ al-tilāwa ‘an qulūb al-‘ibād), such as what has been narrated 
by ‘Umar, “Among that which was recited in the Book of God is, ‘When a married man and 
married woman commit adultery, stone the two of them as an exemplary punishment (nakālan) 
from God. God is Mighty and Wise’.” As for God’s speech [itself], it is impossible for it to be 
abrogated. 
As for the descent (inzāl) from the Preserved Tablet to the worldly heaven, and from there 
to the earth, it also pertains to this Composition. God says, “Ḥā-mīm. By the Clear Book. Verily, 
We sent it down (anzalnāhu) on a blessed night,” (Q 44:1-3). He caused the Book to be “sent 
down” (munzal), and “The Book” (al-kitāb) is a name for this Composition since “book” is a 
name for something written and the Composition is something written. So the term “descent” 
(inzāl) is applied to God’s speech in virtue of the descent of the Composition indicative of it, 
[similar to how] when a minister delivers a ruler’s message from the citadel, it is said that he 
“sends (anzala) it down”. 
As for letters, they are not [components of] God’s speech, since even human speech, as 
we have explained, is not marked by letters; so how could God’s speech contain them? Rather, 
letters belong to the Composition in the sense that it is written and recited with letters. They are 
created, in the view of the majority of rational people (‘uqalā’), except a traditionist group (qawm 
min ahl al-ḥadīth) and a group of Sufis, who claim that they are not. However, they claim [this] 
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due to insufficient reflection, fleeing from the doctrine of the creation of God’s speech and 
preventing the common people from [adopting] it. Indeed, the common people [would] hardly [be 
able to] distinguish between letters and God’s speech. Nonetheless, their view is totally wrong 
and it is forbidden to espouse it. It is necessary to indoctrinate (yujri) the common people to 
regard the letters as created, or if they cannot distinguish between speech and letters, uncreated; 
and they must be ordered to believe that God’s speech is uncreated.  
The proof that the letters [of scriptures] are created is that letters are in fact the sides of 
the mouth (jawānib al-fam), and the sounds that occur on these sides are [also] called letters, 
while both the sides of the mouth and sounds are created. Furthermore, what is written on paper 
is called letters because it is indicative of those letters [that occur on the sides of the mouth], 
while the ink [used to write letters] is fabricated and created. Arabic and Hebrew are also 
attributes of the Composition, and not of God’s speech. God’s speech is neither in Arabic nor 
Hebrew, since they are languages, and God’s speech is not in any language. Rather, the 
Composition that is indicative of God’s speech in Arabic is the Quran, while the Torah in 
Hebrew is [also] a Composition.  
As for conveyance from place to place, it also pertains to the Composition, not God’s 
speech. 
[To] their statement, “[It is created because] it is written, memorized, read, and heard,” we 
respond: God’s speech is indeed written in our books (maṣāḥif), memorized in our hearts, heard 
with our ears, [and] recited with our tongues, [but it] does not inhere in any of these entities; 
rather, it subsists in the essence of the Almighty Creator. We say likewise about human speech 
that it is written on paper, recited with the tongue, memorized in the heart, and heard with ears, 
[but it does not inhere in any of these entities, instead subsisting in the speaker]. 
Writing speech means writing what is indicative of speech so that speech becomes written 
through the writing of it and…355 God’s speech, and writing this Composition is writing God’s 
speech. Thus, God’s speech becomes written through the writing of this Composition, not 
metaphorically, but truly, for the writing of speech can only be [accomplished] in this way, even 
though speech subsists in the essence of the speaker [and] does not disjoin from it.  
As for the memorization of speech, it consists of memorizing what is indicative of speech, 
namely, a composition; thus, in memorizing it, one is memorizing speech. It is said, “So-and-so 
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memorizes the speech of so-and-so,” when he memorizes his poetry that he composed. Thus, one 
who memorizes this Composition that God composed becomes through his memorization a 
memorizer of God’s speech. This, also, in a true and not metaphorical sense for this is what the 
memorization of speech is.  
As for the recitation of speech, it is also the recitation of that which is indicative of 
speech, namely, the composition that the speaker composed; in reciting it, one becomes a reciter 
of his speech. It is said, “So-and-so recited and read the speech of so-and-so,” when he [recited 
and] read his composition indicative of his speech. Thus, one who recites this Composition 
indicative of God’s speech becomes a reciter of God’s speech. This, also, in a true and not 
metaphorical sense because the recitation of speech is like this.  
As for hearing speech without the presence of the speaker, it is also hearing the 
composition indicative of speech. When one listens to a man’s poetry and his sermon without the 
speaker being present, people say, “He heard the speech of so-and-so from so-and-so.” When he 
hears from a reciter God’s composition indicative of His speech, namely, the Quran, he hears 
God’s speech. This, [also], in a true and not metaphorical sense because there is no way but this 
to hear speech without the speaker.  
As for Moses, he heard God’s speech from God [directly], without the intermediary of the 
speech of a speaker other than Him [and] without sound and letter. Indeed, as we have explained, 
God caused Moses to hear His self-subsistent speech through the subtlety of His craftsmanship 
(ṣan‘) and perfection of His ability, and Moses heard and understood it. 
If they say, “God called Moses, namely, ‘O Moses,’ and His call required sound. 
[Indeed], God [explicitly] says, ‘He was called, “O Moses,”’ (Q 20:11).” 
Then we respond: a call is a type of speech. Speech does not require sound. Sound is 
accessory to it as speech is not marked by sound; rather, it is marked by a speaker because there 
is nothing in sound to be heard. Speech is heard, whether it is accompanied by sound or not.  
If they say, “[There are] indications in the Book of God that Moses heard sound. God 
says, ‘He was called by a voice from a tree in a blessed spot, on the right side of the valley, “O 
Moses,”’ (Q 28:30). The call from the tree could not have occurred unless He created sound in 
the tree, which Moses then heard. 
We respond: it was not like that. If it had been like that, the tree would have been the 
speaker, not God, because the speech would have subsisted in the tree, not God, whereas God 
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states that He was the speaker; so this [objection] is not valid. [As for] His remark, “He was 
called from the right side of the valley,” it means—and God knows best—that God caused Moses 
to hear His speech while Moses was on the right side of the valley near the tree. It was thus as if 
he heard [God’s speech] from the tree on the right side [of the valley] because of his nearness to 
it. 
Some Sunnites say, “It is possible that God causes His speech to be heard during the 
[Quran] reciter’s recitation, so that one simultaneously witnesses God’s speech and that of the 
reciter. [This is] because God’s speech is permanent, so it is possible for it to be heard during the 
reciter’s recitation.” This is one of al-Ash‘arī’s two views, [which] contrasts with [his view 
about] Moses, [namely], that he heard God’s speech without the intermediary of human speech, 
whereas we hear with the intermediary of human speech. Thus, a disagreement arises between us 
and him. In this [second view], the speech of a human being differs from God’s speech for, 
according to this view, when the speech of a human being is heard (sumi‘a) from someone else, it 
is not [truly] heard (lā yusma‘u); but, according to the first view, it is heard because human 
speech is an accident and thus does not last.  
The majority of Sunnites hold the first view because it is plainer and more appealing. We 
say the same about the entire Quran, [namely], that it constitutes a Composition, not God’s 
speech, [and yet God’s speech is experienced through it]. 
[When] scholars say that Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq and ‘Uthmān compiled (jami‘a) the Quran, 
they do not mean that Abū Bakr and ‘Uthmān devised the arrangement [of the Quran] or 
compiled [its] chapters, because the Quran is God’s Composition and [its] chapters are His 
compilation. Gabriel transmitted the verses and chapters to the Messenger of God and explained 
to him that this verse belongs to that chapter and this chapter follows that. The verses and 
chapters, however, were dictated by people in various manners, so Abū Bakr gathered them 
together in a book (maṣḥaf) after the Prophet’s death. It is well known that ‘Uthmān then ordered 
the writing of copies of the Quran (maṣāḥif), compared them with the copy that Abū Bakr put 
together, and sent them to distant lands. The Quran occurs in (yaqa‘u ‘alā) reading, recitation, 
and this Composition, and it occurs as God’s speech. [With respect to it], we say, “To read 
(qara’a), he reads (yaqra’u), reading (Qur’ān), and recitation (qirā’a).” This being the case, it is 
not proper for anyone to say that the Quran is uncreated. Rather, what one must say is, “The 
Quran is God’s speech, and God’s speech is uncreated.” [But] if one says in an absolute sense 
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(muṭlaqan), ‘The Quran is uncreated,’ that is fine and harmless, even though the reading, 
recitation, and utterance of the Quran are created, because the absolute sense (al-muṭlaq) 
ultimately pertains to God’s speech. 
Some traditionists (aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth) and jurists state, “We do not say that the utterance of 
the Quran is created,” [and indeed] do not permit the application of the term “created” (makhlūq) 
to the recitation and utterance of the Quran. However, they forbid this because the common 
people would not [be able to] distinguish between an utterance (lafẓ) and the referent of an 
utterance (al-malfūẓ). [In other words], they take this approach so people will not come to believe 
in the creation of God’s speech. But it is undeniable that an utterance is created for human acts 
are created by God. It must not be thought that this is difficult for them [to understand]; rather, 
their intention may be what we mentioned.  
[As for] God’s statement, “We made it an Arabic Quran,” (Q 43:3) it refers to this 
Composition, not to God’s speech. In the same way, “There comes not to them a created 
revelation from their Lord,” (Q 21:3) refers to the Composition, not God’s speech, or it refers to 
legal rulings (aḥkām). And His remark, “In it are clear verses—they are the foundation of the 
Book—and others are ambiguous,” (Q 3:7) also refers to the Composition, not to His speech. 
As for [what] the Karrāmites’ sophism [posits], [it is] impossible because origination in 
time without an act of creation is impossible. [Furthermore], God’s essence is not a substrate for 
temporal beings, because, [if it were], He would change with the temporal beings when they 
inhered in Him, while it is impossible for the Eternal to undergo change. As for their argument, 
“[It is impossible that] God commanded Moses, ‘Throw down your cane!’” (Q 7:117) when 
Moses and the cane did not exist,” we respond: some Sunnites claim, “God speaks with an eternal 
speech for He is eternal with His speech and His speech is single. With [this] single speech, He 
speaks with people at various times, and He also speaks and there is no beginning and end to His 
speech. He commanded Moses with His pre-eternal speech after He created him, “Throw down 
your cane!” (Q 27:10). 
If they ask, “How could that be?” We reply: there is no “howness” (kayfiyya) to His 
speech, just as there is no howness to His essence. Inquiring about the howness of that which has 
no howness is impossible. 
If they say, “Speech consists of informing, inquiring, and commanding. God’s informing 
is His statement, ‘Adam disobeyed his Lord, so he went astray,’ (Q 20:121); His commanding is 
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His order to Moses, ‘Throw down your cane!’ (Q 27:10); and His inquiring, ‘What is that in your 
right hand, O Moses?’ (Q 20:17). Therefore, how did [God’s] speech not originate in time while 
[His] informing, inquiring, and commanding did? It is impossible that He informed us about 
Adam’s disobedience when Adam and disobedience did not exist; commanded Moses to throw 
down the cane when Moses and the cane did not exist; [and] asked, ‘What is that in your right 
hand?’ when that hand did not exist.” 
We respond: speech, as we have explained, is that which muteness and silence lack, and it 
is heard and understood. It has been proven that God possesses it, [and] it is forever atemporal 
(lam yazal ghayr ḥādith). Informing, commanding, and inquiring occur through speech. God with 
His eternal and single speech informed [us] that Adam disobeyed [Him]; commanded Moses to 
throw down the cane; and asked Moses, “What is that in your right hand, O Moses?” (Q 20:17). 
Thus, against their view, speech is not [merely] informing, inquiring, and commanding. This is 
the opinion of some Sunnites. 
Some of them say, “Speech consists of informing, inquiring, and commanding. But God 
with His single, eternal speech informs, inquires, and commands in pre-eternity, the future, and 
the present. He informed in pre-eternity that He is the Glorious, Holy, and Lord of the angels and 
Spirit, and bore witness to His oneness; He informed [us] about Adam’s disobedience with His 
pre-eternal speech [in the present when He revealed His scriptures], not in pre-eternity; and He 
[will] speak with the believers in heaven with His pre-eternal speech.” This is also the view of 
some Sunnites. Each of these views is acceptable and good. 
If they say, “By claiming that God is always speaking (mutakallim), do you not then also 
imply that He is always addressing (mukallim)?” 
We respond: some Sunnites do maintain that He is always addressing, just as He is always 
speaking. Al-Ash‘arī maintains this [as well]. 
[However], a group among the Sunnites believes that He is always speaking [but] not 
always addressing; rather, with His eternal speech, He addresses an addressee after his existence. 
Abū Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘īd al-Qaṭṭān affirms this view, and against the view of those 
who claim that God is always addressing, he argues that He addresses people [periodically] by 
establishing a connection [with them] (bi-ṭarīq al-iḍāfa). The majority of Sunnites espouse the 
view that al-Qaṭṭān inclines toward.  
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This [whole] issue [of God’s speech] is among the most delicate of topics. We have set 
forth an exposition of it in accordance with Sunnite doctrine that every judicious, dignified, 
contemplative, and just Sunnite [will] comprehend. 
 
